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Lack of management integration is hindering the Department of Homeland 
Security’s ability to conduct oversight and perform accurate assessments of its mission 
support functions. The DHS Under Secretary of Management and the Department’s 
Management Directorate have been tasked with creating a “unity of effort” aimed at 
integrating the department’s management functions via technology strategies that capture 
data and use it to make informed decisions. This thesis explores these strategies as the 
Department makes strides towards removing itself from the GAO’s classification of DHS 
as “high-risk”—a categorization due in part to DHS’s inability to integrate the disparate 
management information systems in existence during its creation in 2001. 
The author conducted interviews with past and present senior executives in an 
effort to comprehensively explore the various strategies used to accomplish the goal of 
implementing true data-driven decision-making. The result is identification of 
impediments and facilitators associated with the ability to drive enterprise-wide change. 
These findings are then applied against a change management analytical framework, 
Leavitt’s Diamond. Recognizing that change cannot happen in a vacuum, the findings are 
analyzed across the dimensions of Leavitt’s Diamond to determine which strategies are 
most consistently aligned.  
Ultimately, the results of this thesis are considerations for how the Management 
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In God we trust, all others must bring data. 
 
 – KT Waxman1   
  
Certain industries have excelled at collecting data, transforming it into 
information, and then positioning it back into our lives to influence our decision-making 
processes. For example, the retail corporation Target “knew” a teenaged girl was 
pregnant based on her search queries and began sending her baby-related coupons, prior 
to her family being made aware of her situation.2 Google Flu Trends, which in 2008 
began to predict flu outbreaks based on Google users’ search queries, was able to 
demonstrate accuracy comparable to the Center for Disease Control, yet was able to 
release their predictions one to two weeks in advance of the CDC.3 The list of examples 
of how technology and data influences our daily lives can go on and on. However, while 
there are numerous examples of industries using technology to influence our decision-
making processes, there are others that are struggling in their ability to collect data and 
position it for similar purposes. Unfortunately, some of these entities play a critical role 
in maintaining and managing our nation’s safety and security resources.      
Information silos contributed to the inability of U.S. federal agencies in detecting 
and thwarting the September 11, 2011, attacks. The Department of Homeland Security 
was created in the aftermath of these attacks as a means to integrate numerous federal 
agencies responsible for executing missions associated with securing the homeland. 
However, more than a dozen years after the creation of DHS, many of these agencies’ 
information management systems pertaining to mission support and business operations 
                                                 
1 KT Waxman, “Financial and Business Management for the Doctor of Nursing Practice,” Nov. 5, 
2012. Springer Publishing Company, 186. 
2 Kashmir Hill, “How Target Figure Out A Teen Girl Was Pregnant Before Her Father Did,” Feb. 16, 
2012. Forbes.com, http://www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/2012/02/16/how-target-figured-out-a-teen-girl-
was-pregnant-before-her-father-did/.  
3 Christian Stefansen, “Google Flu Trends gets a brand new engine,” Google Research Blog, Oct. 31, 
2014, http://googleresearch.blogspot.com/2014/10/google-flu-trends-gets-brand-new-engine.html   
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remain non-interoperable and un-integrated. In other words, the same tools and 
information we now take for granted to manage our personal lives are not readily 
available to the leaders that manage a multi-billion dollar federal conglomerate that is 
integral to our national security.   
The inability to capture and access management data for decision-making has 
been a known problem area for DHS since its inception. As such, there have been 
numerous attempts using multiple strategies aimed at integrating the department’s 
Components and implementing technologies to capture and provide enterprise data to the 
business leaders of DHS. However, these initiatives have all encountered obstacles – not 
from the technologies themselves, but instead from other factors inherent to the homeland 
security project, including those related to political, interpersonal, legal, and 
procurement. 
In an attempt to partially overcome these silos, DHS Secretary Jeh Johnson issued 
a memo to the leaders across the Department on April 22, 2014, titled “Strengthening 
Departmental Unity of Effort.” This initiative defines the goals of maturing a teenaged 
Department to be “greater than the sum of its parts” and instructs DHS leaders to take 
specific steps to improve planning, programming, budgeting and execution across the 
Department.4 This memo also directed DHS leadership to make several key changes to 
“transparently incorporate DHS Components into unified decision-making processes and 
the analytic efforts that inform decision-making.”5 The Under Secretary of Management, 
the third highest-ranking official within the Department, is tasked with executing the 
“Unity of Effort” initiative. While many in Congress and government see the 
“importance of developing and implementing a systematic approach that emphasizes 
strong management and integrated processes” within DHS, this is not the first attempt at 
pursuing such objectives.6 The previous Secretary, Janet Napolitano, had a similar 
                                                 
4 Jeh C. Johnson, Department of Homeland Security, Strengthening Departmental Unity of Effort 
Washington, DC: April 22, 2014, 1, http://www.hlswatch.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/
DHSUnityOfEffort.pdf.   
5 Ibid. 
6 Stephanie Sanok Kostro, “The Department of Homeland Security Unity of Effort Initiative,” 
Homeland Security and Counterterrorism Program: Center for Strategic & International Studies. April 
2015. http://csis.org/files/publication/150407_Kostro_DHSUnityofEffort.pdf.  
 xvii 
initiative titled “One DHS.”     
To fully understand the challenges associated with implementing “Unity of 
Effort” and the Management Directorate’s ability to position data to drive decision-
making, the origins and missions of the Management Directorate must be first addressed 
and digested. The initial role of the Management Directorate was to “establish a center 
for comprehensive management leadership. The lack of such a focal point is a serious 
omission in most executive departments, resulting in the dispersion of responsibility for 
promoting effective management among numerous second and third-tier officials.”7 
Thus, to gain an understanding of the origins of the Management Directorate and its 
ability to drive enterprise-wide change, interviews with past and present senior-level 
DHS officials were conducted. These interviews revealed that while the Management 
Directorate has been given significant responsibilities, it suffers from a lack of a defined 
identity and faces numerous internal and external obstacles towards influencing 
Department-wide change. Many of these obstacles are a result of having to continuously 
balance operational and oversight responsibilities as well as from initially lacking a well-
defined relationship with the DHS operating Components. Additionally, the influences of 
the law enforcement and legacy agency cultures contribute to a territorial environment, 
which adds to these obstacles. Another contributor involves the fact that the event-driven, 
reactive environment of DHS creates an atmosphere that is dominated by the “tyranny of 
the present.”8    
Change cannot happen in vacuum. For change to be successful, it must be aligned 
across a variety of interrelated dimensions, to include policy, authority, process, 
technology and people. The implementation of information technology (IT) systems 
impacts organizations significantly. However, as is often the case with the selection and 
implementation of IT systems, the magnitude of change associated with these systems 
and the necessity of this alignment and are not typically understood or effectively 
                                                 
7 Thomas H. Stanton, Meeting the Challenge of 9/11: Blueprints for More Effective Government (New 
York, NY: Routledge, 2006), ix. 
8 “Tyranny of the present” was a phrase used by many of the research participants to describe the 
Management Directorate’s operating environment.  
 xviii 
managed. Meanwhile, adding to the intrinsic organizational change management 
challenges is the idea that, 
The subject of strategic information management is diverse and complex. 
It is not simply concerned with technological issues—far from it…it 
incorporates aspects of strategic management, globalization, the 
management of change and human/cultural issues, which may not at first 
sight have been considered as being directly relevant in the world of 
information technology.9  
Using the data from the interviews, the research is applied to Leavitt’s Diamond, 
which is an analytic change management framework. The result of this thesis is an 
analysis of how the various technology strategies pursued by DHS align across the other 
change dimensions identified Leavitt’s Diamond. Using this analysis, recommendations 
are presented for how DHS can achieve its goals of management integration, data-driven 
decision making and systems modernization, all of which are foundational to “Unity of 
Effort.”     
                                                 
9 Robert D. Galliers, Dorothy E. Leidner, Bernadette S.H. Baker, Strategic Information Management: 
Challenges and Strategies in Managing Information Systems (Woburn, MA: Butterworth Heinemann, 2nd 
Edition, 1999), xiii. 
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I. THESIS OVERVIEW, METHODOLOGY AND SYNOPSIS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The creation of the Department of Homeland Security in 2003 and its absorption 
of several large legacy government agencies presented one of the “biggest ‘change 
management’ challenges of all time, dwarfing even the creation of the Department of 
Defense after World War II. Never before has a consolidation of this size occurred with 
such national importance and urgency and in such a short amount of time.”1 Adding to 
the inherent organizational change management challenges stemming from the creation 
of DHS, “the subject of strategic information management is diverse and complex. It is 
not simply concerned with technological issues—far from it…it incorporates aspects of 
strategic management, globalization, the management of change and human/cultural 
issues, which may not at first sight have been considered as being directly relevant in the 
world of information technology”2 Irrespective of known challenges, former Deputy 
Secretary of DHS Admiral James Loy in 2006 recognized that, “We at Homeland 
Security now better appreciate how we must integrate our organizational, personnel, 
financial, evaluation, and information technology systems with the rest of the 
government.”3 However, a dozen years after its creation, this management integration has 
yet to occur in either the rest of the government or internally within DHS. Additionally, it 
is reasonable to expect DHS to be able to integrate these systems internally—and have 
the ability to represent itself as a single entity—prior to successfully integrating them 
with the rest of government.  
                                                 
1 Thomas H. Stanton, Meeting the Challenge of 9/11: Blueprints for More Effective Government (New 
York, NY: Routledge, 2006), xi. 
2 Robert D. Galliers, Dorothy E. Leidner, Bernadette S.H. Baker, Strategic Information Management: 
Challenges and Strategies in Managing Information Systems (Woburn, MA: Butterworth Heinemann, 2nd 
Edition, 1999), xiii. 
3 Stanton, Meeting the Challenge of 9/11, xi. 
 2 
B. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Since the Department of Homeland Security’s inception, it has lacked a single, 
integrated, enterprise-wide management information system. The result is that the 
Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS or the Department) business data is not 
housed in a standardized, centralized manner. Consequently, when leaders require 
information, they must conduct time-intensive, resource-dependent data calls with each 
DHS Component. The DHS business leaders are the six chief executive officers whose 
lines of business report directly to the Under Secretary of Management.  
The impact of not having readily available business data was formally 
acknowledged by the DHS Under Secretary of Management (USM) in February 2014 
when he stated, “As you know we have 13 different financial systems, it took sometimes 
90 days plus just to do a data call within the various components to get information back 
to help decision making, whether it was to respond to Congress, respond to the Office of 
Management and Budget or respond to the secretary.”4  
Similarly, when “Superstorm Sandy” hit the Northeastern United States in 2012, 
substantial DHS government assets—ranging from office and warehouse space, motor 
vehicles, computer servers, and other forms of property—were destroyed or severely 
damaged in the tri-state area.5 The total value of the repair and replacement costs for 
DHS assets exceeded $91 million.6 Many DHS programs operating in this region were 
severely handicapped because of debilitated property.7 Due to not having property 
inventory data readily available, DHS Headquarters was forced to conduct a time-
intensive data call with its Components to gather data on the damaged assets in an effort 
to understand the impact to the Department’s capabilities. The dependency on data calls 
has a compounding negative effect, because it pulls personnel away from serving the core 
                                                 
4 Jason Miller, “Borras Leaves DHS More Integrated, on Better Financial Path,” Federal News Radio, 
February 19, 2014, http://component.federalnewsradio.com/?nid=474&sid=3565846&pid=0&page=1. 
5 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Internal Departmental Report, Superstorm Sandy: Real and 
Personal Property Damage Assessment (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2012). 
6 Ibid. 
7 U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, Hurricane Sandy Rebuilding Task Force, 
Hurricane Sandy Rebuilding Strategy, Washington, DC: 2013, http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/documents/h
uddoc?id=hsrebuildingstrategy.pdf.  
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homeland security missions at a critical time. The absence of a recognized, authoritative 
information source from which leaders could assess the impacted property prohibited 
DHS from mobilizing response assets, conducting liability analysis, and engaging 
Congress to request emergency repair/replacement funds in a timely manner.  
The lack of a single, enterprise-wide information management system has resulted 
in numerous, disparate systems operating within the Management Directorate’s lines of 
businesses and across the DHS Components. The lack of a single enterprise-wide system 
is an example of an impediment severely impacting the Department’s ability to collect 
and manage data.  
C. OBJECTIVE OF STUDY 
The goal of this research is to enable an understanding of the organizational, 
cultural, and technology dynamics impacting the Department of Homeland Security’s 
Management Directorate pertaining to strategies for the collection of business and 
management data from which a data-driven decision-making culture can be established.  
D. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The goal of centralizing management information and data-driven decision-
making is a high priority for DHS. In March 2012, the Department’s Under Secretary of 
Management, who is the third highest ranking official in the Department, testified before 
the U.S. House of Representatives and stated that one of his highest priorities was to 
“improve the way we [DHS] collect, store, and manage data across the Department in 
order to improve executive-level decision making.”8 The entirety of this testimony 
focused on core themes related to maturing data management, supporting enterprise-level 
decision making, and integrating disparate processes and systems.”9 
 
                                                 
8 Building One DHS: Why Can’t Management Information Be Integrated: Before the Committee of 
Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Oversight, Investigations, and Management, House of 





What are the likely impediments associated with the goal of collecting and 
managing enterprise-wide management data and from where do these 
impediments originate?  
Secondary Question:  
How do these impediments relate to the primary technology strategies the USM is 
currently using in an attempt to meet this goal?  
E. BENEFITS  
The benefits of this research will potentially allow organizations struggling to 
identify and establish successful data collection strategies to develop a culture of data-
driven decision-making and learn from the Management Directorate’s experiences. This 
research demonstrates that technology strategies cannot be developed in a vacuum and 
must be juxtaposed with other environmental dynamics, such as organizational structure 
and influence and the existing oversight and governance models.  
F. BACKGROUND ON DHS MANAGEMENT DIRECTORATE 
The DHS Management Directorate is headed by the Under Secretary of 
Management and is responsible for bolstering national security through effective use of 
the Department’s workforce, assets, and resources.10 It ensures that the 
Department’s more than 230,000 employees have well-defined responsibilities, and that 
“managers and their employees have efficient means of communicating with one another, 
with other governmental and nongovernmental bodies, and with the public they serve.”11 
According to its website, the Directorate for Management is responsible for: 
• Budget, appropriations, expenditure of funds, accounting and finance; 
• Procurement; human resources and personnel; 
                                                 
10 “Directorate for Management,” U.S. Department of Homeland Security, accessed September 26, 
2015, http://www.dhs.gov/directorate-management.   
11 Ibid.  
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• Information technology systems; 
• Facilities, property, equipment, and other material resources; and 
• Identification and tracking of performance measurements relating to the 
responsibilities of the Department.12 
The Under Secretary of Management is a presidentially appointed and Senate 
confirmed civilian position and is the third ranking member of the Department. The 
Management Directorate is organized into six offices that assist the USM in carrying out 
of management responsibilities and duties. The officials, each with a corresponding 
office with the Management Directorate, include: 
• Chief Financial Officer 
• Chief Human Capital Officer 
• Chief Information Officer 
• Chief Procurement Officer 
• Chief Readiness Support Officer 
• Chief Security Officer13 
While most of these executive positions are career appointments, the CFO and 
CIO are considered political appointees. Political appointees “refers broadly to any 
employee who is appointed by the President, the Vice President, or agency head” and 
differs from “Career Appointment” officials who are generally long-term civil servants 
within the federal government.14   
G. SCOPE AND ASSUMPTIONS  
This research is primarily framed from the interviews with senior-ranking 
officials who either previously served or are currently serving in the Management 
Directorate. With one exception, each of the officials’ last tour of duty was in the 
                                                 
12 Ibid.  
13 Ibid. 
14 “Political Employees,” U.S. Office of Government Ethics, accessed September 26, 2015,  
http://www.oge.gov/Topics/Selected-Employee-Categories/Political-Appointees/.  
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Management Directive prior to leaving DHS. The one exception is an official who was 
initially the DCFO for DHS, but is currently a senior-level executive within Customs and 
Borders Protection (a DHS Component) where he serves as CFO and CAO. Therefore, 
the data captured in the research is predominantly represented from the DHS 
Management Directive’s perspective, while the perspectives of the DHS Components 
were not equally represented. Further research would be needed to collect the 
perspectives of executives in similar positions from across the DHS Operational 
Components.15  
There was a significant amount of data captured from these interviews for this 
thesis. This thesis will primarily focus on a handful of the most common patterns and 
themes that were identified in the data—it will not explore all the findings and themes 
identified. Additionally, not all of the core themes and patterns necessarily relate to the 
Management Directorate’s pursuit of information systems or data; however, they provide 
insights to the DHS culture and the environment influencing the ability to coordinate and 
govern enterprise-wide initiatives.  
In terms of the Management Directorate and its lines of business, this thesis 
focuses primarily on the business functions of financial management, procurement, and 
asset management. This is due to several factors, including the composition of the 
research participants and the long-standing investments towards modernizing the systems 
associated with these business functions. The other business functions associated with the 
Management Directorate, namely security and human capital management, had 
modernization and consolidation strategies that were only notionally addressed within 
this research. There are opportunities to explore how the strategies for these business 
functions align to the research and findings presented in this thesis.   
The selection of interviewees resulted in a top-down approach, as the interviews 
were conducted with executive-level officials who are/were responsible for establishing 
strategy and priorities. This approach was intentional as the research was focused on the 
                                                 
15 The DHS Operational Components include: The U.S. Coast Guard, U.S. Customs and Border 
Protection, U.S. Secret Service, Transportation Security Administration, Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, and the Federal Emergency Management 
Agency.  
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development of strategy in relationship to other organizational factors. If the interviews 
had been with mid-level managers and tacticians, the data would have been presented 
differently as the focus would likely have been on implementation challenges associated 
with the targeted strategies.  
H. METHODOLOGY INTRODUCTION  
The purpose of this section is to provide an overview of the investigative 
techniques and research performed in support of this thesis. The methodology for 
collecting data and the reasoning behind the interviews are examined. Face-to-face 
interviews were utilized in conjunction with a literature review to gain insight into the 
history of the Management Directorate’s approach towards capturing management data 
and developing a data-driven decision-making culture.  
Interviews were conducted to gather firsthand information regarding strategies 
aimed at collecting data and developing a data-driven culture. The interviews were 
designed to gain an understanding of the organizational characteristics, priorities, and 
dynamics of the DHS Management Directorate. Additional information about the 
selection of interviewees, the interview questions, and the characteristics of the data 
obtained are outlined in this chapter.  
Prior to the interviews being conducted, the author coordinated and submitted a 
“Human Subject Determination Request” package through the Institutional Review 
Board (IRB). The package included the interview questions contained in the enclosed 
Appendix, the list of targeted interview candidates, and the thesis proposal. The author 
also completed all required IRB training associated with conducting human subject 
research. The IRB determination was that this research did not meet the definition of 
human subject research and that the interviews could be conducted without additional 
IRB oversight.   
I. SELECTION OF OFFICIALS TO INTERVIEW  
Interviews were conducted with past and present high-ranking officials of the 
Management Directorate. These individuals held executive positions, such as Under 
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Secretary of Management, Chief Financial Officer, and Deputy Chief Information Officer 
within the Management Directorate. These chiefs/deputy chiefs came from the Financial, 
Information, and Administration/Readiness Support offices. The objective was to 
interview executives spanning the timeframe from the inception of the Department (i.e. 
January 2003) through present day and to have representation from each Executive 
Secretaries’ administration. 
The purpose of targeting and interviewing officials from each administration was 
to gain an understanding of the environmental, organizational, and leadership factors that 
influenced the focus of the Management Directorate at that given time. The purpose of 
selecting executive personnel was to understand how these factors influenced the ability 
to establish and implement strategy – and more specifically, strategy tailored towards 
integrating management information and establishing an environment where information 
could be a foundation for decision-making. Therefore, all interviewees were from the 
Senior Executive Service ranks and played instrumental roles in influencing the 
Management Directorate’s policy and strategy.  
The intention was to interview multiple Under Secretaries of Management, as 
they are responsible for leading the Management Directorate and setting its priorities. All 
USMs except the current one were interviewed. The first was Janet Hale, who was the 
first USM of DHS and served under the first two DHS secretaries (Secretary Tom Ridge 
and Secretary Michael Chertoff) from November 2002 through May 2006. The second 
was Elaine Duke, who served at TSA prior to joining DHS as the Chief Procurement 
Officer and was subsequently appointed as USM. She served DHS in this role from June 
2007 through April 2010. The third was Rafael Borras, who served as USM from April 
2010 through December 2013 and served the last four months in the role of Acting 
Deputy Secretary of DHS. He served under Secretary Janet Napolitano and briefly under 
Secretary Jeh Johnson. Ms. Hale and Ms. Duke were republican appointees under 
President George W. Bush’s Administration. Mr. Borras was a democratic appointee 
under President Barack Obama’s Administration.  
It was also important to interview the “Chiefs” (Chief Executive Officers), of 
which there are six serving the USM at any one time. These individuals are responsible 
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for setting policy, strategy, and priorities within the core lines of business (LOBs) for the 
Management Directorate. It was especially important to interview a blend of executives 
from the various offices to observe if and how their functional focus impacted the 
responses. Executives from the Chief Financial Office and the Chief Information Office 
were specifically targeted due to their historical roles in influencing strategies pertaining 
to systems modernization and information consolidation. Executives from other 
Management Directorate lines of business were also interviewed. Of the six chief 
executive officers serving the USM, four of the six are career officials, while two are 
senate-confirmed political appointees. The two political appointed chiefs are the CFO and 
the CIO.  
The officials interviewed were a combination of career and political appointees 
and are currently at various stages of their careers. Some are still executives within the 
DHS Management Directorate. One individual was previously an executive within the 
Management Directorate, but is currently an executive within a DHS Component. Many 
have left the federal government and are currently in the private sector, as is oftentimes 
the case with political appointees when the Executive Administration changes. The 
impact of political appointees and their affiliation and tenure as aligned to the political 
cycle will be further discussed in later chapters.   
The full list of officials interviewed for this thesis includes: 
• Rafael Borras: Former USM and Acting Deputy Secretary from April 2010 
through December 2013. 
o Interview conducted in person on August 27, 2015, in Arlington, 
Virginia.  
• Elaine Duke: Former USM from June 2007 though April 2010 and prior Chief 
Procurement Officer for the Management Directorate.  
o Interview conducted in two parts: First part was conducted in person in 
Washington, D.C., on September 21, 2015. Second part was conducted 




• Chip Fulghum: Current DHS CFO and Acting DUSM. 
o Interview conducted in person in Washington, D.C., on October 29, 
2015.  
• Margie Graves: Current DCIO serving since September 2008. Ms. Graves has 
also served as the acting CIO in her 11 years with DHS. 
o Interview conducted in person on September 10, 2015, in Washington, 
D.C.,  
• Janet Hale: First Senate-confirmed USM for DHS serving from February 2003 
through May 2006.  
o Interview conducted in person on September 2, 2015, in Washington, 
D.C. 
• David Norquist: First Senate-confirmed CFO serving from June 2006 through 
December 2008. 
o Interview conducted in person on September 10, 2015, in Alexandria, 
Virginia.  
• Stacy Marcott: Current DCFO since May 2012. Ms. Marcott has served DHS 
in a variety of roles, including Chief of Staff to the USM, since 2004. Also 
serves as co-chairman of the USM’s chartered Business Intelligence 
Dashboard Executive Steering Committee.  
o Interview conducted in person on August 25, 2015, in Washington, 
D.C. 
• Scott Myers: Former DCAO and DCRSO serving from July 2007 through 
December 2014. 
o Interview conducted in person on August 26, 2015, in Washington, 
D.C. 
• Richard Spires: Former CIO serving from Sept. 2009 through May 2013. 
o Interview conducted in person on September 11, 2015, in Washington, 
D.C. 
• Peggy Sherry: Former DCFO and CFO serving from July 2008 through 
November 2013. Also served as Director of Financial Management starting in 
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2007 within the Office of the Chief Financial Officer.  
o Interview conducted in person on August 31, 2015, in Alexandria, 
Virginia. 
• Eugene Schied: Former DCFO serving from November 2004 through 
December 2006. Current Assistance Commissioner of Administration for 
Customs and Border Protection, which entails the former responsibilities of 
the CFO and CAO.  
o Interview conducted in person on September 4, 2015, in Washington, 
D.C. 
• Keith Trippie: Former Executive Director of Enterprise Services for the DHS 
Chief Information Officer serving from April 2003 through March 2014. Also 
served as co-chairman of the USM’s chartered Business Intelligence 
Dashboard Executive Steering Committee.  
o Interview conducted in person on August 21, 2015, in Arlington, 
Virginia. 
J. INTERVIEW QUESTIONS AND FORMAT  
Each of the individuals voluntarily met to conduct their interview in person. The 
interviews typically lasted between 90 and 120 minutes. Only one interview was broken 
into two parts with the first half being conducted in person and the second half being 
conducted over the phone. Some officials were comfortable having their interviews 
recorded, while a few were not.   
The interviews were conducted using a semi-structured approach wherein 
questions that were designed to elicit discussion and reflection from the interviewees 
were provided in advance of and then again at the start of the interview. The interview 
questions, which can be found in the Appendix, were established from the strategies and 
approaches identified in the literature review. During the interviews each research 
participant, understandably, focused on questions that resonated with the strategies and 
programs that were relevant during their tenure. The direction and topical areas selected 
by the participants generated discussion to clarify and better understand the topics raised 
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by the interviewee. This was expected because the participants were employed by the 
DHS Management Directorate at different times, during which certain strategies and 
initiatives were more pertinent than others. None of the interviews followed the questions 
in order and oftentimes the interviewee jumped around to questions to which they had a 
particular interest.  
Despite the research participants driving the dialogue towards relevant topics 
from their tenure, there was an effort to ensure specific questions and topics were 
addressed. These questions/topics pertained to the role of culture within the Management 
Directive with specific focus on the relationships between the Management Directorate 
and the Components, the role and availability of systems to produce management data, 
and the organizational factors influencing that ability to use data to inform decision-
making within DHS.   
Each interview was documented with notes and, when allowed, digitally recorded. 
Notes were then transferred to electronic files in most cases. The research quotes and 
concepts presented in this thesis that comprise chapters III through VI were sent to each 
research participant for verification and validation.   
K. LITERATURE REVIEW APPROACH 
In preparation for the interviews and to understand the history and culture of the 
Department in the targeted research topics, a literature review was conducted. The 
literature review spanned multiple topics, focus areas, and sources. The literature review 
was broken into a handful of key sections, including: DHS-specific internal literature, 
GAO and OMB literature, and third-party academic and government journals.  
The DHS-specific literature reviews focused on exploring Congressional 
testimony, internal memorandums, charters, and briefings. Testimony and briefings by 
many of the same officials that were ultimately interviewed were incorporated into this 
literature review.   
The Government Accountability Office’s and Office of Management and 
Budget’s websites were also queried with similar terms. Specific policies, such as Memo-
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13-08 “Improving Financial Systems through Shared Services” were searched within the 
OMB website. Within the GAO website, audit and reports associated to DHS and 
“Management Integration” were queried.  
To conduct the general third-party literature review, the principle topics that were 
researched online, primarily through the Dudley Knox Library, Google Scholar, and 
Government Information Quarterly sites, included individual or combined searches on 
the following topics: 
• “Socio-technical Factors” 
• “Leavitt’s Diamond”  
• “Systems modernization”  
• “Data Consolidation” or “Data Warehousing”  
• “Business Intelligence” 
• “Management Integration”  
• “Organizational Change” 
Some queries were paired with the term “Department of Homeland Security” 
while others were not.  
L. ORGANIZING THE DATA 
The results of the interviews and literature reviews produced an extensive amount 
of data. Some of the interviews themselves explored topics that were not anticipated. 
While there are clearly identifiable common themes and patterns described within, the 
extent to which the interview responses varied is surprising. In fact, the results of the 
interviews demonstrate disparate—and at times conflicting—perceptions by officials on 
the various strategies, priorities, and roles and responsibilities of the Management 
Directorate. The disparity in certain responses in-and-of-itself is revealing. As the data 
was collected from executives representing the breadth of the Department since its 2003 
creation and throughout different administrations, differences regarding the target 
strategies, priorities, and challenges are to be expected to a certain extent. Additionally, 
fundamental differences surrounding strategy surfaced during the interviewing process 
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and those will be also discussed. The data was ultimately organized into four core themes 
that were most prevalent and pertinent across all the interviews. Each of these core 
themes is presented as individual chapters.  
Further, the core themes identified herein do not represent the full breadth of data 
collected during these interviews. Many insightful and significant observations were 
made that simply did not pertain to the topics associated with this thesis research.  
The research presented in Chapters III through VI pertains directly to the 
interviews. All content appearing in the bodies of these chapters directly correlate to 
statements or concepts made during the course of the interviews, unless specifically cited 
otherwise. Thus, the initial quote made by a research participant will be cited 
accordingly. Since all research participants were interviewed one time, with the exception 
of one which spanned two sessions, it is assumed that all subsequent quotes made by an 
individual stems from the same interview. As such, the subsequent quotes by a research 
participants made in these four chapters will not be cited.   
It is also worth noting that many of the interview participants, when discussing 
their role within the Management Directorate, used a variety of terms to reference the 
Management Directorate. The terms were used interchangeably and examples included 
“the Department,” “Headquarters” and “Management.” For consistency within this paper, 
the term Management Directorate will be used. 
M. APPLYING THE DATA THROUGH AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK  
As this research focused on instituting change across a complex and dynamic 
federal department, Leavitt’s Diamond, represented in Figure 1, was selected at the initial 
onset. Leavitt’s Diamond is recognized as a readily known and referenced change 
management framework. It is comprised of four dimensions and asserts that for change to 
be successful, it must occur in a balanced manner across all four of its dimensions, 
“Organization and Structure,” “Policy and Processes,” “Technology,” and “People.”16 Of 
                                                 
16 In the original Leavitt’s Diamond, the “Process and Policy” dimension was referred to as “Tasks,” 
but its description allows it to be positioned and applied in this manner. There are numerous studies that 
have adopted this dimension in the same approach.  
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its four dimensions—each represented as a corner of the diamond—three aligned with 
direct or ancillary research topics addressed in this research. The only dimension that did 
not apply to this research is the “People” dimension. This was because this dimension 
correlates primarily to the rewards and incentives systems that influence behavioral 
change among the workforce, which was not within the scope of this research project. 
Background on Leavitt’s Diamond can be found in Chapter II, as it was part of the 
literature review.  
Figure 1.  Leavitt’s Diamond Adaptation 
 
 
There are numerous adaptations of Leavitt’s Diamond found in 
literature. This adaptation stems from the model found in 
Strategic Knowledge Management in Multinational 
Organizations by Kevin O’Sullivan (Hershey, PA: IGI Global, 
2007), 64. 
 
Once the data was collected and analyzed, it was presented against this 
framework. More specifically, it looks at the relationship between the various strategies 
used by the DHS Management Directorate to capture management data for decision-
making purposes and determines their level of alignment across the “Organization & 
Structure,” “Technology” and “Policy and Process” dimensions. This analysis is 
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presented in the final “Findings and Recommendations” chapter. Once the analysis was 
completed, it was used to frame the recommendations found in the final chapter. 
N. CHAPTER SYNOPSIS 
This section provides a summary of each chapter within the thesis. There are six 
chapters in addition to this one. Chapter II pertains to the previously described literature 
review. The next four chapters, Chapters III through VI, relate directly to the research 
associated with the interviews. Chapters III through VI each correlate to a core theme that 
emerged from the interviews. Chapter VII is the final chapter and pertains to the findings 
and recommendations. This final chapter is where the data from chapters III through VI is 
applied through the Leavitt’s Diamond framework, which is used to structure the final 
recommendations.   
 
 Chapter II: Literature Review  
 
Given the emphasis on first-person interviews for this research, the literature 
review was conducted to achieve three objectives. The first objective was to inform the 
researcher on the academic literature associated with information management and 
systems as they pertain to organizational change in public sector organizations. The 
second objective was to understand and identify the federal oversight and audit literature 
associated with the thesis topics as applied to DHS specifically, as well as the federal 
government in general. The third objective was to have the literature review frame and 
formulate the interview questions that would be asked of the research participants. 
 
 Chapter III: Management Directorate’s Lack of an Identity  
   
This chapter provides a historical look at influencing factors surrounding the 
establishment of DHS and the Management Directorate. This chapter begins with a focus 
on understanding the environmental and cultural dynamics influencing the Department as 
described by those officials who led the Management Directorate at its onset. Having this 
context from these individuals was important because many of their early decisions 
established precedents that are still in place in current day. The chapter then explores 
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impediments that have impacted the Management Directorate’s ability to define and 
execute its core missions.  
 
 Chapter IV: Management Directorate’s Role in Policy, Oversight, and 
 Governance  
 
With respect to its authority, there was wide recognition that the Management 
Directorate’s strategic value proposition to the Department is establishing business policy 
and instruction, performing oversight, and conducting assessment. These activities are 
described as the “hard-wiring and plumbing of the Department.” Despite this 
acknowledgement, there have been cultural and organizational barriers that have 
prevented these activities from being effectively resourced, executed, and adopted. This 
chapter explores the Management Directorate’s approaches toward maturing these 
activities and discusses how cultural and organizational barriers influence their 
approaches.   
 
 Chapter V: Challenges with Implementing Enterprise-wide IT Solutions 
This chapter outlines the strategies the Management Directorate has formulated to 
achieve its goals pertaining to the collection and positioning of data. It also provides a 
chronology of the information systems initiatives that the Management Directorate has 
pursued, with specific attention on its efforts to modernize and transform its financial 
management systems. Financial management includes other related subsidiary functions, 
such as procurement and asset management. The second part of the chapter explores the 
Management Directorate’s approach towards enterprise data consolidation, which was the 
strategy that was adopted once the pursuit of a single, centralized management system 
ceased. As each of these various initiatives are discussed, their alignment to the 
Management Directorate’s authorities and other organizational and cultural dynamics are 





 Chapter VI: Maturing and Positioning Business Information within DHS  
 
This chapter builds on the subsequent chapter to discuss factors for consolidating 
and integrating the Management Directorate’s individual LOB data. Specifically, it 
explores how a data warehousing and business intelligence tool, referred to as the 
Management Cube, is being developed and positioned to integrate data from each of the 
individual lines’ of business data marts. As these systems have matured, there is a need to 
understand the governance necessary to position and utilize their information for 
decision-making purposes, especially given the organizational and cultural dynamics 
described in the earlier chapters. Therefore, this chapter also explores the tactics the 
Management Directorate should consider for positioning information within the 
organizational dialogue and decision-making processes.  
 
 Chapter VII: Findings and Recommendations  
 
This final chapter takes the research data from the subsequent chapters and 
applies it to the Leavitt’s Diamond analytical framework. The objective is to determine 
how the various strategies used to consolidate and position data interrelate across the 
framework’s dimensions of “Organization and Structure,” “Policy and Process,” and 
“Technology.” As this research was structured around identifying impediments impacting 
the various strategies, this chapter applies the data collected in Chapters III through VI 
and determines which strategies offset these impediments. These recommendations 
would presume to be the most viable option for the Management Directorate to achieve 
its goals.  
Once the analysis via Leavitt’s Diamond is conducted to present the findings, this 
chapter is used to present recommendations that the Management Directorate should 
consider. These recommendations are both directly and indirectly associated to the 
objective of the research question. In other words, because the data from this thesis, 
specifically the interviews with the Management Directorate officials, explored topics 
tangential to the immediate research, the findings and related recommendations also 
diverge across interrelated organizational and policy considerations.  
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This literature review focused on the intersection of two distinct topics. The first 
topic was the relationship of strategic information management, as associated with 
information systems, to organizational change. This relationship was specifically framed 
against public sector agencies, since most of the immediate literature on this topic 
appears to be predominantly in reference to the private sector. It is important to 
understand the different variables for instituting information systems and organizational 
change within the government, as opposed to the private sector, since there are different 
mission drivers. The second topic was the Department of Homeland Security’s business, 
management and audit drivers. A synopsis of the Department’s information systems 
approaches, as associated with these business and audit drivers, is also provided.  
Additionally, this literature review includes a section on Leavitt’s Diamond, 
which is a change management analytic framework. This section provides an introduction 
and overview of the framework.  
B. STRATEGIC INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND 
ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE 
The advancement of information technology continues to be transformative on all 
sectors and industries. Dianne Lux Wigand, Ph.D., in a 2007 article titled “The Impact Of 
Information Technology On Structure, People, And Tasks,” notes, “Numerous 
information technologies (such as group support systems, custom Intranets, workflow 
systems, ERP systems) play a central role in today’s organizations. Their combined use 
may be seen as analogous to the body’s central nervous system. Collectively they enable 
numerous desirable tasks such as retrieving, linking, tracking, data entering and providing 
feedback (e.g., user/customer responses).”17 Given the impact of the deployment of 
                                                 
17 Dianne L. Wigand, Ph.D., “Building on Leavitt’s Diamond Model of Organizations: The 
Organizational Interaction Diamond Model and the Impact of Information Technology on Structure, 
People, and Tasks” (article, America’s Conference on Information Systems, University of Arkansas, Little 
Rock, AR 2007, December 31, 2007). 
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information technology generally—and information systems, more specifically—there is 
a significant amount of literature on its application as a change agent. However, much of 
this literature is tailored to the private sector where the business drivers, such as time-to-
market, eliminating redundancies, and competition, are readily apparent and voluminous. 
The literature associated to public sector information technology—specifically as it 
pertains to information systems—is not as comprehensive. Much of this is due to the 
unique complexities associated with the public sector, which is even further compounded 
when applied to the federal government. The drivers between the private sector (profits, 
stakeholder value) and the public sectors (mission, open competition) greatly influence 
how information technology is managed and implemented across these two sectors.  
It is clear that information technology/information systems (IT/IS) is a change 
agent and that change, irrespective of sector, must be managed to recognize the value of 
the IT/IS investment. Peter G.W. Keen supports this stance in Information Systems and 
Organizational Change when he notes, “Formalized information systems are thus often 
seen as threatening and not useful. They are an intrusion into the world of the users who 
are rarely involved in their development and see these unfamiliar and nonrelevant 
techniques as a criticism of themselves. Leavitt’s classification of organizations as a 
diamond, in which Task, Technology, People and Structure are mutually inter related and 
mutually adjusting, indicates the complex nature of social systems. When Technology is 
changed, the other components often adjust to dampen out the impact of the innovation. 
Many writers on implementation stress the homeostatic behavior of organizations, and 
the need to ‘unfreeze the status quo.’”18 Keen identifies “Data as a central political 
resource. Many agents and units in organizations get their influence and autonomy from 
their control over information” and later notes the “link between control over information 
and influence… Information is a resource that symbolizes status, enhances authority and 
shapes relationships. Information is an element of power.”19 Keen recognizes the 
importance of information as a political and power-based entity and notes that it is a 
                                                 
18 Peter G.W.Keen, “Information Systems and Organizational Change,” Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology: Center for Information Systems Research, CISR No. 55 (May 1980): 6. 
19 Ibid., 7. 
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“main cause of inertia,” which needs to be overcome through the “careful building of 
coalitions, based on complex negotiations.”20 One significant finding of Keen’s that 
resonates strongly within the DHS landscape is, “evaluation [as defined] as central to the 
exercise of authority. In general, providing management (or outside agencies) with data 
that permit closer observation of subordinates’ decision making or that help define 
additional output measures increases control and decreases autonomy. Many public 
sector agencies protect data on their operations as a means of maintaining their 
independence.”21 Keen exemplifies this point by highlighting studies of information 
systems in local government, which provide many illustrations of this point. One example 
given is how police agencies shield their data from ancillary stakeholders, such as mayors 
and budget agencies, as a means of maintaining information control.  
Part of this thesis will focus on understanding the role of change management as a 
critical ingredient within the Department’s technology strategies. It will also explore how 
the organizational dynamics should influence the selection of IS strategies. To this point, 
Rob Lambert in Chapter 15 of Strategic Information Management, which is titled “The 
Information Technology—Organizational Design Relationship: Information Technology 
and New Organizational Forms,” recognizes that “Business transformation planning 
demands two key activities: planning the organization strategy and developing an 
information systems strategy which facilitates this strategy, but which is also closely 
aligned to business requirements. The conventional IS/IT planning framework does not 
explicitly consider the organization’s ability to delivery business strategy. A key concern 
of business transformation planning is a critical evaluation and understanding of the 
existing organization’s characteristics and capabilities of how the current IS/IT strategy is 
being used to support them. The gap between existing and required can then be 
determined. It is important to emphasize that the relationship between the organization 
strategy and the IS strategy is bi-directional.”22 
                                                 
20 Ibid., 13. 
21 Ibid., 15. 
22 Rob Lambert and Joe Peppard, “The Information Technology-Organizational Design Relationship: 
Information Technology and New Organizational Forms,” Strategic Information Management (2013): 454–
486. 
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Meanwhile, Robert Galliers observes, “Delivering the Information Systems (IS) 
Strategy is traditionally seen as a purely technological issue. However, of key concern are 
the changes which accompany any IT implementation.”23 Scott Morton identifies 
“People issues are key reasons why many IT investments fail to realize benefits.”24 
Further along the lines of managing change and the personnel impacts associated to any 
change initiative, “Central to the successful management change is the HR initiatives 
which are put in place. Many organizations try to accomplish strategic change by merely 
changing the system and structure of their organization. This is a recipe for failure. HR 
initiatives will be incorporated within the organization’s overall HR strategy and will 
include education, management development, programs, training and reward structures. 
Probably one of the greatest barriers to the management of change is the assumption that 
it simply happens or that people must simply change because it is necessary to do so.”25 
As it pertains to the relationship between an entity’s IT and organization 
structures, “Many of the research studies that have set out to determine the relationship 
between IT and organizational structure have suffered from one particularly worrying 
defect. They have sought to make statements about the implications of IT on the 
organization as a whole, yet studied information systems that impact part of the 
organization. It is difficult and probably inaccurate in many cases to make observations at 
a local level and then generalize findings to an aggregate or organizational level. Thus, 
we seek to align the impact of the information system under evaluation with the 
appropriate level of organization impact. If one wants to make statements about the 
organization as a whole, then one must study computer information systems that impact 
the entire organization”26 
                                                 
23 Robert D. Galliers, “Strategic Information Systems Planning: Myths, Reality and Guidelines for 
Successful Implementation,” European Journal of Information Systems 1, no. 1 (1991): 55–64. 
24 Scott Morton, The Corporation of the 1990s: Information Technology and Organizational 
Transformation (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991).  
25 Lambert and Peppard, Strategic Information Management, 454–486. 
26 Jeff Sampler, “Exploring the Relationship Between Information Technology and Organization 
Structure” in Information Management: The Organizational Dimension, ed. Michael J. Earl (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1996). 12. 
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In his piece “Exploring the Relationship Between Information Technology and 
Organization Structure” Jeff Sampler asserts “organizations can be viewed as being 
composed of departments or sets of groups, which [are referred] to as sub-units…this 
perspective on organizational structure suggests that the appropriate unit of analysis is the 
organizational sub-unit. Thus, rather than attempting to characterize the organization as a 
whole, the more important issue may be what are the optimal organizational 
arrangements for the various organizational sub-units...and what are the appropriate 
mechanisms used to coordinate these interdependent sub-units. Similarly, the appropriate 
question may be to ask what is the impact of IT on an organization’s sub-units and how 
can IT be used to facilitate coordination among these various sub-units.”27  
Sampler summarizes, “analysis of the relationship between IT and organizational 
sub-units should result in a more accurate matching of the scope of impact of IT with the 
affected areas of the organization. In addition, analysis at the organizational sub-unit 
level may allow for more accurate comparisons across similar sub-units within 
organizations, which will facilitate a cumulative and hopefully more generalizable set of 
recommendations. Conducting research at the organizational sub-level also may be more 
relevant as more organizations continue to focus on alternative forms of organizational 
arrangements, such as networked or virtual organizations.”28 He concludes, “Thus, the 
impact of IT on the organization may be due to the nature of the task under analysis 
rather than some intrinsic property of the organization or IT.”29  
C. ANALYTICAL CHANGE FRAMEWORK: LEAVITT’S DIAMOND 
In 1964 Harold J. Leavitt produced a model for analyzing the management of 
change. This is generally referred to as Leavitt’s Diamond and is “based on the idea that 
it is rare for any change to occur in isolation.”30 There are four dimensions, also known 
as elements, in the diamond that are interdependent: technology, task, people, and 
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structure. “Leavitt argued that any change at any point of the of the diamond would 
impact some or all of the other elements and that any failure to manage their 
interdependencies at critical times of change could create problems. For example, a 
change in tasks in a core production process affects the people involved, the structure in 
which they work, and the technology that they use; and needs to be adjusted 
throughout.”31 In other words, “changes made to any one of these four elements cannot 
and will not occur in isolation. Rather, a change made in any one area of your 
organization will impact the entire system.”32 
As it applies to information technology, Leavitt’s Diamond “gives a balanced 
view of the complexities that affect the Knowledge Management framework by 
positioning technology in strong relationships to the tasks carried out, people 
participating in these, and to the organization of the tasks and people, for example, the 
structure.”33 According to Leavitt, the four sets of organizational variables—task, people, 
technology, and structure—are indicated by arrowheads to demonstrate their 
interdependence and that change in any one usually results in compensory or retaliator 
change in others. “Technologies are considered tools that help the organization to get 
work done and mechanisms for transforming inputs to outputs.”34  
The management implications of Leavitt’s Diamond are far-reaching. Leavitt 
explains, “Any of these changes could presumably be consciously intended, or they could 
occur as unforeseen and often costly outcomes of efforts to change only one or two of the 
variables.”35 “If the interdependences are not managed at critical times of change, then 
problems will occur. Experience shows that this is more often the case than not; 
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management tends to look at change factors in isolation and reacts to interrelating 
variables after the event.”36 
Suprateek Sarker argues:  
[The] approach to managing the implementation of information 
technologies is often dependent on how we frame the implementation 
problem…traces the dominant ways of framing the implementation 
problem that are evident in the literature, and through this historical 
analysis, identifies the Leavitt’s Diamond for representing organizations 
as the integrative conceptual model underlying much of the current 
implementation literature.37  
Sarker also noted:  
Given the recognition of the importance of conceptual devices and 
frameworks in informing management practice, and more specifically, of 
an organizational model in informing implementation management it is 
surprising that scholars have not attempted to improve or extend the 
diamond model by incorporating concepts (such as subjective realities) 
that can help analyze political or institutional issues.38 
D. DHS AUDIT AND BUSINESS DRIVERS FOR INTEGRATING 
MANAGEMENT INFORMATION 
The challenges of integrating the Department—also known as developing a “One 
DHS” as it has been branded—and integrating management information stems back to 
the Department’s inception. The challenges were recognized at a March 2012 House of 
Representatives hearing before the Committee of Homeland Security, Subcommittee on 
Oversight, Investigations, and Management pertaining to “Building One DHS: Why 
Can’t Management Information Be Integrated?” where testimony was heard from the 
DHS USM, GAO Director of Homeland Security and Justice, and the DHS Inspector 
General (Acting). The ranking member of this committee, Rep. William R. Keating, 
observed early in this hearing that,  
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The Department of Homeland Security is one agency formed with 22 
other legacy agencies. Legacy is worth mentioning because it is part of the 
problem we still are grasping trying to deal with today as we look for 
integration. There is no secret that since the Department’s inception in 
2003, that its unique history has caused DHS officials, particularly the 
management division, to face multiple challenges in building One DHS.39  
Others have observed the challenges stemming directly from how DHS was 
created:  
Building the organizational structure and relationships to accomplish that 
[defending the homeland] mission. That meant integrating the numerous 
support functions of a new department. It meant working swiftly to get 
servers up, systems consolidated, and a stapler on every desk—all without 
moving forces from the protection of the country.40  
Along the lines of management information systems, the chairman of this 
committee, Rep. Michael T. McCaul, also recognized, “Stove-piped management 
information systems continue to plague DHS with mismanagement, redundancies, 
duplication, and inefficient use of resources that has increased costs within the 
Department and bungled the implementation of security operations.” GAO defines 
management integration as the “development of consistent and consolidated processes, 
systems, and people—in areas such as information technology, financial management, 
acquisition, and human capital—that lead directly to greater efficiency and effectiveness 
of management and programs.”41 Rep. McCaul also observed the importance of 
integrated management systems: 
It is essential that integration not be limited just within each individual 
management function, but also be integrated horizontally across all core 
management functions of the Department. Without full integration, 
inconsistent reporting requirements and varying definitions for cost 
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estimations across the Department can create inaccurate reports on a 
program’s true cost.42  
The Government Accountability Office’s presence at this hearing was a reflection 
that GAO categorized the Department’s transformation efforts as high-risk in 2003 
because, “implementing and transforming the DHS is high risk because DHS had to 
transform 22 agencies—several with [their own] major management challenges—into 
one department. Further, failure to effectively address DHS’s management and mission 
risks could have serious consequences for U.S. national and economic security. Given the 
significant effort required to build and integrate a department as large and complex as 
DHS, our initial high-risk designation addressed the department’s initial transformation 
and subsequent implementation efforts to include associated management and 
programmatic challenges. At that time, we reported that the creation of DHS was an 
enormous undertaking that would take time to achieve, and that the successful 
transformation of large organizations, even those undertaking less strenuous 
reorganizations, could take years to implement.”43 Almost annually since this 
categorization, GAO has published a report updating the Department’s status on the 
strength and integration of the DHS management functions.  
Many of these findings and recommendations stem from a 2005 GAO report 
(GAO-05-139), “A Comprehensive and Sustained Approach Needed to Achieve 
Management Integration.” Additionally, GAO incorporated the requirements associated 
to developing “a comprehensive strategy for management integration” as specified in the 
Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 into the score of 
their ongoing audit and updates of the Department’s efforts in this areas.44 The 
Department is demonstrating progress as recognized in the last such report, GAO-15-
388T, published and released on February 26, 2015 and titled, Department of Homeland 
Security: Progress Made, but More Work Remains in Strengthening Management 
                                                 
42 Ibid. 
43 Report to Congressional Committees: High Risk Series – An Update (GAO-15-290) (Washington, 
DC: U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2015), http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-15-290. 
44 Department of Homeland Security: Progress Made, but More Work Remains in Strengthening 
Management Functions (GAO-15-388T) (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Accountability Office, 
2015), http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-15-388T. 
 28 
Functions. This report demonstrates how the Management Directorate has matured in this 
area since the GAO’s 2009 report, DHS: A Comprehensive Strategy is Still Needed to 
Achieve Management Integration Departmentwide. 
At the March 2012 hearing, David C. Maurer from GAO stated that DHS 
“currently lacks vital management capabilities to integrate the Department into something 
greater than the sum of its parts…DHS twice attempted and was unable to build an 
integrated Department-wide financial management system. DHS also lacks 
comprehensive Department-level visibility over key human capital information.”45 
Another statement that Mr. Maurer makes at this hearing summarizes and underlines the 
purpose of this thesis:  
DHS also faces challenges in modernizing its financial systems. We 
previously reported that DHS twice attempted to implement an integrated 
Department-wide financial management system, but had not been able to 
consolidate its disparate systems. Specifically, in June 2007, we reported 
that DHS ended its Electronic Managing Enterprise Resources for 
Government Effectiveness and Efficiency effort after determining that the 
resulting financial management systems would not provide the expected 
system functionality and performance. In December 2009, we reported 
that the Transformation and Systems Consolidation program had been 
significantly delayed by bid protests and related litigation. In March 2011, 
DHS ended this program and reported that moving forward it would 
consider alternatives to meet revised requirements. In 2011, DHS decided 
to change its strategy for financial system modernization. Rather than 
implement a Department-wide integrated financial management system 
solution, DHS opted for a decentralized approach to financial management 
systems modernization at the component level.46  
This statement recognizes that the Management Directorate had previously 
attempted to acquire and implement multiple enterprise resource planning (ERP) systems 
focused on financial management, procurement, and asset management functions. After 
multiple attempts to acquire a financial ERP system and spending upwards of $80 
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million, the Department ceased its pursuit of a single, enterprise-wide system in 2011.47 
However, the GAO findings and integration objectives that an ERP system would address 
remain. One of the impacts of not having a management information system is reflected 
the following statement issued in February 2014 by the DHS USM: “As you know we 
have 13 different financial systems, it took sometimes 90 days plus just to do a data call 
within the various components to get information back to help decision making, whether 
it was to respond to Congress, respond to the Office of Management and Budget or 
respond to the secretary.”48  
Despite more than a decade of challenges related to integrating management 
information and implementing a management system, there is reason for optimism as the 
DHS Secretary Jeh Johnson testified on April 15, 2015, before a Senate Judiciary 
hearing, “Our Unity of Effort initiative has now been in effect for a year, and it has 
brought a more centralized process for making decisions concerning budget requests, 
acquisition, strategy, and other Department functions. Growing out of this initiative, we 
also have realigned major DHS headquarters activities to consolidate like functions and 
promote efficiency.” The Secretary went on to note that DHS is, “on a path to get off the 
Government Accountability Office’s so-called ‘High Risk List.’”49  
E. OVERVIEW OF DHS MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS APPROACHES 
From 2003 through 2011, DHS pursued a financial/mixed-functions (interrelated 
functions of procurement, asset management, and budget) ERP system. In the early 
2000s, “the significant development in global information technologies and the ever-
intensifying competitive market climate have pushed many companies to transform their 
businesses. ERP is seen as one of the most recently emerging process-oriented tools that 
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can enable such a transformation.”50 For DHS, the ERP system was the transformative 
solution to address the GAO management integration findings and a mechanism to 
standardize business processes. It was essentially “this demand for process-oriented IT 
platforms [which] led to the development of ERP systems which essentially work at 
integrating major functional systems within the organization, e.g., financial.”51 ERP is 
defined as: 
An integrated, multi-dimensional system for all functions, based on a 
business model for planning, control, and global (resource) optimization 
of the entire supply chain, by using the state of the art Information 
Systems / Information Technology that supplies value added services to all 
internal and external parties.52 
It is specifically the ERP elements of planning and control that impacted the 
Department’s ability to successfully implement an ERP system. It can be argued that the 
legacy missions and cultures of DHS agencies—now components—of the newly formed 
Department, were impediments to standardizing and centralizing onto a single platform, 
lexicon, and configuration, which are defining attributes of an ERP system.  
In November 2010, DHS made its final attempt at a financial ERP when it 
awarded a five-year, $450 million systems implementation contract for an integrated 
Oracle Commercial-off-the-Shelf (COTS) software system with additional, augmenting 
bolt-on COTS applications to address related functions, including property, procurement, 
facility, and project management.53 However, the losing vendors protested the award.54 
The GAO ultimately upheld the protest and DHS was advised it would need to re-
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compete the contract, setting the department back multiple years.55 This was the third 
failed attempt at an ERP spanning nine years. DHS concluded that the differences across 
their Components’ cultures, missions, and business requirements were not conducive for 
an ERP system. The Components’ budgets associated with systems modernization, which 
had essentially been frozen since 2002 due to the pursuit of the ERP, were unfrozen in 
late 2012. This allowed the Components to individually and distinctly pursue systems 
tailored to meet their unique requirements. Upon ceasing its pursuit of an integrated, 
Department-wide financial, procurement, and asset management system in May 2011, 
DHS announced it would be exploring other options, including cloud-based systems, with 
a “focus on component-by-component development and non-integrated solutions.”56  
Around this same timeframe, federal guidelines were issued that significantly 
impacted how the department and its components could proceed with the modernization 
of its systems. These guidelines included the release of the United State’s Chief 
Information Officer’s 25 Point Implementation Plan to Reform Federal Information 
Technology Management in December 201057 and Federal Cloud Computing Strategy in 
February 2011.58 Because of these new guidelines, DHS recognized that “OMB requires 
cloud-based and service provider solutions be evaluated first and used whenever a secure, 
reliable, cost-effective option exists. With advances in IT security, DHS security 
architecture now expressly supports external services as an extension of the trusted 
internal environment. Thus, a cloud-based or shared services solution could meet the 
department’s needs.”59  
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One additional guideline, which was released in March 2013 by OMB, was Memo 
13-08 “Improving Financial Systems Through Shared Services.”60 This memo explicitly 
directs all executive agencies, “to use, with limited exceptions, a shared service solution 
for future modernizations of core accounting or mixed systems.” This memo recognizes 
that all agencies will give consideration to the capabilities and gaps of the recognized 
cloud-based Federal Shared Service Providers (FSSPs) as the first source for satisfying its 
financial and mixed-system requirements. The impact of the U.S. CIO’s aforementioned 
guidelines and OMB Memo 13-08 is that each DHS component is currently 
independently evaluating the individual FSSPs, of which there are seven. This approach 
could result in DHS having multiple cloud-based FSSP systems represented within its 
architecture. Each FSSP would potentially be responsible for one or multiple 
Components’ accounting, acquisition, and asset management functions.  
Once it was determined that each of the Department’s Components would explore 
and pursue FSSPs, DHS had to identify a secondary strategy for consolidating and 
standardizing information associated to its Management Directorate’s functions. DHS 
recognized the decentralized nature of its future-state transactional systems would require 
an integration strategy to meets its goals of consolidated analysis, reporting, and decision-
making. To adapt to the decentralized architecture, DHS turned to a data warehousing 
and business intelligence initiative.61 The DHS USM chartered and established the 
Business Intelligence Dashboard Executive Steering Committee in 2012, which was 
tasked with developing an integration layer across these applications.62  
The DHS CIO was to formalize and mature a cloud-based Business Intelligence 
as a Service (BIaaS) offering. The USM viewed the BIaaS platform as a means to 
accomplish its strategic objectives and advised the Management Directorate’s chief 
executive officers to utilize this service as a means to consolidate the data for which it has 
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oversight the DHS components. The chiefs independently proceeded with establishing 
projects, plans, and governance as a means of designing, developing, and populating their 
respective data warehouse and reporting/business intelligence solutions within the BIaaS 
platform. As the USM testified in March 2012, “These solutions provide robust business 
intelligence (BI) over disparate data sources, collating information to improve decision-
making through access to accurate program data and metrics. Deploying business 
intelligence solutions across the financial management spectrum has improved 
Departmental compliance with the Chief Financial Officer (CFO) Act and DHS Financial 
Accountability Act, OMB guidance, other regulations, and Government accounting 
standards. I firmly believe that utilizing BI tools will improve the effectiveness of 
management and achieve compliance, performance, and quality improvement goals by 
providing: 
• Enhanced access to key financial data across organizational boundaries, 
• Key indicators of acquisition health that are data-driven and risk-informed, 
and 
• Improved human capital and resource management to enable emerging 
organizational opportunities.”63 
In the USM’s charter, he recognizes that the BIaaS applications would not meet 
their full potential without a mechanism to join and combine interrelated data from across 
all the Management Directorate’s lines of business as a means to support cross-functional 
analysis and reporting.64  
F. LITERATURE REVIEW SUMMARY 
As the literature outlines, the pursuit of data as a prerequisite to the integration of 
management information is a long-standing strategic objective of DHS. The lack of this 
integrated information has been identified in GAO audits and by Congress as a critical 
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deficiency for DHS and has resulted with DHS being on the GAO “High Risk” list since 
2003. Integrating management information has also been recognized as foundational to 
establishing a “One DHS.”  
While multiple technology strategies have been attempted since 2003, two 
primary strategies—”Systems Modernization” and “Information Consolidation”—
continue to be pursued by the DHS Management Directorate in attempts to centralize and 
standardize data from across all entities comprising DHS. However, it is not clear if and 
how these current strategies are aligned with the organizational, people, and process 
facets of the DHS Components. Also influencing these strategies is the volume of DHS 
Components—each with their own unique cultural, legacy, and political considerations 
and constraints—and breadth and disparity of business functions falling within the scope 
of the Under Secretary of Management. Given these factors, the literature contends that 
success cannot be achieved without deliberately managing the change associated with 
these technology initiatives. It is also reasonable to conclude that change management 
was not suitably conducted in coordination with prior Management Directorate 
technology strategies.  
Many studies argue that change cannot occur in isolation and that any change 
must be managed across multiple facets. Further, Harold Leavitt argues that change must 
be managed across four distinct points—organization, people, processes, and 
technology—of a diamond. Thus, for any technology strategy to succeed, it requires 
change management to align and assess the impacts of any strategy against these other 
three facets. As Leavitt’s Diamond demonstrates, a change to any of these factors will 
impact one, multiple, or all these facets. “Studies have shown that when one of these 
facets undergoes change without the other three facets also changing either deliberately 
or unintentionally in response to it, the remaining three facets will actually respond in a 
way to minimize the newly implemented initiatives.”65 Therefore, for the purpose of this 
thesis, Leavitt’s Diamond is an optimal model for analyzing how the Management 
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Directorate’s individual technology strategies influence the people, processes, and 
organization of DHS.  
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III. MANAGEMENT DIRECTORATE’S LACK OF A DEFINED 
IDENTITY 
A. INTRODUCTION  
This chapter explores the formative years of the Management Directorate, which 
was created in conjunction with the establishment of DHS. The chapter identifies and 
delves into the organizational dynamics and factors that impacted the Management 
Directorate’s initial focus and strategies, according to interviews with officials who led 
the Management Directorate during this time. There is also some discussion regarding 
how specific precedents set during the early years had cascading effects that continue to 
influence the Management Directorate’s focus and mission in present day.  
The data outlined within this chapter reveals that the Management Directorate 
was created in a highly political and turbulent environment with limited recognized 
authorities and significant constraints. The position of the USM was not a common 
position within other federal departments in 2003 when it was established for DHS. 
Therefore, there was no model or precedent for the early Management Directorate 
officials to use as a guide for establishing the organization’s mission, focus, authorities, 
and relationships within the newly formed Department, or with the Components that were 
collapsed into it. The result yielded an organization with not only limited authorities, 
direction, and resources, but also leaders who were overly tasked in both the creation of 
the DHS and the establishment of an unprecedented Management Directorate.  
After considering the background and environmental factors influencing the 
inception and early days of the Management Directorate, the remaining sections of this 
chapter discuss four specific interrelated impediments. These impediments were 
identified in the interviews as primary factors, which highly influenced the Management 
Directorate’s operational model and strategies.  
 38 
B. THE INCEPTION AND EARLY DAYS OF THE MANAGEMENT 
DIRECTORATE 
This section first explores the reasoning behind developing the Management 
Directorate in conjunction with the creation of DHS, and then examines how this 
rationale translated into and impacted the execution of the Management Directorate’s 
establishment. Interviews with many of the Management Directorate’s early leaders 
reveal an environment with numerous operational and tactical demands and unique 
challenges.  
The formation of DHS in January 2003 was the largest reorganization in the 
federal government since the creation of the U.S. Department of Defense in the late 
1940s. The initial role of the Management Directorate was to “establish a center for 
comprehensive management leadership. The lack of such a focal point is a serious 
omission in most executive departments, resulting in the dispersion of responsibility for 
promoting effective management among numerous second and third-tier officials.”66 As 
Dean and Ink observe in Meeting the Challenge of 9/11: Blueprints for More Effective 
Government, “Only by creating a post at the Under Secretary [of Management] level with 
this broad scope of authority could a DHS secretary hope to shape this extraordinarily 
complex department into an organization that could operate effectively under stress.”67 
Establishing the Management Directorate meant “building organizational structures and 
relationships to accomplish that [defending the homeland] mission. This meant 
integrating the numerous support functions of a new department. It meant working 
swiftly to get servers up, systems consolidated, and a stapler on every desk—all without 
moving forces from the protection of the country.”68  
However, one of the challenges associated with the USM position is that it does 
not have a peer counterpart within the DHS Components’ organization structure. This 
position is also relatively uncommon within the federal management structure, so there 
was not a prototype that could be referenced for establishing the position or its 
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authorities.69 This lack of a parallel USM counterpart, coupled with the fact that the 
USM position had no clear purpose or precedent in federal government, appears to have 
been an initial and contributing impediment in the maturation of the Management 
Directorate.  
Furthermore, there was a notion consistently alluded to by interview participants 
which was best summarized by prior DHS CFO Peggy Sherry when she said: 
“Government is hard, but DHS is harder.”70 This challenge stems from the “obvious 
management problem that arises from the aggregation of so many entities with legacy 
missions that are both diverse and not entirely consistent with the overriding terrorism-
related mandate given to DHS. Separate administrative systems and agency [Component] 
locations have further complicated effective consolidation.”71 As it pertains to the 
Management Directorate, there are numerous factors that have impacted its ability to 
develop an identity that aligns to its mission. That mission essentially tasks the 
Management Directorate with shaping a large, diverse, and complex Department into one 
that can operate effectively under stress, in addition to integrating its various support 
functions through establishing organization structures and relationships that will most 
effectively accomplish the Department’s operational missions. Unfortunately, many of 
the impeding factors are rooted in the manner in which the Management Directorate was 
established and the events of its early formative years and have therefore become the 
institutionalized modis operandi and de facto precedents.  
Janet Hale began serving as a Republican political transition appointee with the 
Department in November 2002, prior to its formal ratification in January 2003. She was 
formally appointed as the Department’s first USM shortly thereafter. She was one of the 
primary officials responsible for crafting the structure and focus of the Management 
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Directorate. She worked closely with the original Secretary Tom Ridge and strongly 
emphasized the importance of her complementary relationship with Secretary Ridge. Ms. 
Hale noted that despite a desire to focus on and emphasize the early establishment and 
integration of the Management Directorate’s roles, responsibilities, and early strategies, 
the demands of the “foundational building blocks” and day-to-day operations of the 
Department regularly demanded her full attention and “there were simply not enough 
hours in the day.” She noted that she was not only establishing and integrating a 
Directorate for which there was no precedent, but was also a key official in the initial 
creation of the entire Department—much of which was being consolidated from other 
departments and agencies (now referenced as “Components”). Ms. Hale described the 
Department’s formative days “as the equivalent of a mergers, divestitures, dotcom, and 
start-up of an international conglomerate rolled into one.” She also described many of the 
tactical activities involved in the formation and stand-up of the Department, such as 
recruiting and hiring staff, securing a physical DHS mailing address, and establishing a 
call center “to allow civilians to report terrorist attacks in the post 9/11 world.” 
Additionally, as it pertains to the creation of the Department she pointed out: 
We had to figure out how to get the agencies into the Department—and in 
many instances out of their donating department—and determine how to 
bring every asset, every employee, every contract, and transition them off 
the books of the donating department and into DHS. So, all this 
information was coming in and we had limited resources [within the 
Department] available to do anything with this it…and little institution 
knowledge of what we receiving—all the while figuring out how we 
ensured all personnel were paid.  
And despite these challenges, there were no delays in paychecks being released to 
DHS personnel. Ms. Hale discussed the lengths that the Management Directorate went to 
in an effort to ensure there were no disruptions in pay and noted “we couldn’t expect to 
ask our frontline personnel to fight al Qaeda, while worrying about if they were going to 
be paid or not.”  She also noted that if paychecks were missed or delayed that it would 
have placed the Department in an untenable position right from the start, yet she also 
noted that very few realized the amount of obstacles that were faced just to ensure 
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paychecks were not disrupted during the transitional period of transitioning employees 
from their donating department’s payroll system into DHS’s system. 
Ms. Hale also recalled the immense pressure, in large part due to commitments 
made to Congress (not by herself) that the new Department would be established with 
“no additional personnel” and would not detract from the missions of the agencies being 
collapsed into it. This point pertaining to “no additional resources” is substantiated by 
Susan Ginsburg who noted, “While Congress took the initiative in forming the 
Department, bargaining between the executive and legislative branches brought it to life. 
This produced only a qualified commitment to the department. The two branches agreed 
that DHS was to accomplish its initial consolidation with no net increase in the total 
funding that resulted from summing of each of the individual agency budgets.”72 
Furthermore, Ms. Hale opined that the Department was provided adequate resources at its 
inception; however, these resources primarily manifested themselves in the form of 
contract dollars. It was the lack of federal personnel with institutional knowledge of the 
policies, processes and cultures from the organizations being collapsed into the 
Department that detracted from the ability “to establish an agile Department that was 
flexible and adaptable to the evolving threats of our advisories.”  
Further, the Management Directorate, as perceived by the Components, appears to 
be synonymous with Headquarters.73 “The Components,” as former USM Elaine Duke, 
stated in reference to the early years of the Department, “were at this time hunkering 
down and establishing their territories within the Department at the same time the 
Management Directorate was standing itself up and understanding its own territory.”74 
She also explained the direct correlation between territories and appropriated funding 
levels. This dynamic stems from the “obvious management problem that arises from the 
aggregation of so many entities with legacy missions that are both diverse and not 
entirely consistent with the overriding terrorism-related mandate given to DHS. Separate 
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administrative systems and agency [Component] locations have further complicated 
effective consolidation.”75  
Along those lines, the demands and politics involved with creating the DHS in in 
tandem with) the Management Directorate failed to serve the interests of the Management 
Directorate. As the Management Directorate’s workforce was critical in leading and 
supporting the tactical activities of developing the Department, there was no opportunity 
to either focus on or resource the priorities of the Management Directorate effectively. 
Furthermore, workplace tension began to simmer, stemming from the Components’ 
attempts to establish their presence within the newly formed Department while they also 
sought to understand the purpose of the Management Directorate and its effects on their 
existence and operations. The combination of these strains and constraints resulted in 
misalignment between the Management Directorate’s intended purpose and the reality of 
its responsibilities, which established precedents that have been difficult to change. 
C. THE ROLL OF DATA AND THE LACK THEREOF   
A common theme that surfaced throughout almost all the interviews involves the 
dearth of management data that impacted the Management Directorate’s ability to make 
informed decisions. This was especially true in the early, formative years. However, there 
were specific activities and demands for which the Management Directorate was 
responsible, which were contingent on having data. This section will discuss the 
ramifications of having neither the management data, nor the systems or processes from 
which it could be built upon, and how the Management Directorate responded to these 
challenges. The discussion regarding data from this timeframe involved two primary 
themes: 1) the lack of enterprise systems and, 2) the lack of data interoperability within 
the Components’ data.  
As the Department evolved, a significant amount of time and energy was 
eventually devoted to the formal transition and related recordation of systems, assets, and 
people from their donating (pre-DHS) agencies, such as Department of Transportation 
and Immigration and Naturalization Services, to DHS. A substantial amount of 
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paperwork and records were generated to formalize these exchanges. However, with the 
exception of a human resources and payroll system, DHS did not have processes, 
procedures, or electronic systems pertaining to the capture and management of these 
records. Many of the interview participants acknowledged they did not know what data 
the Management Directorate had collected or where and how it was housed. It was 
recognized that the collected data was predominately housed on individuals’ local 
computers in spreadsheets and that processes and security protocols associated with the 
data varied by individual offices and divisions. And while this issue was a point of 
concern for several of the interviewees, many noted that it just did not resonate as a 
critical issue when compared to the other pressing, more tactical, mission-specific 
priorities the Department was facing in the early years.  
Despite this known lack of data, there were Congressionally required reports that 
needed to be produced by the Department, which were supposed to be representative of 
all of the Department’s Components. One such required report was the Department’s 
budget. Eugene Schied, who was the Department’s first budget director within the Office 
of the Chief Financial Officer, was responsible for the initial years’ budget processes and, 
thus, was tasked with generating this report to Congress. While the individual 
Components did submit their individual budgets, Mr. Schied noted that there was no clear 
way for the Management Directorate to create a “central” budget process during the first 
two years and that the initial internal attempt to do so did not occur until 2005. He 
described the conditions he faced in attempting to develop the budget in support of the 
Secretary in 2005 and noted some of the impeding factors included being completely 
dependent on email-driven data calls and a lack of controlling documents. He also cited 
as impediments 1) the high dependence on supplemental sources (as opposed to primary 
sources), 2) absence of tools or processes to validate the provided data, and 3) continued 
reliance on locally-housed spreadsheets where access control and version control were 
constant challenges. According to Mr. Schied, all these factors yielded a budget that had 
glaring and significant anomalies.  
Mr. Schied also expounded upon the lack of data consistency and interoperability, 
a factor that is inherent to any process dependent on centralizing data from across 
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disparate stakeholder groups via unstructured data calls. He noted that despite using 
Microsoft Excel spreadsheet templates with standard column fields to conduct data calls, 
each of the Components applied their own interpretation and business logic to the data 
fields being collected. When consolidated into a single Departmental spreadsheet, the 
Components’ data had significant discrepancies that clearly stemmed from a lack of 
consistent interpretation or business rules within the data. Mr. Schied recalled one 
instance where initial data suggested that minor programs within USCIS appeared to 
represent spending amounts larger than the U.S. Coast Guard’s fleet recapitalization 
efforts—a conclusion that could never be the case, he said.  
During this same 2004 timeframe, the Department was flagged for an Anti-
Deficiency Act violation, which was primarily due to funding challenges associated with 
the stand-up of the TSA and the Federal Air Marshall Services (FAMS).76 According to 
Mr. Schied, TSA required more than $1 billion in re-programming funds to meet their 
obligations, which the DHS Office of the Chief Financial Officer helped coordinate from 
across many of the other DHS Components. While DHS was ultimately successful in 
reprogramming the money to TSA, which was no small feat, the complexity and volume 
of the transactions required to do so resulted in an Anti-Deficiency Act violation for the 
Department. The Anti-Deficiency Act “prohibits federal agencies from obligations or 
expending federal funds in advance or in excess of an appropriation” and “once it is 
determined that there has been a violation of [this Act] 31 U.S.C. §§ 1341(a), 1342, or 
1517(a), the agency head ‘shall report immediately to the President and Congress all 
relevant facts and a statement of actions taken.”77 Anti-Deficiency reports “are to be 
signed by the agency head” and these reports are required to be submitted to the President 
via the Director of OMB.78 These violations are of serious concerns and federal 
individuals involved with the violations are susceptible to administrative and penal 
                                                 
76 Letter from Rep. Jim Turner (ranking member of the Select Committee on Homeland Security, U.S. 
House of Representatives, 108th Cong.) to the Inspector General of the Department of Homeland Security 
(June 14, 2004), http://www.govexec.com/pdfs/TurnerICELetter.pdf. 
77 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Anti-Deficiency Act website, Accessed October 28, 2015. 
http://www.gao.gov/legal/anti-deficiency-act/about.  
 78 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Anti-Deficiency Act website, Accessed October 28, 
2015. http://www.gao.gov/legal/anti-deficiency-act/about. 
 45 
sanctions. Management Directorate officials viewed this Anti-Deficiency Act violation as 
the result of not having consistent, transparent processes across the enterprise for the 
oversight and execution of financial transactions and the management of Departmental 
funds.  
The challenges associated with not having consistent, transparent Department-
wide processes and lexicons were compounded, according to a Congressional report, by 
the fact that “some of the agencies transferred to DHS came with known serious financial 
management problems. For example, four of the major agencies transferred…had a total 
of 18 material weaknesses in internal control reported by auditors for fiscal year 2002.”79 
Furthermore, as all the DHS Components except TSA were legacy agencies from other 
parent departments, they each brought with them their unique, legacy financial 
management practices, policies, processes, and accounting systems.80 As a mechanism to 
overcome this fragmentation, Congress in 2004 passed the DHS Financial Accountability 
Act, which “incorporated this new agency into a series of existing financial management 
laws and required DHS to get a clean opinion on its financial statements and its internal 
controls over financial reporting.”81  
These drivers, along with similar challenges associated with major, high visibility 
processes and reports (e.g., budget formulation and budget execution reports), contributed 
to the common perception by officials from the Office of the Chief Financial Officer that 
a single, unified financial management system (UFMS) was necessary to the foundational 
management practices of the Department. Many of the research participant recognized 
that in a corporate merger—which is how DHS was initially viewed at its inception—
migrating all parties onto a UFMS is a standardized best practice. Stacy Marcott 
specifically noted that, “in the initial stage of a corporate merger it is a standard textbook 
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mergers-and-acquisitions practice to migrate everyone onto the same infrastructure and 
systems.”82  
Along those lines, the perception that a UFMS was necessary for DHS was further 
strengthened by the fact that a few of the early Management Directorate’s leaders came 
from agencies that had operated enterprise-wide financial management systems. Two 
notable examples, one of whom was part of this research, include Janet Hale who came 
from the Department of Health and Human Services, and Bruce Carnes, who was the 
Department’s initial Chief Financial Officer (non-Senate confirmed) and had started his 
career at the Department of Defense. Ms. Hale indicated that both she and Mr. Carnes 
had been accustomed to having timely, relevant data to help steer decision-making in 
their previous positions, and that the data was provided via a UFMS system. This 
factor—the familiarity with unified financial management systems—was reflected upon 
by Ms. Hale and many of the other participants during their interviews as greatly 
influencing the Management’s Directorate’s early focus on the UFMS model. 
It was a culmination of all these factors that led the Management Directorate to 
pursue the acquisition of the eMerge2 solution, which was targeted to be an integrated 
financial, procurement, and asset management ERP system. The eMerge2 solution will be 
discussed further on in this thesis.  
In conclusion, the general unavailability of management data and, in the limited 
cases where data existed, its non-interoperable nature impacted the ability of the 
Management Directorate to perform certain fundamental responsibilities on behalf of the 
Department. The inability to perform these duties, combined with leaders who were 
accustomed to having management data via a UFMS in their prior governmental 
positions, led these leaders to conclude that acquiring and deploying an ERP was the 
appropriate strategy for the Management Directorate going forward.   
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D. MERGERS-AND-ACQUISITIONS AND ESTABLISHING THE 
MANAGEMENT DIRECTORATE’S WORKFORCE 
This section discusses impediments associated with attracting, recruiting, and 
developing the initial Management Directorate’s workforce. Additionally, it explores 
specific backgrounds and skillsets that were identified and targeted, yet unsuccessfully 
filled, which had implications on the Management Directorate’s ability to establish its 
foundational strategies and merge its role across the Department.  
USM Hale indicated that one of her early objectives was to recruit mid-level and 
senior-level managers from the donating departments and operating agencies that were 
being consolidated into the Department. Her intention was to build a team of subject 
matter experts with firsthand knowledge of the agencies’ key back-end business 
functions, such as budget formulation and execution, accounting, human capital, 
information technology, security and acquisition. This approach would have two primary 
benefits for the Department and Management Directorate. First, it would bring the 
Components’ authorities in specific management functions into the directorate to focus 
on establishing and scaling them across the enterprise. Second, it would establish 
credibility and pave the way for bridging relationships back to those agencies. However, 
Ms. Hale encountered many obstacles in establishing this workforce. One of obstacles 
stemmed from President William J. Clinton’s “National Partnership for Reinventing 
Government,” which was an interagency taskforce charged with reforming the way the 
federal government works and streamlining back-office governmental functions.83  One 
result of this taskforce was a reduction in government workforce in the same business 
areas Ms. Hale was attempting to staff. Ms. Hale recalled entering an environment where 
she was looking to partner with the DHS Components at a time where they were 
attempting to adapt to a smaller workforce.  “There simply weren’t enough breathing 
bodies for these agencies to conduct their current workloads,” Ms. Hale noted,  “and we 
[the Management Directorate] were adding to it – or perceived to be adding to it.”  She 
further noted that asking the Components to invest their personnel’s time to share their 
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institutional knowledge, support the Department, and deal with the reduced staffing 
models created some hardships. Another obstacle Ms. Hale encountered was that with 
exception of certain Components, such as USCG and USSS, there was minimal interest 
from the Components’ subject matter experts in leaving their organizations to join DHS 
within the Management Directorate or other areas within headquarters. Ms. Hale 
recognized that many of the Components, including CBP, ICE, and TSA, were 
experiencing massive change themselves and were wholly focused on transitioning their 
own organization. Nevertheless, there was a perception shared by many of the interview 
participants that there was reluctance to contribute to the stand-up of the Department due 
to the view that DHS’s creation was highly political and lacked long-term support. Along 
those lines, there was little confidence by the Components that the Department would be 
successful and few were willing to leave their agency to join an organization that as one 
author notes, “was hastily formed and was the product of as much political and policy 
conflict as consensus.”84  
As a result, Ms. Hale and the Department had to recruit officials from other 
federal government agencies and industry to fill these subject matter expert roles and to 
establish enterprise-level oversight. These roles were filled without significant personnel 
contributions from the Components, although these were the exact legacy agencies that 
would be ultimately impacted by the processes these individuals would establish. Ms. 
Hale turned to recruiting experienced personnel from other cabinet-level agencies, such 
as DOD, Department of Treasury, and HHS. However, tasking individuals who were not 
familiar with neither the Components’ missions and stakeholders nor their policies and 
processes to establish the initial Departmental business policies and strategies was 
observed by many to be a set-back. Ms. Hale noted that not having these resource 
synergies in the initial establishment of the Management Directorate had longstanding 
and cascading cultural and organizational impacts, especially as it pertained to 
establishing the foundational relationships with the Components. 
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This dynamic is represented in the backgrounds of the participants who were 
interviewed. While two of the executives actually came from DHS Components, the vast 
majority of them came from other federal agencies, including the Department of Defense 
(3), Department of Treasury (3), General Services Administration (1), and Government 
Accountability Office (1). Many of the participants shared a general recognition that bi-
directional rotational assignments (known as details) between the DHS Components and 
Management Directorate would have been valuable in bringing in critical mission context 
to the Management Directorate while conversely providing Management Directorate 
personnel an opportunity to gain firsthand insight into the Components missions and how 
the emerging policies and strategies would impact the Components. However, many of 
the participants expressed apprehension in pursuing this approach, pointing to several 
reasons—one of which included concern regarding the Components’ receptiveness to 
these rotational assignments. Many of the interviewees emphasized the general 
unwillingness and reluctance to partner with the Management Directorate, especially as it 
pertained to the prospect of bi-directional rotational assignments. While the disinclination 
of the Components to pursue these rotational partnerships were not directly discussed, it 
was inferred that the Management Directorate’s geographical and cultural disconnect 
from the Department’s missions is a contributor to this reluctance.  
Meanwhile, Ms. Hale also described how Components, including CBP and TSA, 
had contracted mergers-and-acquisitions consultants to assist in the strategy and 
execution of their own internal stand-up and transition into the Department. These “large 
international consulting firms were seen as the arms and legs” of these early Components 
and were largely responsible for the preliminary integration and strategy initiatives for 
these Components’ individual headquarters functions. Ms. Hale noted she had sought a 
mergers-and-acquisition service contract for the establishment and integration of the 
Management Directorate into the Department, but while the requirement was ultimately 
filled, it did not provide the value it had anticipated due to challenges with the 
procurement and its oversight. Ms. Hale recalled recognizing significant value in the 
activities these firms performed on behalf of their customers in the early days of the 
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integration of the Components and their transition into the Department.85  Ms. Hale said 
that not having a mergers-and-acquisition services contract comparable to those provided 
to CBP and TSA was an “opportunity lost” for having a force multiplier for driving 
enterprise integration and implementing more strategic focus and carving out the 
Management Directorate’s role during the initial years.    
Along the lines of needing to provide Management Directorate personnel access 
to the field and missions of the Department, USM Rafael Borras specifically noted that 
he established a “Next Generation Leadership” program, which executed a forum for 
providing visibility and access to mid-level Management Directorate employees to the 
DHS Components and their leadership. He said one facet of the program involved pulling 
these individuals “out of their cubes and taking them to where the Component’s 
performed the mission,” while at the same time providing them access to the leaders 
within the Components to see and hear firsthand about the DHS mission. Mr. Borras 
noted the importance of getting Management Directorate personnel occasionally out of 
the National Capital Region (NCR) “and away from the distractions and politics of D.C.” 
to travel to Components’ sites, and learn firsthand the mission-space where the 
Components performed. While this program appears to provide an opportunity for a 
handful of personnel to gain visibility of the DHS mission space, it is worth noting that 
only approximately 30 individuals participate in this program annually, which is a 
fraction of the Management Directorate’s workforce (noted as now over 2,000 
personnel).  
The implication is that a significant majority of the Management Directorate does 
not have access or visibility into the DHS missions performed outside of National Capital 
Region. This creates challenges for those responsible for driving strategy and writing 
policy in that there is minimal visibility and understanding of the operational application 
of these strategies and policies. Additionally, more than one interviewee reflected on the 
connection and alignment to mission which Component personnel feel and are resistant to 
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leaving. Additionally, it was repeatedly noted that the Management Directorate’s 
mission, while vital, has a tendency to be viewed by those across the Department as 
amorphous and fluctuating due to its reactive and unstructured nature, in addition to 
being seen as disconnected from the performance of the Department’s actual missions 
(e.g., counterterrorism, immigration, travel security, cyber security, etc.).  
Finally, it is worth noting that there is an appearance that the unstructured, 
reactive, and politically turbulent manner of DHS in general, but especially within the 
Management Directorate, contributes to poor morale. The Department as a whole has 
struggled with persistent and significant employee morale challenges, which have been 
on the decline since 2009 as measured in the Office of Personnel Management’s annual 
Employee Viewpoint Survey. While employee morale has been a consistent concern of 
DHS leadership, the results of the 2015 survey ranked DHS last for employee morale (19 
out of 19 for large agencies).86 Employee morale contributes to the inability to 
effectively drive and lead enterprise-wide changes and results in high levels of attrition 
across the Department. Poor morale and high attrition may also contribute to the 
Management Directorate’s inability to recruit and attract personnel who have crucial 
institutional knowledge of the legacy policies and processes and how they align to 
supporting the mission of the Department’s Components.  
In conclusion, there are many factors involving the Management Directorate’s 
early workforce that influenced its ability to establish and perform its mission. The 
inability to recruit and attract resident subject matter experts from the Components to 
leverage and scale their expertise and establish credibility was a major setback. Further, 
the early Management Directorate was not only handicapped by having to establish a 
workforce lacking institutional knowledge and credibility, but was also unable to obtain 
specialized mergers-and-acquisition services. These services were perceived as critical to 
developing and instituting foundational strategy and establishing the early focus of the 
Directorate. Multiple other DHS Components successfully acquired and capitalized on 
these same services, yet the one that needed to integrate all the Components did not. 
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These factors, coupled with the fact that the Management Directorate is housed in the 
National Capital Region far from where a vast majority of the DHS missions are 
performed, has created an environment where the Directorate is perceived as 
disconnected and unfamiliar with the DHS missions.  
E. THE IMPACT OF THE DHS MISSION ON THE MANAGEMENT 
DIRECTORATE 
This section explores another factor, which has impeded the ability of the 
Management Directorate to focus and execute its intended mission. This factor wholly 
pertains to the event-driven nature of DHS. In other words, the support and oversight 
required by the Management Directorate’s workforce for major events, combined with 
the sheer volume of events, such as hurricanes, supper storms, attempted bombings, and 
successful bombings, hat have occurred since the Department’s inception, has greatly 
impacted the ability of the Management Directorate to perform its core missions. As one 
USM explained, the success and failures of the various Management Directorates’ 
administrations cannot be evaluated without the context of the major events that occurred 
during their tenure.  
In August 2005, just 30 months into the Department’s life, two of the deadliest 
and most destructive storms to ever strike the continental United States—Hurricanes 
Katrina and Rita—touched down in coastal Louisiana, Mississippi and Texas. Ms. Hale 
explained that the emergency response and recovery missions associated with the 
aftermath of these storms were seen as the first “true emergency response test” of the 
Department. She went on to further recognize that much of the Department’s attention to 
that point had been focused on the terrorist threat and that “the all hazards and natural 
disasters’ response model had not yet been adopted.”  
And while she spoke of the significance of this initial test for DHS as a whole, she 
also spoke to its consequence in detracting from the initial strategies and focus of 
standing up the Management Directorate. She noted that the responsibilities required for 
the emergency response and recovery missions required all the focus, time, and energy of 
herself, her management team, and the majority of the Management Directorate’s 
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personnel. This theme, corresponding to the impacts of DHS’s event-driven culture on 
the ability of the Management Directorate to perform its core missions, was a consistent 
one expressed by many of the interview participants. In summary, while the DHS 
Components were inherently designed and staffed for responding to events as part of 
their core mission, the Management Directorate was leaned on to provide mission support 
and integration, which is a function not aligned to its core function or recognized in its 
staffing model. Therefore, when national events occurred, the same workforce that was 
responsible for executing the Management Directorate’s core mission was also tasked 
with providing mission support and integration to the emergency response and recovery 
missions across the Department.  
The impact of major homeland security events, such as the 2008 Hurricanes 
Gustav and Ike, the 2009 H1N1 flu pandemic, the 2009 Christmas Day attempted 
“underwear” bomb attack aboard a Detroit-bound flight, the 2010 concealed printer 
cartridge bombs, the 2010 Deepwater Horizon Spill, 2012 Super Storm Sandy, and 2013 
Boston Marathon bombing, commanded DHS’s—and by extension the DHS 
Management Directorate’s—leadership attention. The responses to these events span the 
USM and each of the Management Directorate’s lines of business, requiring time and 
resources from all levels of the organization. Many of the interview participants 
discussed the role DHS’s event-driven culture has on detracting leadership attention from 
the development and implementation of strategy. This dynamic was best articulated by 
Elaine Duke when she noted, “Management [Directorate] has suffered because no one 
ever really defined if it is an operations or an oversight organization.” Along those lines, 
Ms. Duke noted that in her opinion, “one of the mistakes made at the beginning of the 
Department was they did not develop a good line between what was Components’ 
operations and what was DHS Headquarters.” She went on to describe how not having 
this “good line” contributed further to a territorial atmosphere and substantial confusion 
surrounding the role of the Management Directorate’s personnel in its relationships to the 
Components.  
Ms. Duke went on to discuss how this lack of defined organizational mission 
impacts the Management Directorate and its priorities. To articulate her point, Ms. Dukes 
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referenced the Eisenhower Decision Matrix, as represented in Figure 2, and indicated that 
during her experience as CPO and USM, the Management Directorate appeared to 
operate in Quadrants I and III, where attention was given to topics of varying urgency, 
but questionable importance. However, she noted that there was limited time and 
resources to focus on activities associated with Quadrant II where strategies and planning 
emerge.87 The inability to operate in this quadrant had a direct bearing on the 
Management Directorate’s ability to establish, coordinate, and prioritize long-term 
strategies.  
Figure 2.  Eisenhower’s Decision Matrix 
 
 
Dwight D. Eisenhower is attributed with saying, “What is important 
is seldom urgent and what is urgent is seldom important” and for 
establishing the Eisenhower’s Decision Matrix.  There are 
numerous adaptations of this matrix found in the literature. One 
adaptation is provided and described by Drake Baer in “Dwight 
Eisenhower Nailed A Major Insight About Productivity” in a 
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To the point about the early territorial dynamics, another official (who requested 
not to be named) discussed the early relationship challenges between the Management 
Directorate and the Components and observed, “DHS wasn’t even a loose confederation 
of agencies [when it was established], back then it was more like rogue nations that 
happen to find themselves on the same continent.” This official went on to equate DHS to 
Europe in the post-Cold War era and the Management Directorate responsible for the 
establishment of the European Union.  
It was while discussing her individual and the collective Management 
Directorate’s role in the response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita that Ms. Hale described 
one of her regrets as USM. She indicated that she should have organized the Management 
Directorate under three primary functions to include: Operations, Policy, and Integration/
Strategy. This structure would have resulted in numerous tactical and strategic benefits 
for the Department and Management Directorate, she stated. Ms. Hale offered some 
examples of the benefits this structure would have provided, including: 1) cordoning 
personnel away from the operations and response missions to focus on long-term and 
strategic Management Directorate priorities (a strain that many of the Management 
Directorate executives still recognize is a struggle), 2) establishing a consistent 
organizational structure for each of the Chiefs to emulate and use in the founding of their 
executive office and its priorities, and 3) forming inherent and parallel stakeholder groups 
within each of the Chief’s offices as a means to drive integration and common goals 
across the lines of business.  
When this organizational structure concept was posed to the other interviewees, 
many concurred with Ms. Hale’s assessment, recognizing that this structure would be of 
value, and acknowledging a lack of organizational consistency and uniformity within and 
across the Management Directorate’s chief executive offices. Many of the interviewees 
recognized that while a semblance of this structure existed within each Chief’s office, it 
was not incorporated in a standard manner and, with some general exceptions, they were 
not aware if and how their Chief counterparts had organized around these three core 
areas. All participants agreed that the reactive and operational nature of the DHS 
missions, coupled with the breadth of oversight groups, required an organization where 
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segments of the workforce are allowed to focus on maturing the business functions in 
terms of writing policy, implementing oversight, conducting assessments, and identifying 
integration opportunities. One joked that “Management Directorate” was perceived as the 
“management of the National Capital Region” and went on to note the significant “time 
suck” that NCR operations had on the performing their other mission areas. Another 
participant recognized that the Management Directorate suffers from the “tyranny of the 
moment from which it cannot escape.”  
Additionally, Mr. Myers and Ms. Marcott both spoke about the critical 
importance of dedicating time and resources towards establishing and formalizing policy 
and developing strategy. It was emphasized that DHS is a chaotic environment that is 
highly reactive and tactical and that priorities tend to align with the political cycle. The 
political cycle is an important factor due to the fact that the DHS Secretary, Under 
Secretary, Chief Financial Officer and Chief Information Officer are each politically 
appointed positions. And while the “DHS Reform Act of 2007” states that the deputies of 
these officials shall be career appointees as a means for maintaining continuity across the 
political cycles, there have been numerous examples where this simply has not been the 
case. For example, from 2011 through 2014 both the Under Secretary of Management 
and the Deputy Under Secretary of Management were both political appointees.  
Mr. Myers and Ms. Marcott also each noted the importance of ensuring an 
investment was made in strategic planning and activities that transcended the political 
cycle and were focused on initiatives five to 10 years in the future. It is worth noting that 
seven of the participants from this research were political appointees while at DHS. All, 
however, had prior federal government experience prior to joining DHS and many spoke 
of their commitment to public service and the DHS mission. In other words, despite being 
political appointees whose tenures were associated with the political cycle, many spoke 
of a deep commitment to the mission of DHS and desire to position it for long-term 
success.  
In conclusion, the impact of major events has significantly influenced the ability 
of the Management Directorate to maintain focus and continuity on its intended missions. 
Furthermore, other factors, such as the influence and role of the political cycle and the 
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lack of a consistent organizational alignment around its core functions, have also 
combined to impede the Management Directorate’s ability to effectively and consistently 
execute its missions across the Management Directorate. It is incumbent upon the 
Management Directorate’s leadership, most notably the career appointees, to push an 
organizational model and long-term strategic initiatives that transcend the chaotic, 
reactive, and politically charged nature of the Department and allows the workforce to 
focus on executing them.   
F. ROLL OF EXECUTIVE SECRETARY AND THE LACK OF 
INSTITUTIONAL GOVERNANCE 
This chapter discusses the dynamic between the DHS Office of the Executive 
Secretary and Under Secretary of Management, with specific attention on how the 
individual priorities and leadership styles influence the Management Directorate’s ability 
to engage with the Components and drive change. It explores how the lack of institutional 
governance, combined with the political cycle’s influence on leadership attrition, impacts 
continuity of operations and execution of the Management Directorate’s mission. It also 
addresses how this dynamic contributes to the perception that priorities are myopically 
and short-term focused due to the influence of the political cycle.   
One of the more telling insights regarding the perceptions of the Management 
Directorate was revealed during an interview with Eugene Schied. Mr. Shied offers a 
unique perspective because he is the only research participant previously employed by 
the Management Directorate who currently works for one of the Components, CBP, 
where holds the position of CBP’s Chief Financial Officer and Chief Administration 
Officer. Mr. Schied, when discussing the dynamic between the Management Directorate 
and their Component counterparts, observed “human nature is to take the path of least 
resistance to obtaining the objective.” He went on to explain that because the 
Management Directorate’s role and organizational governance was not formalized, the 
Components’ interactions with Management Directorate stakeholders tended to fluctuate 
in response to how the Office of the Executive Secretary positioned them within the 
decision-making process.  
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Mr. Schied also noted that the involvement and priorities of the USM and 
DUSM—combined with the relationships of these individuals with the Secretary and 
Deputy Secretary—also contributed significantly to the level of engagement the 
Components had with coordinating with and through the Management Directorate. Mr. 
Schied explained that during certain Secretary administrations, the Components worked 
directly with the Office of the Executive Secretary with minimal inclusion of 
Management Directorate. During other administrations, he went on to note, the Secretary 
required Components to engage with and coordinate through Management Directorate 
prior to engaging the Secretary’s office. When asked which model was more conducive 
for the Components, he responded “either one,” explaining that the Components want a 
decision and are flexible to adapting their processes to whatever model provides them 
with a decision in an effective manner. Essentially, if the model necessitates the inclusion 
of the Management, then they will coordinate with Management. If either the Secretary 
or the process does not require the inclusion of Management Directorate, then the 
Components will forego their involvement. Mr. Schied made it clear his observations 
were not a reflection of the Components’ perception of the Management Directorate or its 
personnel, but a desire to arrive at a decision in an expeditious manner. “It is just human 
nature,” he said.  
Other participants concurred with Mr. Schied’s observations regarding the roll of 
the Management Directorate fluctuating with the preferences and styles of DHS 
executive leadership, and some offered specific examples of how the Management 
Directorate’s role and authorities appeared to fluctuate based on the Executive Secretary 
(i.e., the Secretary’s leadership preferences and relationship with the Under Secretary of 
Management). Many also noted that the authorities and engagement of the Management 
Directorate had a direct correlation to, as Ms. Duke put it, “the coalition of the willing.” 
She explained that through her tenure as CPO and USM many hard-fought efforts were 
made to develop management policies and processes, but as she and David Norquist 
(DHS CFO during this timeframe) transitioned out as republican-appointed “politicals” 
(after President Obama won the election), many of their initiatives “slid back down 
because they had not been institutionalized and there was not a coalition of the willing 
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established behind them to push them back up.” She clarified that this was a not a 
reflection on her successors, but a consequence of the leadership gap that emerges in 
conjunction with the political cycle.  
As it pertains to the current DHS Secretary’s leadership style, multiple 
participants observed that current DHS Secretary Jeh Johnson had a long-standing 
relationship with and had personally selected the current USM, Russ Deyo. This 
relationship, coupled with Secretary Johnson’s perceived focus on developing 
Departmental processes, is currently bolstering the roll of the Management Directorate in 
the Components’ engagement with the Department. It was also mentioned multiple times 
that the Senate-confirmed CFO who is also the current acting Deputy USM Chip 
Fulghum’s focus on developing enterprise-wide processes is resulting in synergies for the 
Management Directorate, as he is able to yield more oversight and influence. However, 
equally mentioned was that the Obama Administration has little more than a year left in 
office and that the political appointees tied to his Administration, such as Mr. Deyo and 
Mr. Fulghum, have limited time remaining to accomplish and institutionalize their 
objectives before they begin transitioning out.   
In conclusion, the lack of leadership continuity in conjunction with the lack of 
institutional governance contributes to an environment where the Management 
Directorate is further susceptible to the influence of the political cycle and the associated 
leadership turnover. These factors have a direct bearing on the ability to implement and 
institutionalize enterprise-wide, long-term strategic initiatives. It also creates an 
environment where Components are hesitant to invest in the initiatives and partnerships 
affiliated with the Management Directorate based on the uncertainty surrounding the next 
Administration’s objectives and priorities.  
G. FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS 
The apparent lack of a defined set of authorities and institutionalized governance 
has left the role of the Under Secretary of Management ill-defined and fluctuating with 
the leadership styles and focus of the Executive Secretary and the individual appointed 
into the USM position. Additionally, the reactive, event-driven nature of the Department, 
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which—despite the Management Directorate’s mission to be a strategic enabler for the 
business of the Department—has continually detracted leadership’s attention and 
resources from the focus towards implementing and overseeing standardized policies, 
instructions, governance, and other business enabling tools and systems. These activities 
combined comprise what is perceived as one of the principal missions of the 
Management Directorate, yet they suffer due to the event-driven nature of the 
Department and other “urgent, but not important” competing priorities, such as the 
operational activities of the National Capital Region.  
Meanwhile, the lack of a clear mission, leadership attrition, disjointed 
organizational structure, and fragmented priorities have left the organization as being 
perceived as lacking a consistent identity. This is especially true when contrasting the 
individual priorities and internal organization of the Management Directorate’s lines of 
business as constructed under the chief executive officers. These offices were established 
without consistency and consideration to an overarching set of principles. With limited 
exceptions, these offices do not have consistent organizational alignment and lack 
integration. Because the organization as a whole suffers from too many priorities, cross 
line of business coordination of priorities has been a consistent challenge, due to a lack of 
shared venture in coordinating and executing priorities.  
Striving towards a more standard, consistent organizational model focused on 
core mission areas of operations, policy, and integration and strategy within each chief 
executive office could result in increased integration, stakeholder alignment, more mature 
integrated policies, and a generally more coordinated and effective Directorate. It is 
worth noting that while there is a “Management Integration Office” within the 
Management Directorate, it appears from the data to be strictly in name only and lacks 
influence over strategy or actual internal integration of the offices comprising the 
Directorate. This office appears more to be an advisory group to the USM that focuses on 
external stakeholder coordination.  
An early focus on IT systems—specifically enterprise-wide transactional 
systems—appears also to be commonly viewed as a misstep that detracted from focusing 
on these foundational activities. These transactional IT management systems initiatives 
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are contingent on a management operational model founded on standardized policies, 
processes, business rules and configuration. Given that these principles simply did not 
exist, these systems could have been successful without first having established the 
aforementioned foundational management principles.  
All participants noted that the Management Directorate operates in an 
environment where data could not be collected and analyzed in a consistent and 
standardized manner. The result is an environment where data, if it exists, is managed in 
silos and is not regularly available for leadership consideration in the decision-making 
process. Many participants indicated that systems-generated data was not even a 
consideration for them when making a decision during their tenure. 
It was these contributing factors, combined with the extensive consolidation of 
numerous large legacy agencies that led the GAO to assess DHS as high-risk for lacking 
“Management Integration” in 2003. While DHS, led by the Management Directorate, has 
made significant strides in addressing some of the root issues and early documented 
challenges, it currently remains on this high-risk list a decade later.   
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IV. MANAGEMENT DIRECTORATE’S ROLE IN POLICY, 
OVERSIGHT, AND GOVERNANCE  
A. INTRODUCTION 
It was recognized in the previous chapter that the Management Directorate suffers 
from an ill-defined fluctuating mission space, which is rooted in the lack of institutional 
governance and having to balance too many priorities, but it should also be noted that 
there have been consistent efforts to address these issues. One area of focus emphasized 
during the interviews is that the Management Directorate does have the apparent 
authority to conduct oversight and assess performance. It was clear the research 
participants perceived one of the Management Directorate’s core missions as not only 
establishing management policies and instructions, but also conducting oversight and 
assessing performance of them.  
This chapter discusses tools the Management Directorate should pursue and 
utilize to effectively establish the capabilities to perform this core mission, in addition to 
integrating the business functions aligned under the Management Directorate’s lines of 
business. There was consensus among participants that instituting consistent principles 
and practices were predicated on having clearly defined, formalized delegations of 
authority, policies, and management instructions. Despite the fact that officials from 
every Executive Secretary’s administration seemingly recognize the importance of 
having these governance documents solidified, there have been consistent challenges in 
getting them drafted, reviewed and cleared in a timely manner. This issue will be further 
discussed later in the thesis. But while progress has been slow is this area, there has 
indeed been progress—and participants provided examples demonstrating how the 
maturation of the authorities, policies, and instructions translated into more consistent, 
rigorous business practices for the Department. Along these lines, one specific area of 
value that will be discussed in this chapter is the use of industry/government standards as 
an integral part of instating policy and management instruction.  
The ability to utilize audits as a change agent emerged as a key theme throughout 
the interviews. An audit presents numerous opportunities, which, if leveraged 
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appropriately, can provide both tangible and intangible benefits to the Management 
Directorate as well as partnership opportunities with the DHS Components. This chapter 
will discuss the opportunities presented by these audits.  
Furthermore, there are integration and governance-enabling tools that the 
Management Directorate has the authority to utilize and has invested in establishing. 
These tools include enterprise portfolio governance and enterprise architecture, which 
were regularly cited as foundational in their ability to transform, mature and integrate the 
Department’s management functions. However, these tools have not had their intended 
effect. This chapter will explore these tools in an attempt to better understand why they 
have not been able to be institutionalized.  
B. COMPONENT ENGAGEMENT FACTORS 
This section discusses how the Management Directorate should engage with and 
execute its authorities over the DHS Components with specific attention on the various 
options that were given consideration. While there was not a defined model that was 
recognized as the best, there were models that were identified as ill-suited when given 
consideration to other cultural and environmental factors.  
It was specifically stated that despite invitations by Congress to do so, the Under 
Secretary of Management declined to adopt a “command-and-control” model in which 
the Components would have a “dotted line” reporting structure to the USM. On this 
point, Mr. Borras asserted that declining this model was the “right decision as it would 
have resulted in a formal reporting model that would have contributed to another level of 
bureaucracy in an organization where there is already too much of it.”88 Additionally, it 
was further noted by Mr. Borras that attempting to drive enterprise-wide standardized 
operating procedures (SOPs) also would not have been successful within DHS. Mission 
disparity and legacy processes and systems within the DHS Components were cited as 
prohibitory to establishing SOPs.  
                                                 
88 Rafael Borras (former DHS Under Secretary of Management), in discussion with the author, August 
27, 2015. 
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The lack of a command-and-control model combined with a lack of SOPs appears 
to handicap the Management Directorate’s authority and ability to influence change. 
However, when asked which tools the Management Directorate should be utilizing to 
conduct oversight and drive change, multiple participants pointed to needing to have the 
“right” policies and directives in place, combined with the ability to assess and conduct 
oversight of the Component’s processes as aligned to the Management Directorate’s lines 
of business. Additionally, the use of audits, governance, and enterprise architecture were 
also noted as tools that should be further utilized, which will be discussed later in this 
chapter.  
C. DEVELOPING THE “RIGHT” POLICIES 
This section will explore a core theme that was identified consistently and 
repeatedly during the interviews and involves the role of the Management Directorate in 
formalizing delegations of authority, publishing policies, establishing management 
instructions, and conducting oversight. Each of the interviewed USMs noted that during 
their tenure there was recognition that the current delegations and policies were 
ambiguous and lacked a level of clarity and definiteness. Each indicated a strategic focus 
on driving the Management Directorate’s Chiefs toward developing, revisiting, and 
formalizing their policies (also known as “management directives”) and management 
instructions as a key objective of their administration. However, it was noted there were 
numerous obstacles into accomplishing these objectives.  
One obstacle included significant pressure exerted on the Management 
Directorate by DHS Components and other stakeholders to keep policies written at high, 
generic levels and in deference to existing federal regulations, such as the Federal 
Acquisition Regulations and Financial Management Regulations, which are fundamental, 
mission-agnostic regulations that are supposed to be the foundation of departmental 
policies but not the totality. Many of the interview participants recalled submitting more 
rigorous policies through their policy review governance boards, which are comprised of 
Component representatives and other Management participants, only to have the policies 
emerge diluted.  
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Attempting to find a balance between the Management Directorate’s desire for 
auditable, definitive policies and instructions as compared to the Components’ desire to 
tailor policies towards their mission and culture contributed to time and resource-
intensive processes tied to the development and clearing of policies. The fact that each 
USM between 2003 and 2014 identified the need for more granular, audit-ready policies 
and instructions is an example of the challenges the Department faces in this area and 
would appear as a contributing factor to why DHS remains on the GAO high-risk list due 
to a “lack of management integration.”  
Another factor contributing to the inability to expeditiously clear new 
management policies and instructions is the breadth of stakeholders involved in the 
review and clearance processes. In addition to the Management Directorate’s line of 
business that owns the policy and, if it existed, the corresponding policy review 
governance board, other stakeholders influencing the clearance process include the 
Management Directorate’s front office and legal office, the DHS Office of Policy, and 
the Office of the General Council. The dynamic between the DHS Office of Policy and 
the Management Directorate has also been a long-standing point of confusion. The 
Management Directorate is tasked with developing policy and conducting oversight of its 
core lines of business Department-wide, yet there is a whole office within DHS 
headquarters dedicated to policy. Former USM Elaine Dukes noted that the relationship 
and boundaries between the Management Directorate and the Office of Policy was seen 
as an impediment as it pertains to developing and clearing policies in an effective and 
timely manner.  
Recognizing these delays in the clearance process, Scott Myers—in his time as 
Deputy Chief Readiness Support Officer—said that to overcome these obstacles with 
issuing new policies he would regularly release and distribute policies and instructions to 
the Components in “draft” form (with a watermark indicating as such) while these 
documents were still in the formal review process.89 Despite the fact that these items 
were in a draft state, he explained that he referenced them and began to operate as if they 
                                                 
89 Scott Myers (former DHS Deputy Chief Administrative Officer), in discussion with the author, 
August 26, 2015. 
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were already formally recognized with both Management Directorate and Component 
stakeholders. Mr. Myers noted that, notwithstanding their “draft” watermark status, he 
was successful in positioning these policies and instructions as if they were in a final state 
with minimal resistance. When these documents were eventually cleared and formalized, 
he simply would capture any changes, which were typically marginal, and remove the 
“draft” watermark from the most current version. His position was that the published 
draft version had been sufficiently recognized and propagated and that the formalization 
of the artifact was strictly ceremonial by that point. However, irrespective of available 
workarounds, almost all participants referenced the inability to efficiently and effectively 
clear new policies and instructions as a source of frustration.  
As it pertained to developing “audit-ready” policies, Mr. Borras recalled a 
specific example when the Management Directorate was preparing a response to a GAO 
audit. Mr. Borras recounted how he pulled out the corresponding policy and walked 
through it with his leadership team to determine if he could get consensus of its meaning 
and interpretation within his team. When he could not, he used it as a challenge to his 
Chiefs to develop policies that were more granular, definitive, and could stand-alone—
meaning they did not require significant interpretation.  
Furthermore, a handful of the interview participants noted a desire to drive their 
policies and instruction towards including references to industry-defined standards, such 
as those published by the ISO and ASTM standards bodies. In fact, Mr. Borras said he 
wanted to get one of the Management Directorate’s core business processes ISO certified 
as a means to demonstrate “that government had the ability to operate at an optimal 
performance standard as defined by industry.” While obtaining this ISO certification was 
never achieved, those executive participants who served under Mr. Borras recognized 
that significant strides were made with fortifying policies and directives. And while the 
use of standards was in fact the goal, Mr. Borras clarified that striving towards “optimal 
standards” was his actual goal.  
Along those lines, Mr. Myers provided an example of how industry standards 
were used to assist in the fortification of management instruction. His example pertained 
to a situation when DHS was facing an OIG audit regarding to insufficient inventory 
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controls associated with the Department’s personal property to include its most sensitive 
property—firearms and weapons. Turning to ASTM voluntary consensus standards, Mr. 
Myers was able to target a published standard known as “Equipment Control 
Classification” that provided a methodology for categorizing property into tiers of 
criticality and risk and which aligned the tiers to the appropriate level of accountability 
controls. Mr. Myers tailored the methodology defined in the ASTM standard to the 
Department’s personal property inventory and formally referenced the standard as 
applied to DHS within its corresponding Management instruction. This approach was 
successful in demonstrating to the auditors how DHS would implement and differentiate 
appropriate levels of accountability controls for categories of property that assumed the 
most risk (e.g., weapons and firearms). The ability to base this approach on industry-
recognized standards helped streamline the implementation and review processes, 
because it carried an industry-recognized authority.   
In discussions with Mr. Schied pertaining to the role of the Management 
Directorate, he noted that the use of standards established and propagated by the 
Management Directorate had demonstrated value to the Components. One specific 
example Mr. Schied used was the Department’s “Square Footage Space Standard,” which 
essentially specified that the average square footage allocated to each person was 150 
square feet. What Mr. Schied appreciated was that while the Management Directorate 
would provide options and support pertaining to how to accomplish this standard, it was 
contingent on him to tailor and align it to the unique organizational and mission factors 
within CBP. This balance of having a “Headquarters” driven standard, but allowing it to 
be applied by the Components to their distinct mission is critical. Mr. Schied went on to 
explain that having this specific space standard has provided him a catalyst to engage the 
mission owners to assess their actual real estate requirements and best fit their space to 
the mission. The result has been a reduction in the real estate footprint and the associated 
operational costs. The savings from these business costs has translated directly back to 
more funding for the mission programs. Mr. Shied noted that he cannot take a blanket 
approach to this model and must adapt it to the individual CBP mission program, which 
demonstrates that there needs to be contextual and operational considerations when 
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applying these standards. In summary, he acknowledged that the use of Headquarters-
established standards, such as the square footage space standard, coupled with the 
opportunity to apply and implement them in consideration of the mission requirements 
was providing a model where “business can complement and better enable the mission of 
the Components.”  
In conclusion, Mr. Borras referred to the focus on developing exacting 
delegations of authority, management policies, and instructions, which should look to 
industry or government standards when applicable, as “the hard-wiring and plumbing of 
the Management Directorate.” He noted that this is the “unsexy work that will never be 
seen or recognized by Congress or garner any attention in the form of a journal article,” 
but which is crucial for establishing the necessary authorities and defining the rules and 
structures from which the Management Directorate can execute and operate. However, it 
needs to be recognized that these activities will never be complete—the hard-wiring and 
plumbing will never be finished—and will require consistent, continual investment and 
management by the Management Directorate to integrate and mature both horizontally 
and vertically in its business areas.  
D. OVERSIGHT AND ASSESSMENT  
This section will discuss the Management Directorate’s “Assessment” authority, 
which was identified as a primary tool for the Management Directorate to engage the 
Components and conduct oversight. This “Assessment” authority is especially relevant 
given consideration to the lack of a command-and-control structure or ability to pursue 
SOPs. However, there was acknowledgment from the interview participants that that 
ability to engage with the Components for oversight purposes must be done in a nuanced 
and deliberate manner.  
Although a common theme within the interviews, Mr. Myers summarized it best 
when he described that Management “Assessment” authority should be used as a 
mechanism to engage the Components in a forum based on the clarification, 
interpretation, and implementation of the Management Directorate’s policy and 
instruction. Mr. Myers—along with others—were emphatic that these assessment forums 
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could not be used for punitive means or as the basis for criticizing the Components. Many 
participants emphasized that developing a collaborative environment with the 
Components was key and required an environment of trust, respect, and transparency. 
And despite many of the Components’ positions, it also requires collective recognition 
that the Management Directive does, in fact, have the authority to conduct assessments. 
However, this environment needs to emerge from a position where Management 
Directorate officials recognize that despite being the policy owner and considered 
“Headquarters,” they are not the authority or more knowledgeable than their Component 
counterparts. Since the Components play a critical role in tailoring and implementing the 
Management Directorate’s policies and instructions to their respective mission and 
operational space, a collaborative partnership model based on the recognition of 
Management Directorate’s assessment authority is crucial to this relationship. This 
partnership model is also critical for mitigating identified audit findings, removing DHS 
from GAO’s high-risk list, and developing a Departmental “Unity of Effort” culture.  
The use of audits and the relationship between the Management Directorate 
officials and audit stakeholders, such as the GAO and OIG, was also noted as a key factor 
in managing change. Mr. Norquist recognized that the Management Directorate 
oftentimes has limited access to “carrots or sticks” from which to drive change across the 
Components. However, audits are indeed one of the few mechanisms from which change, 
if managed appropriately, can be shaped and instituted. It was recognized that once the 
Management Directorate learned of an emerging audit that was to be conducted, an 
effective practice was to engage and partner with auditors to help drive change in specific 
areas of concern. In other words, the Management Directorate did not request or initiate 
audits, but once initiated by the GAO or OIG, would attempt to influence them through 
partnering with the auditors to steer them towards areas of strategic focus and value for 
the Department.  
Additionally, it was emphasized that Management Directorate officials did not 
view audits as targeted strictly at the Components. On the contrary, it was noted that an 
audit of a Component or business function was a reflection on—and in some manners an 
audit of—the Management’s Directorate’s associated line of business, because it had 
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equities in the audit findings and are ultimately the policy owner. In fact, Mr. Myers 
explained he would often use an audit as a mechanism for taking on some of the 
liabilities stemming from the findings, as opposed to allowing the findings to be focused 
solely on the Component. He said he would “buy some liability” from the auditors and 
Components. He explained his thought process was that by establishing a sense of 
“shared liability,” he was contributing to a shared sense of ownership and developing a 
partnership model that would not only benefit the Department in responding to and 
mitigating the audit findings, but would also establish a relationship of camaraderie with 
the Components that could be used in other strategic areas.   
One of the more common, specific audit findings assessed against the 
Management Directorate is that it lacks sufficient assessment tools from which it can 
conduct oversight. This inability to conduct oversight contributed to the perceptions of 
many Management Directorate officials, especially in the Department’s early years, that 
implementing enterprise-wide IT systems was a requirement for addressing these related 
audit findings. However, the ability to successfully conduct oversight was recognized as 
being highly dependent on and intertwined with data. In other words, in lieu of actually 
conducting first-hand assessments, the collection and analysis of standardized data is 
required for the purposes of the Management Directive’s assessments. However, a 
prerequisite of successfully collecting and normalizing information in a confederated 
environment, as is DHS, is having defined and institutionalized data dictionaries, 
business rules, reporting requirements, and reporting systems, which need to be 
established upon legislative, regulatory, and policy requirements to be effectively and 
consistently adopted and institutionalized. As will be discussed later in this section, DHS 
has been unsuccessful in acquiring and implementing enterprise-wide transactional 
business systems from which this type of information can be captured and collected.  
In conclusion, while traditional mechanisms for driving change have not 
materialized for the Management Directorate, there are indeed instruments available to 
institute enterprise-level change. The Management Directorate’s authority to conduct 
oversight and perform assessment is foundational to driving this change and performing 
its mission. The ability to perform its oversight and assessment duties is predicated on 
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having clear, defined policies and instructions, which has been a long-standing area of 
focus for the Management Directorate. Additionally, the ability to influence and steer 
emerging audits and utilize them as a reflection of both its own policies and instructions 
and the Component’s performance is another mechanism which is proving successful in 
building and maturing synergies between the Management Directorate and the 
Components. This oversight and assessment model, combined with altruistically 
engaging around shared risks and shared interests, appears to be the one best suited to the 
Management Directorate.   
E. REGULATORY REPORTING AS A SPRINGBOARD TOWARDS 
OVERSIGHT  
The use of management instructions, which are individual documents used to 
augment an associated policy to define more prescriptive, process-level guidelines, to 
define reporting requirements and standards has been a key tool used to begin driving 
standardized data definitions across the department. The Management Directorate, albeit 
in the confines of its individual lines of business and not until the 2010–2011 timeframe, 
started using directives and instruction as a means to define a standard lexicon and 
associated set of standardized business rules.  
Re-enforcing this approach was the decision to consolidate and centralize the 
annual reporting requirements associated with regulatory oversight bodies, such as the 
Government Accountability Office, Congress, and the General Services Administration. 
Historically, in many cases the Components would report their data directly to the 
corresponding reporting tools and, while there may be in some cases an opportunity to 
review the data, there was no ability for the Management Directive to validate, influence, 
or normalize the data from across all the Components. These regulatory reporting 
requirements, which are typically based on the government’s Fiscal Year schedule, was 
perceived as an opportunity by the Management Directorate to consolidate data and to 
institute oversight measures surrounding the reports’ corresponding data elements.  
For example, for the purposes of reporting each Department’s federal real estate 
footprint, OMB has established the Federal Real Property Council (FRPC) as the 
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authoritative board for establishing and defining the data elements and associated 
business rules that federal agencies will utilize to report their real estate to OMB into a 
system referred to as the Federal Real Property Profile (FRPP). As opposed to each DHS 
Component reporting directly to this system, Mr. Myers determined that the Components 
would report their data to the Management Directorate where it could be verified, 
validated, and analyzed not only for reporting purposes to the FRPP, but also for other 
analytical and decision-making purposes. It was these regulatory reporting requirements 
that formed the basis for the Management Directorate to begin collecting data in a 
consistent and standardized manner. The fact that OMB established these requirements 
provided a change agent that DHS typically lacked when attempting to move towards 
obtaining standardized data. This FRPP example is just one of many regarding how the 
Management Directorate began utilizing regulatory and legislative requirements as a 
mechanism to collect data and was the foundation for future strategies associated with 
information consolidation. Further, in lieu of enterprise-wide systems and a lack of access 
to the Component transactional source systems, multiple interview participants 
emphasized the importance of using regulatory reporting requirements as a means to 
drive towards data standardization. 
F. ROLE OF ENTERPRISE PORTFOLIO GOVERNANCE 
A common frustration identified by many of the participants, but most commonly 
by individuals associated with the Chief Information Officer, was the lack of 
institutionalized governance used by leaders at all levels of DHS. Mr. Spires specifically 
noted an example of sitting in meetings at DHS Headquarters with more than 70 leaders 
from across the Department and discussing strategic objectives. He recalled being 
frustrated with how each Component approached their missions in isolation with little 
functional relationship to other Components that operated in the same mission space.90 
He also recalled being discouraged with the amount of anecdotal evidence used and the 
lack of data being used to quantify decisions. He went on to note the example of how in 
one DHS mission labeled “screening of people,” there was no less than five DHS 
                                                 
90 Richard Spires (former DHS Chief Information Officer), in discussion with the author, September 
11, 2015.  
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Components involved and playing a significant role. Yet, regularly at meetings involving 
the senior-most leaders of DHS, there was little discussion, organization, and planning 
towards an integrated approach to fulfilling mission objectives in a unified and 
confederated manner. This lack of a cohesive approach to the missions was an area that 
Mr. Spires felt could be significantly improved through the adoption of enterprise and 
portfolio governance, which was a core priority during his tenure as the DHS CIO.   
The interviews revealed that when considering the role of the political cycle, 
combined with the high-level of attrition DHS experiences within its leadership ranks 
across its 22 Components, the lack of institutional governance is a significant 
impediment. To this end, Ms. Sherry noted an instance when she was DHS CFO and had 
to drop everything she was doing to ensure that she got a signature from a specific 
Component executive before his planned departure from a DHS Component. She 
explained how if she had not been able to get the signature of the exiting official, it would 
have stymied her ability to move the initiative forward because the Component would not 
have endorsed any progress until the position was formally filled. It is important to note 
that filling this vacancy, as is typically the case in government hiring, could take 
anywhere from many months to more than a year. Cases such as this, where the ability to 
move initiatives forward is directly associated to individuals and the personal 
relationships between the Management Directorate’s and Component’s leaders, 
demonstrate the impacts of not having an institutionalized enterprise governance from 
which decisions can be facilitated. Meanwhile, other participants also reflected on the 
importance of personal relationships as a key driver of success within the Management 
Directorate and across the Department in lieu of formalized governance.  
Mr. Spires said the objective of enterprise governance is “at its core, to have key 
executives across the enterprise determine the optimal allocation of capabilities and 
resources across programs to best support the achievement of mission outcomes.”91 He 
further explained that this involves bringing executives engaged in discussing the 
                                                 
91 Richard Spires, July 11, 2011, blog posting on CIO.gov, “Enterprise and Portfolio Governance 
Critical to Ensure IT is Strategically Supporting Your Agency,” https://cio.gov/enterprise-and-portfolio-
governance-critical-to-ensure-it-is-strategically-supporting-your-agency/. 
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alignment capabilities, functionality, and investments necessary to deliver the mission 
and requirements in the both current mission environment, as well as the projected future 
state (e.g., five years out). This governance—especially in federated organizations, such 
as DHS—requires reinforcement through the use of enterprise architecture and 
organization into distinct portfolios. Portfolios are the logical organization and 
decomposition of functionally-oriented segments that are used to categorize and “support 
various elements of an organization’s strategy and mission outcomes.”92 Portfolios can 
be either mission-oriented or business-oriented. Examples of mission-oriented portfolios 
within DHS would include screening, incident response, and cyber security, while 
examples of business-oriented portfolios would include financial management, grants 
management, and asset management. Portfolio governance establishes portfolio-specific 
boards with executive decision makers from all stakeholders groups involved with a 
specific portfolio.  
The term “enterprise architecture” is recognized in industry as having numerous 
and conflicting interpretations that vary by industry. It is also a term readily confused 
because it is regularly used to reference change processes as well as a suite of 
documentation artifacts. Gartner Research defines “enterprise architecture” as “the 
process of translating business vision and strategy into effective enterprise change by 
creating, communicating and improving the key requirements, principles and models that 
describe the enterprise’s future state and enable its evolution. The scope of the enterprise 
architecture includes the people, processes, information and technology of the enterprise, 
and their relationships to one another and to the external environment. Enterprise 
architects compose holistic solutions that address the business challenges of the 
enterprise and support the governance needed to implement them.”93 Contributing to the 
confusion surrounding enterprise architecture and its purpose is that it is viewed as a 
predominantly information technology function. This is because oftentimes in federal 
agencies, including DHS, the enterprise architecture function is aligned under the Office 
                                                 
92 Ibid. 
93 Anne Lapkin et al., “Gartner Clarifies the Definition of the Term ‘Enterprise Architecture,’” 
(Gartner Research, ID: G00156559, August 12, 2008) https://online.ist.psu.edu/sites/gettingstarted/files/g
artnerclarifies.pdf. 
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of the Chief Information Officer. However, as this definition indicates, technology is only 
one of many entities influencing the establishment of an organization’s enterprise 
architecture.  
The role of enterprise architecture was discussed with the majority of the 
interview participants. And while the concepts and purpose of enterprise architecture 
were generally understood, there was also agreement that enterprise architecture was not 
appropriately positioned and represented within the decision-making framework, outside 
of those aligned with the CIO. It was specifically noted multiple times that while the 
DHS enterprise architecture was perceived as “relatively good” and had adequately 
defined 13 distinct portfolios, it was not effectively positioned or recognized in 
governance as a strategic enabler for defining and assessing the requirements pertaining 
to moving a portfolio from an “as-is” state to a “to-be” future state. To this point, Ms. 
Hale pointed out that the initial focus on the acquisition and implementation of systems, 
as opposed to defining and positioning enterprise architecture as a strategic enabler for 
Departmental decision-making related to investments and capability maturation, was an 
opportunity lost.  
The critical aspect of institutionalized enterprise governance is that, if 
implemented and reinforced at the highest levels of the organization, it can help frame 
cross-organizational missions and can be “utilized to regularly brings together the senior-
most leadership to both help decide which new capabilities best support the mission and 
prioritize them for development and fielding…Mature enterprise governance is focused 
on all capabilities to produce mission outcomes, and, as such, enterprise governance is 
not specific to just IT programs.”94 One specific example of how portfolio governance 
can influence the Department’s migration toward data-driven decision-making is by 
establishing the Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) associated with each portfolio. 
Multiple participants explained that program governance boards, when properly instituted 
and governed, provided the ability to drive performance metrics throughout the 
                                                 




organization. KPIs provided one mechanism to collect and measure standardized data 
from each stakeholder involved in the portfolio. And while portfolio governance boards 
were not consistently adopted within the Management Directorate, there are examples of 
success within the financial management and readiness support functions where they 
have been utilized to drive meaningful change and standardization.  
The lack of institutionalized governance has cascading impacts, especially when 
giving consideration to the fact that additional “statutory authorities and compelling 
events have combined to broaden perceptions of DHS’s mission” since the formation of 
the Department in 2003.95 Along those lines, “Congressional and public expectations for 
civil security have surpassed terrorism and migration control to encompass natural 
disasters, high impact industrial accidents, and cybersecurity. This gradual expansion of 
actual and accepted mission scope has followed the course of destructive events.”96 
However, “DHS does not benefit from a central theory or an updated legislative mandate 
that sets out an overarching purpose.”97 The “lack of an articulated, coherent, commonly 
accepted strategic mission increases DHS’s susceptibility to fragmentation, failure to 
prioritize, misguided tactics...”98  
Mr. Spires noted that he pushed hard, albeit unsuccessfully, during his tenure to 
establish a top-down three-tiered portfolio governance model built around portfolios. He 
reflected on his ability to achieve this governance model in large private sector 
institutions and at the Internal Revenue Service, where he worked prior to joining DHS. 
When asked about the differences between these institutions and DHS with respect to the 
ability to institutionalize governance, he responded, “Culture. The difference is all 
culture.” When asked to elaborate, he indicated the differences involve the ability to 
position and enforce the [position of the DHS] CIO to utilize the authorities provided to 
                                                 
95 Ginsburg, “The Department of Homeland Security: Precluding Civil Catastrophe,” 2015, 2. 
96 Ibid., 2. 
97 Christopher Bellavita, “Waiting For Homeland Security Theory,” Homeland Security Affairs 8, 
Article 15 (August 2012), https://www.hsaj.org/articles/231.   
98 Ginsburg, “The Department of Homeland Security: Precluding Civil Catastrophe,” 2015, 2. 
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him under legislation, which at DHS was not necessarily provided or supported in the 
manner it was at these other organizations.  
G. FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS  
The ability to draft and formalize governance documents in the form of policies, 
instructions, and directives has remained a constant, drawn-out challenge for the 
Management Directorate. Despite the fact that these objectives have been a long-standing 
priority voiced by each USM’s administration, the breadth of stakeholders and their 
respective agendas have been prohibitory in producing these documents. In cases where 
they have been produced, the documents have emerged diluted and altogether lacking the 
prescriptive granularity that the Management Directorate originally intended. These 
foundational activities are commonly viewed as the “hard-wiring and plumbing” of the 
Department that need to be continuously pursued and would benefit from streamlining. 
Delineating the roles and responsibilities between the Office of Policy, the Components, 
and the Management Directorate—and various divisions within it—as they pertain to 
producing management and business policies could result in more efficient and effective 
processes to allow these documents to be published and formalized in a quicker manner.  
Looking to industry and/or voluntary consensus standards, such as those 
represented by the ISO, NIST, and ASTM standards bodies, could provide an accelerant 
to this process. The very nature of standards is that they include an inherent level of 
industry and/or government accreditation and rigor, which would benefit the 
Management Directorate in gaining concurrence from across the various internal and 
Component stakeholders. This research demonstrated multiple successful examples of a 
model where the Management Directorate established and propagated standards that 
could be applied and implemented by the Components. This model is critical because it 
provides the Components the ability to adapt these standards within the context of their 
distinct programmatic and mission requirements.   
The Management Directorate has deliberately avoided a command-and-control 
model and opted not to pursue standardized operational procedures. These decisions, 
which are justifiable given the organizational and cultural dynamics, impact how the 
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Management Directorate can engage the DHS Components to drive change. In fact, this 
lack of defined, understood boundaries has been historically detrimental to the 
relationships between the Management Directorate and the Components. However, the 
relationships appear to steady when the Management Directorate utilizes its oversight and 
assessment authorities as a means to engage and partner with the Components. In other 
words, the Management Directorate is more likely to successfully engage the 
Components when defining and influencing what should be accomplished, but struggles 
in these same areas when attempting to define and influence how it should be 
accomplished. This focus on “what” versus “how” was a regular theme that emerged 
during the interviews, especially when considering that the “how” needs to be applied 
across all 22 DHS Components. The individual Components’ perceived distinct mission, 
cultural, and environmental factors are prohibitory to the Management Directorate 
influencing the “how.”  
However, the interviews yielded multiple examples demonstrating successful 
outcomes where the Management Directorate defined the “what” through a policy, 
standard or regulatory reporting requirement, and allowed the Component to focus on 
tailoring and implementing it to their mission and environment. In these cases, the 
Components owned the “how.” This dynamic of “what” versus “how” is consistent with 
the “oversight-and-assess” versus “command-and-control” model the Management 
Directorate has adopted in engaging the Components. 
This ability to successfully define and measure the “what” is predicated on 
incorporating the use of standards into governance. The adoption of standards, which can 
be implemented in the form of a defined lexicon, business rules, data dictionary, and/or 
key performance indicators, should be based on regulatory, industry (e.g., ISSO and 
ASTM), and federal (e.g., GAO) requirements. The utilization of these third-party 
requirements and standards that were not previously available has emerged as a 
mechanism the Management Directorate is now using to drive enterprise-level change.  
Another practice that the Management Directorate has adopted to influence 
change involves that framing of third-party audits. Although the concept of audits is not 
new, the way the Management Directorate is engaging the auditors and partnering with 
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the Components in response to emerging audits is presenting opportunities to influence 
change and enhance relationships. This influence is initially being achieved through 
engaging and focusing the auditors to areas of strategic value to the Management 
Directorate and the Department as a whole. After these audits are initiated, the 
Management Directorate is using them as a mechanism to partner with the Components 
to assess and clarify existing policies and instructions. These tactics are necessary 
because the Management Directorate operates in an environment where, as Mr. Norquist 
noted, “few carrots and sticks exist to drive change.” Meanwhile, partnering with the 
Components also contributes to creating an environment of “shared liability,” which has 
numerous collateral benefits with the potential to enhance the Management Directorate’s 
value to the Department and the individual Components. These benefits include creating 
a forum for discussion and clarification of the existing policies and instruction, vesting a 
shared interest of all parties to the audit’s results, and developing camaraderie and 
alignment towards shared interests. These collateral benefits combined can influence 
future interactions and contribute towards creating an environment of trust that 
transcends the immediate audit.  
Regarding the role of data, a central tenant of the Management Directorate 
authorities involves its oversight capabilities based on data. Until recently, however, there 
was no consistent, enterprise-wide standardized data from which this oversight and 
assessment could be conducted. One notable opportunity to begin collecting data was 
driven by and based on the various annual regulatory reporting requirements that the 
Department must adhere to and report against. In other words, because the Management 
Directorate lacked the ability to influence and enforce information policies and processes, 
it used federal requirements as a catalyst to centralize the corresponding data from each 
Component. This tactic laid the foundation for the initial efforts pertaining to the 
centralization and standardization of data. Because these requirements were defined and 
dictated by external or higher-levels of authority (such as OMB, GAO, Congress, or 
Executive Order), the DHS Components were more amenable and proactive towards 
aligning with them. Prior to this approach, the Components directly reported to these 
external stakeholders. Once the Management Directorate centralized the processes 
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associated with producing these regulatory, legislative, and statutory reports, the data 
required to produce these requirements became the de facto initial data dictionaries and 
baselines for the Management Directorate. The data from these reports were initially 
moved into rudimentary software tools and then repurposed to allow the Management 
Directorate to conduct its initial data-driven oversight and assessment capabilities.  
These annual regulatory, statutory, and legislative reporting requirements form 
the basis of the Management Directorate’s ability to capture consistent, interoperable 
data. In fact, data elements not associated with these types of external requirements are 
where the Management Directorate has experienced the most challenges in defining and 
extending its data dictionaries. These challenges, which have a direct bearing on the 
ability of the Management Directorate to conduct its core missions of oversight and 
assessment, originate from the governance maturity gaps described within this chapter.  
Meanwhile, this chapter demonstrates that it has not been lack of effort, 
investment, or strategy that has impeded the Management Directorate’s governance 
maturation. On the contrary, the establishment and formalization of multiple segment 
architectures—both for mission and business portfolios—demonstrates that there are 
proven methodologies and investments that, if reinforced through institutionalized 
governance, can mature and integrate the Department’s management processes. 
Unfortunately, there are persistent governance gaps, which are a direct extension of the 
organizational and cultural dynamics that have historically undermined many of the 
Management Directorate’s integration strategies. This is one of the primary reasons the 
Department remains on the GAO high-risk list for management integration and has 
continued to struggle with institutionalizing enterprise-wide integration initiatives, such 
as “One DHS” and “Unity of Effort.”   
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V. CHALLENGES WITH IMPLEMENTING ENTERPRISE-WIDE 
IT SOLUTIONS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
A key theme underpinning all of the interviews involves the challenges 
surrounding how the Management Directorate operated without data to substantiate or 
quantify decisions. Accordingly, the pursuit of standardized, enterprise-wide information 
was a consistent goal that transcended all USM administrations, although the strategies 
towards accomplishing this goal varied over time and were influenced by a variety of 
internal and external factors.  
To illustrate the environment in which the Management Directorate operated, Ms. 
Duke noted that when she became Acting USM in June 2007 there “simply wasn’t data 
available when decisions needed to be made” and that she relied mostly on her 
relationships with stakeholders and her intuition when it came to decision-making. To 
articulate her point about the lack of data, she recalled a specific scenario where she was 
receiving complaints from certain organizations about the length of time it was taking to 
fill billets in the hiring process. She explained that her approach to addressing the 
concerns was to conduct a full process analysis as a means to identify process 
stakeholders, integration touch-points, and chokepoints—with a goal of establishing 
metrics. Ultimately, she found that there were several stakeholder groups involved in the 
process, including investigations, badging, information technology (for both hardware 
and systems’ accounts), and space management. She also determined that there was 
minimal integration across these groups. Additionally, there was no standard information 
system supporting this process and the individual stakeholder groups did not use similar 
lexicons. She said that despite a focus on developing metrics, it was virtually impossible 
to measure the performance of this “Time-to-Hire” process, due to the absence of not 
only data, but also standards and a consistent lexicon. 
This chapter provides a chronology of the Management Directorate’s approaches 
towards acquiring and implementing solutions to address the goal of data-driven 
decision-making and analysis. Two primary approaches were pursued, namely: A) 
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acquiring and modernizing enterprise-wide transactional business systems to be used by 
many, and in some cases all, Components, and B) consolidating and harvesting data 
through data warehousing and business intelligence tools. This chapter will explore both 
approaches and the associated projects to acquire and implement corresponding solutions. 
While on the surface these projects may look similar, they actually have nuanced, yet 
significant, differences.  
B. THE INFLUENCE OF THE UFMS MODEL 
The thought process as explained by those officials interviewed for this thesis 
who also were in the Management Directorate at its inception was that a “hard reset” was 
needed to deploy a model similar to the one used by the Department of Health and 
Human Services and the Department of Defense where a single, enterprise-wide unified 
financial management system (UFMS) exists. The 18 material weaknesses the 
Department inherited from the legacy agencies contributed to the Department being 
placed on GAO’s high-risk list for a “Lack of Management Integration.” This distinction, 
combined with the recognized atrophied nature of several of the major Components’ 
legacy financial management systems, such as those within USCG, FEMA, and ICE, led 
to a mindset that a unified financial management system would be the catalyst for 
addressing many of these areas. As previously noted, some of the Management 
Directorate’s early leaders, including Janet Hale, came from HHS and DOD where the 
UFMS model was established, which certainly had some bearing on their perceptions of 
the transformative nature of a UFMS.  
A UFMS would ultimately introduce a platform for standardization because as a 
part of migrating onto the system, the Components would be required to convert to and 
adopt a single data dictionary, configuration, and set of business rules. Conversion to a 
UFMS would trigger standards in the Department’s data while providing the 
Management Directorate access to the data—something it lacked then and in many cases 
continues to lack.  
Based on this logic, the Management Directorate’s primary strategy between 2004 
and 2011 for adopting a UFMS model was the acquisition and implementation of an 
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integrated financial ERP system. There were three distinct attempts made towards 
accomplishing this goal, all of which were unsuccessful for various reasons and all of 
which will be explored in this chapter. In 2011, the Under Secretary of Management 
determined that the Department would no longer pursue a centralized management ERP 
system. However, the goal of consolidating and standardizing departmental data to use 
for reporting, analysis, and decision-making in a timely manner was still necessary and of 
critical importance.  
The distinct attempts at establishing an ERP system as explained via the 
interviews and literature review included projects referred to as “eMerge2,” “TASC 1,” 
and “TASC 2.”  
1. eMerge2 
The project known as eMerge2 (otherwise known as Electronically Managing 
Enterprise Resources for Government Effectiveness and Efficiency) “began as $229 
million effort to build one enterprise resource management system across the department 
and later morphed to a series of planned financial-system migration projects.”99 The 
eMerge2 project’s goal was to implement an ERP solution, which is defined as an 
“automated system using COTS software consisting of multiple integrated functional 
modules that perform a variety of business-related tasks, such as payroll, general ledger 
accounting, and supply chain management.”100 This project started under Ms. Hale and 
thus was a focus of discussion during her interview. She summarized the failure of 
eMerge2 as the “right concept, wrong execution,” but took time to outline her 
perspectives on the myriad challenges that led to this project’s ultimate undoing. It is 
worth noting that eMerge2 was officially canceled in September 2006—six months after 
Ms. Hale left her USM position at DHS—when DHS CFO David Norquist told the 
House Government Reform Subcommittee on Government Management, Finance and 
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Accountability that, “With respect to our systems-modernization efforts, let me state that 
eMerge2 is dead.”101  
The interview participants involved with the eMerge2 project identified numerous 
interrelated factors impacting it’s failure, but the general consensus was that the botches 
were simply a “failure of leadership” and “it was too big in scope, carried too many risks, 
and was based on the wrong (unclear) requirements.”  Further, it was recognized that 
there were issues associated with the Department’s level of maturity and influence it had 
during these early years, while other problems stemmed from the vendor that had been 
awarded the implementation contract. The internal Management Directorate factors 
identified included, A) a lack of discipline in the acquisition and project management 
processes, B) differences of perception within the Management Directive between the 
original UFMS vision and the project’s scope (i.e. “scope creep”), C) too many other 
conflicting priorities that detracted the Management Directorate’s leadership team’s 
attention away from this project.   
Many of the internal factors Ms. Hale identified are consistent with her overall 
position that in the early days of the Department’s creation there were simply too many 
competing priorities that commanded the attention of the leadership team and detracted 
attention from what was truly important. This opinion appears to reinforce Ms. Duke’s 
position when she referenced the “Eisenhower Decision Matrix” and noted that the 
Management Directorate did not effectively prioritize activities that were “important, but 
not urgent.” As it pertained to effective leadership, Ms. Hale asserted her opinion that 
much of the success of the UFMS at the Department of Health and Human Services was 
that it was personally lead by the Deputy Chief Financial Officer, while eMerge2 was led 
by a program manager within a branch of the Office of the Chief Financial Officer—two 
ranks removed from the DCFO. Because there was not the right level of leadership 
engagement by the Management Directorate in this project, she said it resulted in a 
comparable lack of leadership engagement by other key stakeholders, most notably from 
the DHS Components. Ms. Hale noted that the Congressional demands to defend the 
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Department’s budget was enormous during these early years and “definitely played a role 
in detracting critical resources and focus from the eMerge2 project.” 
Additional observations by the interview participants (who requested to not be 
attributed) regarding the eMerge2 project was that the initial scope of the system was for 
it to be strictly focused on the business function of financial management and not 
subsidiary functions, such as procurement, asset management, and grants management. 
These subsidiary functions could be added in latter phases, once the initial financial 
modules were deployed, migrated onto, and stabilized with each of the DHS 
Components. However, at some point, which Ms. Hale could not fully recall, the project 
morphed and its initial scope expanded into the subsidiary functions, which greatly 
increased costs, stakeholders, schedule, and risks. Ms. Hale questioned whether eMerge2 
would have experienced different results if a phased approach had been utilized and the 
initial scope had remained structured around the core financial management function.  
Other research participants involved in eMerge2 shared different opinions of the 
failures associated with the project. For example, while David Norquist noted it was “too 
much, too soon, and with the wrong partner,” he recognized different perspectives on the 
challenges accompanying the project. Mr. Norquist posited that instead of focusing on 
acquiring a new system, the Management Directorate would have been better served by 
focusing on the Department’s people, processes, policies, and assurances. As noted in a 
prior section, the Department lacked complete and comprehensive policies, which Mr. 
Norquist recognized immediately upon arrival as he stepped into the role of DHS CFO in 
2006. Additionally, he also recognized that there were inconsistent and disparate 
financial management processes, to include different and disjointed training curriculum, 
across the Components.  
Furthermore, Mr. Norquist noted there was legacy financial management systems 
within specific Components that had obtained cleaned audit opinions and were developed 
on newer technologies. While eMerge2 had concentrated on implementing a single 
system and migrating all Components—even those that had efficacious systems—onto it, 
Mr. Norquist recognized “consolidating onto fewer, best-of-breed systems was a better 
option for the Department, as compared to the efforts to get onto a single one.” This shift 
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towards consolidating onto existing Component systems would become the basis of the 
“TASC 1” strategy. Mr. Norquist noted that this strategy allowed his energy to be 
focused on providing access to existing internal systems to those Components with the 
most immediate needs.    
One of Mr. Norquist’s initial foci was on building a standard training program, 
which all new hires to the DHS financial community would attend, irrespective of with 
which Component the billet was affiliated. It was important to him that financial analysts 
and managers received an introduction to the Department’s approach to financial 
management as opposed to how it was viewed specifically by the individual Component 
where the individual would be employed. An enterprise-wide training program was one 
of the key initiatives towards beginning to standardize the function of financial 
management within the Department.  
Other key initiatives Mr. Norquist targeted included mapping financial 
management processes against A-123 standards, establishing a Policy, Assurances, and 
Evaluations Division within the office of the CFO, developing an internal controls 
playbook, and developing a roadmap to address each of the 18 material weaknesses 
preventing the Department from getting a clean audit opinion. Mr. Norquist referred to 
these activities as, “establishing the fundamentals” and explained that none of them were 
necessarily contingent on an ERP system. It was this primary focus on developing the 
financial management fundamentals, combined with the aforementioned challenges 
associated with the eMerge2 vendor, which contributed to Mr. Norquist’s decision to 
formally cease the pursuit of an ERP system. 
2. “TASC 1” 
During the interviews with the research participants, there were regular references 
to the terms “TASC 1” and “TASC 2.” The literature review had never differentiated the 
TASC projects in this manner and had simply referred to this project as TASC. TASC 
stands for Transformation and Systems Consolidation. Through the interviews, it became 
clear that there were two unique approaches to TASC and they were referred to as 
“TASC 1” and “TASC 2.”  
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After Mr. Norquist chose to cancel the eMerge2 project to focus on establishing 
the Management Directorate’s financial management fundamentals, he initially did not 
see the need to focus on deploying an enterprise-wide financial management system as a 
mechanism to accomplish his goals. However, after making strides in the aforementioned 
areas, he realized that certain deficiencies would not be overcome without modernizing 
some of the Component’s legacy systems and developing an enterprise-wide reporting 
capability as a means to consolidate and analyze information. The lack of this reporting 
capability relegated the Management Directorate to obtaining information through the use 
of data calls that were not only resource- and time-intensive, but also were self-reported 
with little means for verification. These data calls further required manual reconciliation 
and still lacked standardization and integration across the Components.  
TASC 1 refers to the Management Directorate’s strategy to first assess and 
identify the “best-in-class” systems that were currently in operation by the DHS 
Components, and then attempt to position those deemed as such to be “a center of 
excellence” for the other Components. Mr. Norquist and a few of the other research 
participants were significantly involved in the TASC 1 initiative. Many posited that if the 
Management Directorate could get all the Components consolidated and migrated onto a 
core set of solutions that had been evaluated as “best-in-class” it would greatly reduce 
many of the challenges previously experienced by the eMerge2 project. This approach 
would also result in cost savings and economies of scale because it would allow the 
Department to avoid a large, time-intensive, expensive, and politically-sensitive 
acquisition, while simultaneously allowing the Department to focus its resources on 
modernizing just a handful of systems (while shedding numerous legacy systems). It is 
noteworthy that Mr. Norquist observed that the TASC 1 model looked very similar to a 
“Financial Systems Shared-Service” model, which will be discussed later in this thesis 
and is relevant to present day strategy.  
There were, in fact, systems identified within specific Components that 
demonstrated the potential to support the TASC 1 objective of migrating onto the “best-
in-class” systems. The systems that emerged as potential candidates included TSA’s 
Oracle-based financial management system and CBP’s SAP-based financial management 
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system. It was noted by Mr. Norquist that the selection of Oracle and SAP technologies 
was perceived by the Department as a favorable outcome, since it removed some of the 
acquisition risk of promoting one technology over another.  
However, shortly after DHS issued a request for proposal for contract services to 
conduct the migration of five Components onto the two identified shared system 
baselines (Oracle or SAP), a protest was filed by a “financial services company, which 
was a potential offeror to DHS’s 2007 request for proposal…with the U.S. Court of 
Federal Claims.”102 In March 2008, the Court of Federal Claims “enjoined DHS from 
proceeding with the November 2007 request for proposal until DHS conducts a 
‘competitive procurement’, in accordance to the law.”103  
This would be the first of several protests—often filed by the same vendor who 
has a significant book of business established within one of the DHS Components – 
which over the years would undermine and derail the Management Directorate’s 
strategies involving the modernization of the Department’s systems. The role of the 
acquisition processes and the ability of a small concentration of vendors to be 
consistently disruptive of Departmental strategy was discussed by numerous participants 
during the interviews. And while this topic will be discussed later, the depth of frustration 
with the acquisition regulations and the ability of the vendors’ to use these regulations 
disruptively was a common theme that many participants vented about, but requested not 
be included “on the record” in this thesis.  
The result of this decision by the Court of Federal Claims was a point of 
contention for the Management Directorate for several reasons. One the primary reasons 
DHS lost this protest in court was due to the fact that the Department was unable to 
represent itself. In fact DHS, as is the case with other federal departments, is legally 
prohibited from representing itself in court cases pertaining to procurement protests and 
all legal representation is provided by the Department of Justice (DOJ). In the opinion of 
certain participants, DOJ failed to do their due diligence to adequately prepare for the 
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trial by focusing on the singular argument of legal standing. Once the court established 
that the plaintiff had legal standing, the DOJ was not prepared for the next series of 
arguments made by plaintiff. For example, a key complaint of the plaintiff was that DHS 
had not performed an analysis of alternatives. This was simply not the case. The 
Management Directorate had conducted and documented an exhaustive analysis of 
alternatives with contributions from both their finance and information technology 
stakeholders. However, DOJ was not prepared to represent this argument, which was a 
critical point in the court’s opinion and contributed to the perception that there was a lack 
of preparation on DOJ’s part.  
Secondly, the fact that the Management Directorate felt they had brokered and 
established a responsible, relatively inexpensive strategy that leveraged “best-in-class” 
technologies already deployed and operationalized within major DHS Components, 
which was essentially undone by what was largely perceived as politics and ineffective 
government, was a point of great contention for many of the participants involved with 
this initiative. The inability to leverage existing systems that were already operational in 
DHS—thus viewed as more credible and mature—was perceived as a significant setback. 
For many, this appeared to be an appropriate, logical solution for DHS that was simply 
undone by factors that were perceived as outside of the Management Directorate’s 
control and symptomatic of the challenges of conducting business in the federal 
government.  
The legal jockeying between DHS and a handful of vendors involved with its 
financial systems modernization efforts started in January 2008 and is still ongoing as of 
writing of this thesis. 
3. “TASC 2” 
Once the TASC 1 strategy was derailed by the courts, the Management 
Directorate pivoted and refocused its efforts on acquiring an ERP system based on one 
that already existed and was operational inside the federal government. The logic was 
similar to TASC 1, but was tailored towards the acquisition of an entirely new system for 
DHS that would be based on replicating and mirroring an existing, operational ERP 
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system within the federal government proposed as “best-in-class.” This effort resulted in 
a five-year, $450 million award in November 2010 for a systems implementation contract 
for an integrated Oracle COTS software system with additional, augmenting bolt-on 
COTS applications to address related functions, including property, procurement, facility, 
and project management.104 The awarded system was based off the National Institutes of 
Health’s financial ERP system.  
However, this award was also protested. This time the two losing companies filed 
protests with the GAO, who ultimately upheld the protests. But the basis of the protests 
stemmed from changes OMB had recommended DHS adopt. Essentially, what transpired 
was that in “June 2010 OMB instructed all federal agencies to halt new procurements for 
financial systems worth more than $20 million, pending review and approval of the 
systems by OMB.”105 OMB provided DHS a waiver, but also gave instruction that, 
instead of implementing TASC across 20% of the Department in the first year, DHS 
should focus on a single large component that demonstrates a critical business need and 
poses marginal risk, which turned out to be FEMA.106 With DHS agreeing to modify the 
scope and schedule according to OMB’s recommendation, it received approval to 
proceed and an issue an award. While there were additional factors which led GAO to 
uphold the protests, this change to the TASC implementation schedule was the primary 
factor. The fact that the protests were upheld did not in-and-of-itself undo the TASC 2 
program, but the end result was that the project would need to take on significant rework 
and absorb substantial schedule delays. Ms. Sherry recalled questioning if there was 
“enough political will” to continue to pursue an ERP for the Department and noted that 
many stakeholders across the Department had concerns with its “largeness and 
complexity.” 
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By March 2011, DHS had essentially been pursuing an ERP solution for eight 
years—spending somewhere in the neighborhood of $80 million. During these eight 
years, minimal funding was made available to the Components to update, maintain, and 
modernize their legacy systems, due to the vision that all would ultimately migrate onto a 
single, enterprise-wide system. The political and social capital invested in the ERP 
strategy was significant. It is noteworthy—and will be further discussed later—that 
during these eight years federal guidance and legislation pertaining to IT systems 
changed substantially and played a role in the support DHS received for its pursuit of an 
ERP.  
By this point, Mr. Norquist had left DHS and was no longer working for the 
federal government. During the interviews he and others expressed displeasure with 
OMB and GAO and their habits of issuing new federal governance rules that are 
ambiguous, open to interpretation, contradictory with other governance, and regularly do 
not align with existing federal regulations (e.g., acquisition regulations). Changing 
federal guidance, especially as associated with OMB and GAO, was described by one 
participant as “a poison pill for federal agencies.”  
Many of the participants raised frustrations specifically with OMB, labeling the 
guidance issued “unhelpful,” “disconnected from reality,” “lacking an integrated view 
across business lines,” “contributing to confusion,” and “conflicting.” One participant 
noted that when the change between the Bush and Obama Administrations occurred, the 
leadership and philosophies within OMB did as well, which had significant, cascading 
effects on DHS. One consequential policy shift that came out of OMB as a result of the 
Administration change was a focus from agencies developing their own systems to 
agencies adopting “shared service providers,” which is another term for “centers of 
excellence.” Ironically, as Mr. Norquist noted, DHS had pursued an internal shared 
services model within its TASC 1 approach, but had been derailed by protests in the 
courts.    
Mr. Borras, who had become the USM in April 2010, stated in his interview that 
he had substantial reservations about the TASC 2 project, which he had inherited when 
he came into office. He saw the TASC approach as being “too much, too risky, and too 
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pricey.” The problems he observed concerned the lack of strategies as they pertained to 
risk management and funding. He also saw a lack of a funding commitment to the project 
from Congress, which gave him great pause because he said a lack of a dedicated stream 
of funding meant that each year the Department would be guessing how much would be 
allocated to the project with little certainty for planning purposes. Mr. Borras also noted 
that while the Department’s appropriation levels had grown consistently since 2004, there 
were indicators in 2011 that this trend would stop—which in fact it did. “I did not want to 
be in a position where I was arguing on the Hill to pull money away from the 
Department’s mission for a disruptive and pricey solution that I was not convinced the 
organization had the wherewithal or support to implement,” he said. However, he also 
noted that he did not want to disrupt the TASC project, both out of respect to the chiefs 
who pre-dated his administration and had invested significantly into the ERP approach, 
and also because of the need to maintain continuity and credibility for the Management 
Directorate. When GAO upheld the protests, he recognized it was time for the 
Management Directorate to pursue other strategies, and in May 2011 he decided that 
DHS would no longer pursue a single, consolidated ERP solution.   
C. POST ERP STRATEGY – TWO PATHS FORWARD 
1. “Federal Shared Service Provider” Model  
Upon ceasing its pursuit of an integrated, department-wide ERP system to address 
the business functions of financial, procurement, and asset management functions, “DHS 
announced it would be exploring other options, including cloud-based systems, with a 
focus on component-by-component development and non-integrated solutions.”107 As 
indicated previously, the issuance of federal guidelines in late 2010 and early 2011 
significantly impacted how federal agencies could proceed with the modernization of IT 
systems. These guidelines included the release of the United States Chief Information 
Officer’s 25 Point Implementation Plan to Reform Federal Information Technology 
Management in December 2010 and Federal Cloud Computing Strategy in February 
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2011,.108109 Because of these new guidelines, DHS recognized that “OMB requires 
cloud-based and service provider solutions be evaluated first and used whenever a secure, 
reliable, cost-effective option exists. With advances in IT security, DHS security 
architecture now expressly supports external services as an extension of the trusted 
internal environment. Thus, a cloud-based or shared services solution could meet the 
department’s needs.”110  
One additional guideline released in March 2013 by OMB was Memo 13-08 
“Improving Financial Systems Through Shared Services.”111 This memo explicitly 
directed all executive agencies “to use, with limited exceptions, a shared service solution 
for future modernizations of core accounting or mixed systems.”112 This memo 
recognized that all agencies would give consideration to the capabilities and gaps of the 
recognized cloud-based Federal Shared Service Providers (FSSPs) as the first source for 
satisfying financial and mixed-system requirements.  
However, similar to other changes in guidelines, one participant described how 
the language of M-13-08 has changed since its initial version, noting specifically that the 
language within it appeared to be diluted with subsequent releases. The participant, who 
requested not to be named, noted that “M-1308 started out with the language of ‘shall 
[utilize a FSSP]’, which was then changed to ‘shall consider [utilizing an FSSP]’, and 
then again ‘to conduct a business assessment of a FSSP.’” This participant went on to 
describe how these guidelines and their changing language have the potential to 
undermine a Department’s ability to develop and execute a strategy. It was observed that 
the language of “shall” has much stronger implications than “shall consider,” which the 
participant emphasized essentially has “no teeth to drive any action.”  
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Furthermore, this individual, as well as others, described how federal guidelines 
and legislation have little ramifications inside the DHS—hence the “no teeth” statement. 
The context of this statement is that since the Management Directorate does not have 
centralized budget authority, and, similar to the challenges described in the 
aforementioned section “Lack of Institutional Governance,” there are limited mechanisms 
to drive consistent adoption of regulations and legislations within DHS. When discussing 
the recently passed “DHS IT Duplication Reduction Act” (H.R. 1626, Public Law No: 
114–43), which became law August 6, 2015, Keith Trippie noted that “the law is just a 
piece of paper—what will be interesting is how DHS will choose to implement the 
law.”113 Mr. Trippie went on to describe how it has not been the lack of regulations and 
laws that impeded progression by DHS towards standardized systems and data, but 
instead the ability to implement and enforce the existing ones. However, Mr. Trippie did 
assert his opinion that the current CIO was gaining traction with leadership to gain 
support on key IT strategic initiatives.  
The objectives contained within the U.S. CIO’s aforementioned guidelines, 
coupled with OMB Memo 13-08, was described as essentially the foundation for the 
Management Directorate’s post-ERP strategy. As opposed to acquiring a single, 
collectively agreed-upon system, the DHS Components were given the independence to 
conditionally pursue, implement, and configure existing systems to meet their unique 
requirements and processes, albeit within the constraints outlined by these federal 
guidelines. The Management Directorate established an USM-chartered Financial 
Systems Modernization Executive Steering Committee in FY 13 as a means to 
“modernize financial management systems and expand business intelligence to improve 
the ability to quickly provide Department-level information, increase efficiency, and 
strengthen financial systems in a cost-effective manner.”114 This charter is positioned as 
an oversight and guidance governance document and its mission is described as “to 
provide effective oversight and guidance to all Components undergoing financial systems 
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modernization efforts.” Its first listed authority is that it shall “provide strategy and 
Department-level direction on Component financial system modernization efforts.”115 
Currently, under the governance of the Financial Systems Modernization ESC, 
each DHS Component is currently in the process of evaluating and/or pursuing the 
individual FSSPs, of which OMB has certified seven. With each Component conducting 
this evaluation independent of the Management Directorate and the other Components, 
there is likely potential that Components may select different FSSPs. In other words, 
likelihood exists that DHS Components will select different FSSPs and various FSSPs 
will be responsible for one or multiple Components’ integrated accounting, acquisition, 
and asset management systems.  
The adoption of a FSSP system requires a DHS Component to adopt an existing, 
operational system to include its current application and technology suite and related core 
configurations. This factor, without a complimentary approach, has cascading effects on 
the Management Directorate’s ability to accomplish its enterprise analysis, reporting, and 
decision-making objectives. First, it will impede DHS from achieving a single, 
standardized, Department-wide configuration. With each FSSP having its own unique 
configuration, the Department will need to consider how it will consolidate and 
normalize data from multiple FSSPs, giving consideration to each FSSP’s unique 
configuration and business rules. Second, with the potential for multiple FSSPs being 
adopted across the Department, DHS will need to invest in a mechanism for 
systematically capturing and consolidating data from each represented FSSP. Lastly, 
Department-level policies, such as the CFO’s Accounting Classification Structure (ACS), 
were intended to be implemented within the ERP solution.116 The ACS is the mechanism 
for standardizing the accounting line’s segment and is critical to tracking funding across 
the Department’s programs, projects, and activities in a consistent and comprehensive 
manner. Without an ERP, it is yet to be determined how the implementation and adoption 
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of a consistent ACS, along with other critical standardization data attributes, will be 
achieved.  
As of publication of this thesis, one headquarters Component (DNDO) was on the 
precipice of migrating onto a FSSP with a rudimentary set of capabilities. It is too early 
to determine if this strategy—each Component conducting their own analysis and 
pursuing the FSSPs independently, but under the governance of the FSM ESC—will 
ultimately be successful. The first Operational Component, TSA, is not scheduled to 
migrate onto an FSSP until late FY 16/early FY 17 and many Components are still in the 
discovery phase where they are evaluating the individual FSSPs to determine which best 
align to their requirements, processes, and schedule.  
It is worth noting that procurement protests continue to haunt the Department. 
Early on in the financial systems modernization life, a small DHS headquarters 
Component attempted to migrate off its internal DHS financial system to another 
Component’s financial system, which was at that time being positioned as an internal 
shared systems offering. As the same interview participant who did not want to be named 
explained, this transition across internal DHS solutions was protested and, despite the 
transitioning being described as “all but complete with just the switch to be flipped, the 
Component was instructed to cease proceeding and revert back to its legacy solution until 
the matter could be resolved in federal court.” The matter is still being decided within the 
federal court system. This lawsuit and the environment surrounding DHS was discussed 
by many participants, who bemoaned the litigious nature influencing the Department and 
its subsequent ability to siphon time, resources, and momentum away from moving 
strategic initiatives forward. One participant described the Department as “stricken by 
legal paralysis” as a result of vendors’ ability to protest any acquisition, emphasizing how 
these protests have undermined the Management’s Directive ability to successfully 
modernize its systems.  
2. Information Consolidation and Data Warehousing 
Once it was decided that a decentralized transactional systems modernization 
strategy would be adopted, some of the Management Directorate’s lines of business 
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leaders determined it required a parallel strategy for consolidating and standardizing 
information associated to their business functions. In other words, there was recognition 
that the decentralized nature of the future-state transactional systems, despite not 
knowing how these systems would evolve, would require a data consolidation and 
integration strategy to meets the goals of consolidated analysis, reporting, and decision-
making. This change most notably impacted the financial management, asset 
management, and acquisition business functions and their oversight lines of business, as 
they were the ones most affected by this strategy shift. To adapt to the decentralized 
transactional systems footprint, the Management Directorate turned to a data 
warehousing and business intelligence strategy as a means to accomplish these goals.117  
Many of the interviewed participants spoke at length about the concept of data 
warehousing and business intelligence as it pertains to the Management Directorate. 
Specifically, Mr. Myers said that as soon as the TASC award was cancelled he 
determined, “there will never be a single enterprise-wide system with DHS. There are 
simply too many barriers—legal, political, and cultural. Yet, this does not remove the 
responsibility for each [Management] Chief from conducting oversight and developing 
tools for collecting data to do so.” Mr. Myers went on to describe how he carved out a 
significant portion of his office’s base budget, starting in FY 11 and FY 12, to develop a 
data warehousing tool specifically for capturing the data for the lines of business for 
which his office, the Office of the Chief Readiness Support Officer, has oversight. Mr. 
Myers further pointed out, “Information consolidation is imperative for conducting 
oversight and was subsequently identified as a primary mitigation solution for responding 
to current and future audit findings.” He went on to describe how his approach did not 
start with developing an IT system, but instead originated with establishing a data 
dictionary that was based against requirements described in existing policy, instructions, 
regulatory, and legislative artifacts. Mr. Myers described one of the key lessons learned 
from the early phases of his data warehousing project. “We attempted to try to get too 
much data too soon and we failed at getting any reliable or consistent data,” he said, 
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recalling that each Component had their own transactional real property and personal 
property system, each with their own distinct configuration and data dictionary. Mr. 
Myers went on to describe how his project had to be reset and the data warehouse’s data 
dictionary had to be stripped down to reflect fundamental data elements that either had a 
clear justification founded in a regulatory or legislative report, or were consistently 
identified and defined in each Component’s existing transactional system. He went on to 
say that “with some minimal exceptions, a majority of data elements not founded by an 
external report or legislation were so inconsistent, unstandardized, and inaccurate it 
undermined the entirety of the entire effort.” He then explained that once the data 
dictionary was re-baselined against elements that had external requirements—meaning 
they had third-party (e.g., OMB) definitions and business rules typically based on 
regulatory reporting requirements—only then could he begin to collect consistent, 
reliable data in a standardized manner from each of the Components. Mr. Myers noted 
that during this timeframe he was pushing his office’s policy directors to revisit their 
policies and instructions to ensure data attributes, definitions, and standards were being 
positioned in these documents. He noted that while he would never benefit from these 
efforts during his tenure, having the management instructions define the data standards, 
definitions and business rules would establish a baseline to frame the maturation of future 
transactional systems five to 10 years down the road. 
In FY 11, pursuant to direction given by the USM, the DHS CIO established a 
cloud-based Business Intelligence as a Service (BIaaS) offering. The BIaaS platform 
offering was a culmination of COTS applications that facilitated the integration and 
consolidation of data from the Components into the Chief’s individual data marts. This 
platform should not be confused with a transactional system, as its primary purpose is to 
consolidate and aggregate data from the Components’ transactional business systems as 
defined within data marts designed and developed individually by the Chiefs. USM 
Borras viewed the BIaaS platform as a means to accomplish his strategic objectives and 
directed his Chiefs to utilize this service as a means to consolidate the data associated to 
the lines of business for which they have oversight. As some of the lines of business were 
pursuing other technologies, the decision to force all lines of business onto a centrally 
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operated platform was noted as a crucial decision by Mr. Borras, he said in his interview. 
He noted that while it was premature, he recognized that a single centralized platform 
would not only result in costs savings and efficiencies for the Management Directorate, 
but would also ultimately be the basis for cross-line of business integration in the future. 
Mr. Borras was emphatic that this decision—to force each of his lines of business to 
develop a business intelligence capability on a single, centrally operated platform by the 
DHS CIO—was one of the most critical of his tenure as USM.  
In March 2012, Mr. Borras gave testimony before the U.S. House of 
Representatives, Committee on Homeland Security-Subcommittee on Oversight, 
Investigations, and Management, which he concluded with the following statements: “All 
Management Directorate line-of-business offices are developing information standards 
for their respective functions and are using the Department’s business intelligence service 
to develop dashboards from both internal and external stakeholders. It is expected that 
over the next 12 months, we will standardize data sets and initiate pilots on enterprise 
business intelligence capability. My goal is for the decision support capability to serve as 
the primary source for DHS dashboards where performance, program and portfolio 
management, financial, acquisition, human capital, asset management, enterprise 
architecture, cyber, and other DHS data sets are obtained from the DHS systems of 
record. Those dashboards will be integrated to provide a better view into the 
Department’s mission performance and identify efficiency opportunities.”118  
The following models represented in Figures 3 and 4 demonstrate different 
conceptualizations on how data will flow from the decentralized transactional systems 
into the data warehousing tools centrally hosted and operated by the DHS CIO. Figure 3 
is the author’s interpretation of the relationship between a single LOB’s data mart and the 
transactional business systems that shall source it Component data. Figure 4 depicts a 
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data flow model between the Components transactional systems and the Management 
Directorate’s line of business data mart.119 




Figure 4. Data Warehouse Information Flow 
 
 
This model is one visual depiction of the flow of data from Component source systems 
into the Management Directorate’s Business Intelligence tools. Source: U.S. Department 
of Homeland Security, Management Directorate, Asset Management Systems Executive 
Steering Committee, Washington, DC: August 20, 2014. 
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Based on their own desire to establish a tool to collect data from which they could 
conduct oversight, coupled by the direction of USM Borras to pursue business 
intelligence, Mr. Trippie noted that the Chiefs, out of business necessity, proceeded with 
establishing their own respective projects, plans, and governance as a means of 
designing, developing, and populating their data marts within the BIaaS platform. Mr. 
Trippie said that one of the challenges he recognized from the early stages of this 
initiative was that while it was a priority of the USM, the initiative it was not centrally 
funded—meaning each line of business had independently resourced and funded their 
own data mart from their base budget. The result was that this initiative was not 
prioritized equally by each Management Directorate’s line of business in terms of 
resources and funding. Mr. Trippie noted that he operated the BIaaS out of his investment 
funding, vice a centralized fund, because he recognized that this strategy was the right 
model for maturing oversight of the Department’s business functions and was willing to 
fund the platform to accomplish this objective. As Mr. Trippie was both the executive 
director of the office within the CIO hosting the BIaaS platform and co-chaired the 
USM’s Business Intelligence Dashboard Executive Steering Committee, this observation 
correlates to the earlier core theme that while the department had made great progress in 
the short time DHS had been in existence, challenges still remain; particularly around 
competing priorities across the Management’s Directorate’s missions and the approach to 
centrally organizing around select initiatives. Mr. Trippie, whose experience in DHS 
dated back to 2004, stated, “while this data consolidation and integration model is not the 
most effective cost, resource, or technology strategy as it pertains to maturing the 
Department’s management functions—a central model to maximize efficiencies and 
prioritization across the Directorate would have been preferred—given the limited 
progress toward an Enterprise Financial service and the numerous cultural and 
organizational factors, it is the right model for DHS at this time.” Mr. Trippie recalled 
observing progress from across multiple lines of business in the early timeframe of the 
ESC. He was proud of the achievements made in a short amount of time and felt the 
approach was yielding positive results impacting the Planning, Programming, Budgeting 
and Execution functions of the department. 
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At the time of this thesis, the use of the BIaaS platform as a means to consolidate 
and normalize data associated with the individual DHS management functions is still a 
work-in-progress. It appears to be a viable method for conducting department-wide 
analysis, reporting, and decision-making for each of the Management Directorate’s lines 
of business. However, one significant gap was identified with this strategy. Because each 
of the Management Directorate’s lines of business approached the design and 
development of their data marts individually to meet their unique respective 
requirements, these applications were not designed with a focus on cross-line of business 
data interoperability. This has resulted in applications that can report data myopically 
within a specific function, but—with minor exceptions—cannot relate nor report across 
the management business functions. Mr. Myers observed that it was known that there is 
similar, and at times redundant, data within the individual applications that were not 
aligned or reflective within other applications, which called into question the accuracy 
and reliability of the data in its totality. These gaps could handicap the capabilities of the 
system to conduct comprehensive, management-level analysis, reporting, and decision-
making. One specific example provided by Mr. Myers involved an attempt in FY 14 by 
members of the OCFO and OCRSO to reconcile the Plant, Property, and Equipment sub 
ledger for a single Headquarters Component to determine if the values from the OCFO 
data mart married to the comparable data in the OCRSO’s data mart. The analysis 
showed significant discrepancies and that the data could not be successfully reconciled, 
which demonstrates that, while the data marts themselves may be successful in 
consolidating data for the respective business function, there are challenges associated to 
data interoperability and integration which span multiple business functions.  
To ensure that there were efforts to not only overcome these functional silos, but 
also integrate data and drive data interoperability, Mr. Borras chartered the Business 
Intelligence Dashboard Executive Steering Committee. In addition to these activities, this 
committee and its associated working groups were tasked with developing an integration 
layer across these applications.120 In this charter, the USM recognizes that the BIaaS 
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applications would not meet their full potential without a mechanism to join and combine 
interrelated data from across all the Directorate’s lines of business as a means to support 
cross-functional analysis and reporting. The initial vision and business model for this 
integration layer is depicted in the Figure 5. 




The original conceptual visualization of what would evolve into the Management Cube. This 
model was provided to the USM and the Management Directorate’s Chiefs in January 2012. 
Source: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Management Directorate. USM Dashboard: 
Providing Line of Sight across Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution, Washington, 
DC: January 2012. 
 
D. FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS 
The Management Directorate has made several attempts to mature and transform 
its ability to centralize, normalize, and analyze data as a means to enable and inform 
business decisions. The early attempts at this included the pursuit of centrally hosted and 
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operated integrated financial ERP systems. The acquisition and implementation of a 
Department-wide ERP system posed numerous challenges to the Management 
Directorate. While some of these challenges were peripheral and outside of its control, 
such as changing federal guidelines and continual acquisition protests from vendors, there 
were numerous organizational conditions that made the successful adoption of an ERP 
system within DHS highly unlikely.  
One of the primary factors prohibiting the transition of DHS to an ERP was the 
breadth, disparity, and institutionalized nature of the legacy systems operated by the DHS 
Components. These systems pre-date the Department’s existence and are tailored to and 
embedded in the processes of the individual DHS Components. As William Ulrich tell us 
in his book Legacy Systems: Transformation Strategies, “…Because legacy applications 
specify access points to legacy data along with the business logic for processing that data, 
they cannot be eliminated or easily replaced. Most legacy systems do not integrate well 
with other legacy systems or with new systems because each system tends to access and 
process data in its own unique way.”121 Further, Mr. Ulrich explains, “Legacy data tends 
to have the many of the following characteristics: A) data is defined and stored 
redundantly across multiple stovepipe business units and applications, B) the same or 
similar data is defined inconsistently across multiple systems, C) the same data 
terminology may be used to define different data across multiple applications and 
business units, D) the integrity of the data may be poor and contain information it should 
not contain, E) data may not be easily accessible by modern systems or through user-
based inquiries, and F) data cannot be readily shared across systems, business units, and 
organizational boundaries.”122 Thus, the simple volume of legacy management 
systems—tied to legacy processes—that existed when the Department was created was 
itself an impediment for any systems modernization initiative.  
Of equal significance is that the successful adoption of an ERP system is 
predicated upon certain organizational conditions being in place. These organizational 
                                                 
121 William Ulrich, Legacy Systems: Transformation Strategies (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice 
Hall, 2002), 22. 
122 Ibid., 23. 
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conditions are not optional if an ERP is to be implemented. An ERP system requires a 
single core configuration, which is founded upon standardized lexicons, business rules, 
and integrated processes. As discussed in the prior chapter, the Management Directorate 
did not have these foundation principles established to allow for the definition, creation, 
and standardization of this core configuration. Similarly, it did not have the influence or 
authority to dictate the process-level changes necessary to garner compromise and define 
a single set of system-based processes within the ERP solution. Many of the research 
participants recognized that the early focus on systems was premature. The reference to 
“premature,” which can be interpreted in many ways, appears to apply to this lack of 
foundational, consistent management principles, which significantly impeded the 
Management Directorate’s pursuit of a management ERP system.  
Meanwhile, these systems modernization initiatives were too large, too complex, 
involved too many stakeholders, and carried too high of a price tag, which therefore drew 
the attention of numerous oversight bodies. These ERP systems each carried multi-
hundred million-dollar price tags and thus were highly scrutinized by Congress, GAO, 
and incumbent systems vendors who were vested in the legacy systems. Irrespective of 
the Department’s maturity in its acquisition, program management, and change 
management proficiencies, each of which were identified as questionable and lacking 
maturity, projects of this size, scope, and stakeholder volume are highly complex and 
carry significant risk.  
The early organizational culture was commonly described as “territorial” with 
respect to the relationships between the Management Directorate and the DHS 
Components and among the DHS Components themselves. The Management Directorate 
was also at this time an unknown and unproven entity and, as discussed in Chapters 2 and 
3, the Components had avoided partnering with or dedicating resources to the 
Management Directorate. Given that these systems’ modernization initiatives required 
each of the Components to compromise and relinquish authority/control to the 
Management Directorate, this “territorial” environment was also an organizational 
impediment that detracted from the Department’s modernization initiatives.  
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It is also noteworthy that these aforementioned factors have almost nothing to do 
with the actual information technologies or software applications that the Department 
pursued during its various attempts to modernize its systems. In fact, the technologies and 
software applications selected and acquired were nearly identical in each attempt. The 
primary differences between iterations had to do with nuanced variations in the hosting, 
migration, integration, and/or acquisition plans and schedules. Thus, the failings of the 
initiatives actually had little to do with the technologies or software being acquired and 
implemented.   
Along those lines, the solutions being offered by the certified federal shared 
service providers are primarily constructed of the same software applications that the 
Department had attempted to procure in its centralized modernization attempts. The 
primary differences between the DHS centralized modernization model and the FSSP 
model are as follows: A) the FSSP system is hosted and operated externally to DHS, B) 
the core configuration and software baseline is already established and operational and in 
use by other federal agencies, and C) the individual DHS Components are assessing their 
distinct requirements against the recognized FSSP to select the provider that can best 
accommodate their schedule and requirements, as opposed to the Department’s collective 
requirements being applied and compromised against a single solution. These differences, 
with specific emphasis on the ability of the Components to individually assess and select 
a solution that meets their individual needs, may ultimately prove this model viable.123 It 
is too soon to determine if the FSSP model will be successful and if it can be executed to 
comprehensively satisfy the Department’s management system’s modernization strategy. 
And while there are legitimate concerns about the unproven nature of the FSSPs and their 
ability to be matured, scaled, and tailored, this model is much more conducive to the 
Department’s organizational and cultural dynamics described in the earlier chapters.  
Given that the Department will have multiple, disparate, and incongruent 
transactional management information systems, a strategy to consolidate, integrate and 
                                                 
123 There is an ongoing court case that will be critical in determining if the FSSP model as constructed 
aligns with the current acquisition and open competition regulations. The case is Savantage Financial 
Services Inc. v. U.S., case number 14–307C, in the U.S. Court of Federal Claims. 
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standardize the Department’s management data from across these systems is required. 
The approach to this strategy has been for each line of business within the Management 
Directorate to implement a data consolidation methodology underpinned with data 
warehousing and business intelligence tools. This model is founded upon the 
Management Directorate establishing information standards and collecting the 
corresponding data from each Component. From an organizational standpoint, this model 
aligns with the Directorate’s oversight and assessment authorities and avoids the process/
organizational-level conditions associated with implementing transactional management 
systems. 
Since this model is more suited to the Management Directorate’s authorities, and 
because it has been given USM-level sponsorship, it is demonstrating success as applied 
to the individual lines of business. There are multiple examples in various lines of 
business where data is being consistently consolidated and utilized to better inform 
decisions. However, this model is predicated on specific cross-management integration 
functions being identified and managed. Not surprisingly, these functional integration 
gaps correlate to specific areas an ERP system would have addressed – namely, a 
standard integrated configuration in the form of standardized business rules and data 
dictionary. Because the data warehousing solutions are being implemented by the 
individual lines of business, cross-functional information and shared meta-data had not 
been given consideration or embedded in the initial designs.  
For the Management Directorate to deploy a tool that can successfully consolidate 
and integrate data consistently from each LOB, there needs a mechanism to identify who 
owns the cross-functional information gaps. These gaps are better described as functional 
areas that benefit the Management Directorate or Department as a whole, but does not 
necessarily align with or benefit one of the individual lines of business. These gaps will 
be further discussed in the subsequent chapter.  
In summary, while significant funds, resources, and efforts have been made to 
modernize the Department’s management information systems, this goal has not been 
achieved. The data suggests that the centralized ERP model was not conducive with the 
organization conditions and authorities of the Management Directorate. The FSSP model 
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is a hybrid-ERP confederated model and seems to be better aligned with the 
organizational dynamics and cultures of the Department. However, while accomplishing 
certain goals like modernizing antiquated legacy systems and introducing core data 
configurations (e.g., Common Accounting Structure), this model will not accomplish the 
goal of centralizing Departmental management data. Furthermore, this model is in its 
infancy and has yet to be consistently proven within the federal government. Given this 
evolution within the transactional systems model, the Department requires an information 
consolidation and integration strategy, which has been addressed through implementing 
data warehouses and business intelligence tools along the boundaries of the Management 
Directorate’s lines of business. This approach aligns with the Management Directorate’s 
authorities and mission to conduct oversight and perform assessments.  
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VI. MATURING AND POSITIONING BUSINESS INFORMATION 
WITHIN DHS  
A. INTRODUCTION 
The last chapter presented the chronology of systems’ strategies and approaches 
the Management Directorate used to meet its goal of consolidating data to adopt data-
driven decision-making. It also explored how each approach aligned with interrelated 
organizational and cultural dynamics of the Department. This chapter explores the 
implications of the decentralized transactional systems model and discusses what steps 
are necessary to maintain coordination with it with respect to achieving the overarching 
goals. It will discuss other interrelated investments and success factors associated with 
achieving the goal of data-driven decision-making. Special attention will be given to the 
organizational considerations associated with positioning and recognizing information 
within the context of known political and organizational impediments.  
The interviews explored the most current initiative to consolidate and integrate 
the Management Directorate’s line of business data into a single data warehouse referred 
to as the Management Cube, which Mr. Borras denoted as the “one management Bible.” 
The Management Cube builds upon and is an extension of the data warehousing and 
business intelligence strategy discussed in the prior chapter.  
B. EVOLUTION OF THE MANAGEMENT CUBE 
The Management Directorate is essentially pursuing a two-pronged approach as a 
means to mature its business information systems. As described in the previous chapter, 
the first prong is facilitating the Components transition from self-operated systems onto 
existing “OMB certified” federal financial shared service solutions, which adheres to 
OMB memo 13–08. It is worth recognizing that OMB, through its delegated oversight to 
the Department of Treasury, has provided the ability to allow agencies to obtain a waiver 
to remain on their self-operated system. Certain DHS Components, most notably FLETC, 
have obtained this waiver and will remain on their existing, integrated COTS-based 
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financial management system.124 The second prong is consolidating data into a business 
intelligence platform that is operated by the DHS CIO and consists of individual data 
marts for each line of business within the Management Directorate. Each line of business 
is responsible for funding, managing, and developing their individual data marts in 
accordance with the business functions for which they have oversight. As each line of 
business is developing their data mart independently of the other lines of business, an 
integration layer was required to allow cross-management data to be collected and 
blended from the individual data marts. This integration layer, or “Management Cube,” is 
in the process of being developed.  
The concept of the Management Cube was introduced and initiated by USM 
Borras in 2012. As such, he spoke about it at length during his interview. Mr. Borras 
explained in detail that the model of the Management Cube was not new for him and was 
actually the third time in his government career he used a data warehousing and business 
intelligence model to consolidate diverse, disparate data sets from across a confederated 
enterprise. He went on to describe how oftentimes in his career he found himself leading 
organizations with myriad, disconnected systems and processes with limited visibility 
into the performance of the functions for which he had oversight. One example he used to 
illustrate this was his role as Deputy City Manager of the city of Hartford, Conn., where 
he had oversight of numerous city services, including law enforcement, fire and rescue, 
emergency medical services, and waste management. Recognizing the significant 
increase in terms of time, resources, funding, and change management—not to mention 
the political capital—needed to integrate and modernize the city’s vast disparate systems 
and processes, Mr. Borras said he positioned data warehousing as his primary integration 
strategy.  
Seeing a similar disarray of systems and processes within DHS when he became 
the USM, coupled with the political and acquisition challenges associated with TASC, 
Mr. Borras indicated that he recognized early in his tenure that a similar data 
consolidation strategy via a centralized data warehousing and business intelligence model 
                                                 
124 Their COTS-based system is Momentum and part of their waiver was transitioning their solution 
into a DHS data center. 
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was better suited for the Management Directorate. He also recognized he did not see how 
the Management Directorate could execute its duties associated with conducting 
independent, department-wide oversight and informing its decision-making authorities 
without this form of data. However, Mr. Borras noted that before he could fully transition 
towards this model, he needed to demonstrate how it could be executed and applied 
within the Management Directorate through a proof of concept. To accomplish this, he 
described how he had the Office of the Program Assessment and Risk Management 
develop a system, referred to as the Decision Support Tool (DST), to consolidate 
department-wide program management information and metrics for all major acquisition 
programs across the Department. With minimal investment and coupled with the 
innocuous nature of the acquisition process for this system, it was implemented relatively 
seamlessly, quickly, and inexpensively and was able to successfully produce the targeted 
information. However, the quality of the information was of significant concern by many 
across the Department.  
With this strategy still taking root, in May 2012 Mr. Borras distributed an internal 
memorandum to all his Chiefs stating, “One of the top priorities during my tenure has 
been to mature the decision-making process by providing timely, reliable, and accurate 
information to enhance decision making and inform external stakeholders. The 
Management Directorate lines-of-business (LOB) have been making noteworthy progress 
in their individual areas and we must continue to ensure we have data integration, 
consistency, and consolidation across the organization and the LOBs, particularly in our 
business intelligence dashboard reporting efforts.”125 The memorandum included the 
charter to the newly established Business Intelligence Dashboard Executive Steering 
Committee, which directed each line of business to designate a senior-level representative 
to serve on the ESC. The memorandum also directed all lines of business to not only 
invest in this strategy accordingly, but to also transition all their investments onto a single 
                                                 
125 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Integrating Line of Business Dashboards Internal USM 
Charter, Washington, DC: May 2, 2012. 
 114
technology platform hosted by the DHS CIO within the Enterprise Systems Development 
Office (ESDO).126  
Figures 6 and 7 are two variations of conceptual models depicting the relationship 
and flow of information between the line of business data marts and the Management 
Cube. Both these models have been utilized in prior briefings to the Management 
Directorate’s leadership team. 




One of the earlier depictions of the relationships of systems and the flow of data as presented in the U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security, Management Directorate, Management Dashboard Update, 
Washington, DC: January 16, 2014. 
  
                                                 
126 Ibid. 
 115 
Figure 7. Later Conceptual Model for the Management Cube 
 
 
Source: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Management Directorate, 
Management Dashboard and LOB Data Mart Briefing to USM Leadership, 
Washington, DC: September 10, 2014. 
 
C. POSITIONING DATA WITHIN THE DEPARTMENT  
“Fundamentally,” Mr. Borras stated, “the roll of data is to better equip everyone at 
all levels of the organization—from the executive down to the border agent—to make 
better decisions and act as a common denominator for deliberating decision-making.” He 
went on to note that shortly after arriving at DHS as the USM he concluded, 
“Headquarters, and by extension the Secretary, had limited decision-making capabilities 
independent of what came from the Component organizations.” This point—the dynamic 
of the individual Component’s producing information versus the Department generating 
information—begged the question: Could data—once fully vetted and approved—be 
positioned as part of the decision-making process in DHS, given the recognized culture 
and organizational factors with the Components and breadth of oversight bodies? This 
question was raised with each of the interview participants. The responses varied and 
generally lacked unanimity. However, the majority did believe, as Mr. Schied noted, 
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“data should be the start of the conversation, not the end…it is the foundation for having 
a productive dialogue.” To this point, Mr. Borras responded that data should be fully 
transparent and propagated to those who need it and never be used to play “gotcha.” He 
explained that he established an expectation, despite reservations by many within the 
Management Directorate, that data would never be shielded from relevant and authorized 
Department-wide stakeholders.  
In further discussing this topic, Mr. Borras explained that his policy pertaining to 
information sharing was that prior to any discussion or decision where data was available 
to inform the conversation, the information would be distributed in advance to ensure all 
parties were privy to and able to prepare against the same information. It was important 
to him that all Departmental stakeholders were able to coordinate and collaborate on 
equal footing as it pertained to information. As such, the role of the Management Cube 
was referred to in many manners, such as “everyone reading from the same sheet of 
music” and creating a “single version of truth” for the entire Department to recognize. 
Mr. Borras referred to it as “the DHS information Bible” for information and 
performance oversight. The implication was that Management Cube would be a single 
authoritative, transparent source for the Department to utilize for collaboration and 
decision-making.  
However, just as the Bible has many versions and interpretations, there were 
interview participants who were apprehensive of the ability of the Management Cube to 
achieve this level of maturity. Mr. Schied specifically noted that for data to become 
engrained within an organization—a goal he noted he was striving towards within CBP—
it requires context, expectations, and performance indicators. Further, he noted that it 
requires leadership to demonstrate that they are using data for specific and intended 
purposes and that data needs to be framed against mission and mission drivers. Given the 
breadth of the Components and disparity of missions, it was questioned whether DHS 
could consistently and distinctly frame data in a context that applied to each Component. 
Along those lines, Mr. Schied—when discussing the need for context and 
performance indicators as a mechanism to frame data—also recognized that the type of 
performance data the Department is striving towards can be described as both 
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quantitative and non-quantitative. Quantitative data, as he explained, was more factual 
data that could be easily reasoned. He used the example of CBP’s real estate data that 
included attributes such as square footage, rent costs, employee counts, and other 
descriptive attributes about buildings, land, and structures. Mr. Schied explained how he 
could use this data to outline and present CBP mission leaders with their real estate costs 
and footprint. This provided him an opportunity to engage in a dialogue with the mission 
leaders to determine if they had the right real estate and space configurations. Along 
those lines, it also presented him an opportunity to present options to help these leaders 
understand and reduce their footprint and lower their costs; thus, allowing these costs 
savings to be reallocated for other mission objectives, such as training or filling billets. 
Mr. Schied noted that this is how quantitative data should be positioned—as the basis of a 
discussion to garner agreement on how the business can be tailored to more improve 
mission effectiveness. In other words, better business practices can have direct impact on 
enabling more resources for the mission, he explained.  
Mr. Schied’s scenario demonstrating how quantitative business data is being used 
to enhance mission is relevant. The reason it is relevant is summarized by Ms. Duke 
when she noted, “the historical cultural of ‘mission’ over ‘business’ within DHS as 
opposed to business supporting and driving mission—these have always been seen as 
mutually exclusive. They [mission leaders] failed to acknowledge that sound business 
practice, such as a good budget or acquisition process, were enablers of missions.” She 
articulated that the Department’s law enforcement and security-based missions had 
always trumped and operated in silos of “business” within DHS. The perception—which 
was even more prevalent during the Department’s early years—is that the “business” side 
of the organization (i.e. Management) was in fact more of an administrative burden that 
served to hinder the mission’s side.  
Mr. Schied’s scenario demonstrates that positioning quantifiable data as the 
foundation for a discussion to understand mission support decisions and explore options 
can result in an environment where the business functions are enabling better use and 
performance of mission resources. Mr. Schied discussed the importance of developing 
uniform and prescriptive polices and instructions and supplementing them with internal 
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controls within processes and systems as required elements for positioning quantitative 
data within the organization. Another fundamental question facing the Management 
Directorate concerns whether it can replicate this equation and position quantitative data 
within the conversation without having the immediate context and organizational 
alignment to the mission. 
Returning to Mr. Schied’s point about performance data being either quantitative 
or non-quantitative; non-quantitative data, which is prevalent and typically manifests 
itself in the form of dashboard reports (e.g., stoplight dashboard [red, yellow, green]) and 
key performance indicators, is information that cannot stand alone without some level of 
interpretation. Non-quantitative data, as Mr. Schied described it, requires a level of 
subject matter expertise, is contextual and potentially spurious, and is prone to agendas. 
This discussion led to the topic addressed by many participants regarding an 
organization’s need to develop a “culture” for institutionalizing data. In addition to all the 
other challenges surrounding the ability to adopt non-quantifiable data—uniformity, 
interpretation, agendas, lack of systems, validation and verification, and context—one of 
the key challenges is simply developing an organizational trust. Once leaders identify 
priorities and begin to measure their progress through performance oversight, non-
quantifiable data will intuitively be skewed and predisposed to bias.  
To exemplify his point, Mr. Shied presented his executive key performance 
dashboards and noted, “I am 50/50 with this data, which means while I am dubious of 
50% of the data, I actually have confidence in the other 50%. That is actually saying 
something [inferring that the data had evolved and gotten better from when he started the 
dashboards].” He then provided examples of where certain metrics within the dashboards 
were presented as green, but the underlying supporting data indicated the metrics were 
more likely yellow. These examples brought him to the topic of developing a culture of 
trust, which starts by underpinning data without it being punitive. There needs to be an 
opportunity to allow an open, honest discussion about the status of key initiatives without 
it being posited as judgmental or reflective of individual performance. Mr. Schied noted 
his desire was to create a culture where he could have frank discussions about the actual 
status of metrics, without having to invest in resources to investigate/interpret them, so 
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collectively CBP stakeholders could determine how to improve performance. As Mr. 
Schied surmised, some of the objectives and their associated challenges he was 
experiencing within a single DHS Component made it hard to fathom how the 
Management Directorate could scale and tailor them across 22 Components.  
D. DATA MUST BE PLACED IN THE SUNLIGHT 
The following section discussed the organizational and cultural factors 
influencing the ability to position data within the organizational dialogue and decision-
making processes. It recognizes that the considerations associated with this goal 
transcend implementing an accepted set of tools and systems. There were examples 
provided about the power of management information to mature and enhance the 
missions of the Department. Building upon this last section, this section will discuss 
tactics for positioning and maturing data to adapt to the organizational and cultural 
factors.  
Mr. Borras explained that a central tenant to his philosophy related to instilling a 
data-driven decision-making culture within DHS was that data must reside in a central 
system that is accessible and easy to use. To this point, Mr. Borras stated, “The best way 
to use data is to place it in the sunlight.” He went on to explain that when he first began 
to utilize data from BIaaS data marts within discussions and decisions, he received 
significant pushback from his internal advisors. Many warned him that the data he was 
referencing was unstandardized, unverified, and unreliable and that he should proceed 
with caution when utilizing it. His response, as he put it, was essentially this: Is the data 
an accurate reflection of what submitted by the program offices? Once Mr. Borras had a 
level of confidence that the data marts were synchronized to the source data, he felt he 
had no choice but to utilize the data. He explained that if he was going to get the leaders 
of the Department to focus on maturing and embracing their data, he required a forcing 
function. Using the data irrespective of his initial confidence was such forcing function, 
he said. He noted as soon as he began to position and reference the data from these tools, 
he saw the changes he had desired and anticipated—and the data got better incrementally 
over time.  
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Mr. Borras further expounded that his efforts to position data and develop and 
institute the Management Cube “was never an information technology project. We will 
enable our success through the use of technology and technology tools, but it was 
fundamentally not an IT project. And I did not waiver on this.” He went on to note that 
these efforts were primarily focused on fundamental business integration activities—such 
as aligning people, processes, policies and then systems across the Management 
Directorate—and was the reason why he required an executive representative from each 
of his core lines of businesses and had the Deputy Chief Financial Officer co-chair his 
chartered Business Intelligence Dashboards ESC. He noted that by positioning the 
business owners to lead this initiative and initially focus on business collaboration, such 
as identifying and agreeing to business terms and standards, it allowed the group’s 
concentration to set a precedence not on the technology underpinning the initiative, but 
on the business drivers. He noted that his CIO group, most notably Keith Trippie and the 
ESDO group, were business people themselves and understood the need for the 
information technology to be placed on the backburner. Because the CIO leaders had 
business backgrounds, these individuals were valuable in supporting the collaboration 
exercises and then subsequently bridging to the technology discussion when it was 
appropriate, he recognized.  
Mr. Borras—along with many of the other participants—recognized that the law 
enforcement culture within DHS would be an impediment to developing an information-
sharing environment. The target environment, as best described by Mr. Trippie, would be 
one of “share first with controls.” From the conversations, it was clear some core tenants 
were foundational to the culture surrounding the Management Cube and its objectives. 
They include: A) placing data “in the sunlight,” B) focusing on the business drivers, not 
the enabling technologies, c) refraining from playing “gotcha” with data and propagating 
a single “version of the truth” to all stakeholders for discussion purposes, and d) 
developing tools that are easy to use and available to all authorized officials. 
 121 
E. ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS NO ONE HAS ASKED 
One of the challenges that has emerged and has become apparent as the individual 
data marts and the Management Cube have been deployed and have started to evolve is 
that the workforce is not prepared to utilize these tools effectively. Ms. Marcott noted that 
one of her concerns is not just the lack of analysts using these tools, but also the lack of 
analysis being applied when using them. Mr. Myers and Ms. Marcott both discussed the 
fact that Management Directorate’s workforce became acclimated to conducting 
processes in a vacuum where data was not available and, as such, may not have the 
necessary proficiencies and skillsets to utilize these tools as they are intended. Several 
potential reasons about why these management tools were slow to be adopted and why 
there may be some perceived resistance to them were explored.  
One such reason provided by Mr. Myers pertains to the cultural precedence the 
Management Directorate’s workforce had to overcome. Almost all processes had been 
established without the availability of data. When data is required, it typically involved a 
coordinated, specific manual data call to the Components led by the Management 
Directorate. Now that certain data is readily available, there is a level of change 
management and training that must be implemented – a process which has not necessarily 
been prioritized. In other words, these tools not only require a learning curve, but also 
require a mindset change to ask questions of the data that were never previously an 
option.  
Another related topic discussed during the interviews pertains to how data will 
also increase a feeling of personal accountability and transparency. In other words, in the 
past when a question was asked, the responder would be able to provide a response that 
could not be validated or substantiated. These data marts are providing repeatable, 
consistent data that is accessible and able to be trended. It was noted that not everyone 
was comfortable with the accountability these tools are providing. These tools may also 
allow for the un-substantiation of past claims or facts, which may also be creating a level 
of resistance to adopting these tools. This observation speaks to the previous points raised 
by many of the participants about developing a culture of trust and non-punitive 
discourse in tandem with deploying these tools.  
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Another issue that was raised involves the fact that the Management Directorate’s 
personnel have been slow to embrace both the data and the systems themselves. In other 
words, personnel are not taking the time to learn how to use these systems, despite the 
fact they were selected and implemented with a focus on user-friendliness. Reasons 
provided for this—in addition to the apprehension surrounding the data itself—is that the 
Management workforce is senior in ranks and is constantly balancing numerous 
priorities. Combined with not having information tools to underpin their legacy 
processes, the demands on the workforce and their collective seniority was viewed as an 
impediment that needed to be actively managed to increase user adoption. Identifying 
and/or hiring more junior-level personnel from generations that were more comfortable 
with IT and systems was a proposal that was raised by multiple participants. As it 
pertained to the Management Cube, Ms. Marcott discussed how there would need to be 
an initial level of user adoption of the individual line-of-business data marts prior to the 
user adoption of Management Cube. This is due to the personnel having more familiarity 
and understanding of LOB data contained in their office’s data mart, as opposed to the 
Management Cube where the data reflected and transcended all lines of business. In other 
words, if there were challenges of user adoption at the line of business/data mart level, 
the lead-time for the adoption of the Management Cube would be longer based on the 
logic that there was less familiarity with the data at this consolidated level.  
The user adoption issue corresponds with another factor, which involves the lack 
of “analysts” to utilize the data. Since the Management Directorate was established in an 
environment with limited data, the workforce did not necessarily require analysts because 
there was little information to analyze. Now that significant strides have been made 
towards gathering data, multiple research participants expressed a level of frustration 
with the fact that the data was not being used to conduct analysis. Many of the 
participants noted that it seems that the data, when used, was being used in a very factual 
manner to answer tactical questions and generate requested reports, but that few were 
actually conducting analysis. In discussing this topic, Ms. Marcott stated she was, 
“looking to answer questions that had not yet been asked or in other words looking for 
core patterns or themes to be identified in the data.” Along these same lines, there was 
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recognition that the Management Directorate may need to augment its workforce with 
training and/or hiring actions to develop competencies that can, as Mr. Trippie noted, 
“unleash the analysts and truly position the service it to be a readily available tool in the 
Department’s decision making toolbox.” The implication being that this investment in 
data marts and the Management Cube, if not complemented by Change Management, 
could “easily be an expensive tool that very few ever took out of the toolbox and used,” 
Mr. Trippie said.  
F. FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS 
The Department is modernizing its transactional management information 
systems via a decentralized model. The predominant management functions, such as 
financial management, procurement, and asset management, are intended for 
modernization via the federal financial shared service providers, although this model is 
still in its infancy. Irrespectively, there will be multiple systems and/or service providers 
per business function for the indefinite future. Thus, there needs to be strategy to 
centralize, consolidate and integrate management data from each business function, 
irrespective of where the corresponding transactional systems reside. In response to this 
model and at the direction of the USM, the individual lines of business pursued the 
implementation of distinct data marts. This approach has demonstrated varying degrees 
of success for the individual lines of business. Based on the success of these individual 
data marts, the USM has pursued and funded the Management Cube as a consolidation 
and integration layer for each of the data marts. The Management Cube is intended to be 
the single version of truth for management information within the Department.  
This flow of management information from these three levels is depicted and 









This strategy is organizationally more suitable for the Management Directorate 
because it demonstrates alignment with its authorities and its mission pertaining to 
conducting oversight and performing assessments. Prior strategies lacked this alignment. 
It also adheres with the Management Directorate’s decision not to pursue standard 
operating procedures or a command-and-control operations model. This strategy allows 
each line of business to define standards in the form of a data dictionary, business rules, 
and reporting periodicity and allows each Component to determine how to adopt their 
systems and processes to these standards. By investing in data quality, verification, and 
trending processes within the data marts, the lines of business can assess how each 
Component’s data is adhering to these standards and how the data is improving and 
adhering over time.  
Despite this model being more suitable for the Department, the Management 
Directorate is experiencing challenges with its execution. Some of the challenges stem 
from the fact that this strategy is not centrally funded and there is not an overarching 
methodology used for implementing it consistently across each Management 
Directorate’s line of business. In other words, each line of business prioritized and funded 
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their data mart at varying levels, which means there is disparity in the maturity and 
veracity of data. Also, the lack of an overarching methodology means that there is not 
one consistent model for maturing and extending the data marts. These two issues 
combined means that even though the data marts are centralized on the same BIaaS 
platform and can be easily integrated, the maturation and enhancements of the data marts 
are dependent to the prioritization and influence of the individual lines of business. 
Therefore, as the Management Cube is designed and developed, it will be limited to the 
constraints of these data marts, the data housed within them, and the ability to influence 
the lines of business to expand and mature them.  
Another challenge is that while it is relatively technically straightforward to 
consolidate the incongruent data sets from each data mart into a single data warehouse, it 
is much more complex and requires specific functional subject matter expertise to 
contextually integrate the data. This means that pulling data from each data mart into the 
Cube is a technical exercise that is relatively innocuous. However, the horizontal 
integration of data across the individual data marts and the ability to drive top-down 
standards for information that either A) spans more than one line of business or, B) does 
not directly align to anyone single one line of business but is still required at the 
Management Directorate level, and requires cross-functional business expertise and a 
level of governance that may not be conducive with the confederate model to which the 
data marts were established. There were multiple examples of these types of scenarios 
discussed over the course of the interviews. 
There are other core philosophical questions the Management Directorate needs to 
address to determine what the Cube’s value proposition is and where it should focus its 
resources. Is the Cube primarily a visualization and analytical tool focused on supporting 
front-end users and analysis or if it is a management integration tool focused on 
horizontally integrating the Management Directorate’s lines of business data? Who is the 
Cube’s primary target user base—meaning is it trying to serve a wide swath of analysts 
for answering numerous immediate questions or is it looking to be more of a strategic/
executive-level analytical tool? The answers to these types of questions will have 
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significant impacts on the evolution of the Management Cube, how the workforce will be 
positioned to utilize it, and its ultimate value proposition for the Department. 
Despite these challenges, progress is being made and information is being 
collected within the line of business data marts and then into Management Cube in a 
manner that was never previously possible. Because of this progress, the Management 
Directorate is gradually beginning to position data within its governance and decision-
making processes. In positioning this data, the issue of the information’s quality and 
accuracy is of justifiable concern. There was general consensus that for information to be 
positioned into the decision-making process there must be some consistent governance 
and rules of behavior established. Ultimately, though, there was recognition that there 
must be commitment to positioning data for decision-making, irrespective of the initial 
concerns with quality. This commitment is needed to ensure that there is subsequent 
investment across the Components in maturing their processes as aligned to the data and 
to ultimately increase the veracity of the data. Without this commitment, there will not be 
a consistent, comprehensive focus towards increasing the data’s quality. Notwithstanding, 
this process needs to be done in a collaborative and transparent manner so that all 
Components are clear of the expectations and governance surrounding the data and its 
related governance.  
The decision to drive these business tools towards “share first with controls” data 
governance is a transformative and delicate one. Essentially, what this decision means is 
that as opposed to each Component’s authorized users being relegated to viewing solely 
their own Component’s data (but not Department-wide data) within these tools, they 
would be able to view all Components’ data. Because of the Department’s law 
enforcement and security missions, DHS has always operated under a “need-to-know” 
posture in that information was held tightly and shared solely with those who had 
demonstrated a valid “need to know.” Shifting to “share first with controls” posture for 
management information allows anyone who has been approved for access to these 
systems to have comprehensive admittance to the data. This approach places the burden 
on the Management Directorate to ensure the appropriate security controls are in place 
and that there is a rigorous screening and audit process to those who have access to the 
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data. These tools house management information that when aggregated could be of risk to 
the Department, if improperly accessed. However, given the organization dynamics pitted 
against the Management Directorate towards driving management integration, it appears 
sensible for the Management Directorate to accept and mitigate this risk through 
investing in governance and security controls. The shifting from a “need-to-know” to a 
“share first with controls” is currently ongoing and has not yet been comprehensively 
adopted by all lines of business, but there appears to be significant momentum in support 
of it. That being the case, it may be only a matter of time until this governance model is 
adopted and formalized.  
In conclusion, the use of data warehousing and business intelligence tools 
combined with USM-sponsored oversight and governance is providing a foundation to 
integrate the Department’s management functions in a coherent and transparent method. 
While there are some obstacles in developing and maturing the tools in a uniform and 
consistent manner, these obstacles can be overcome with sound management practices. 
Despite these obstacles, this strategy appears to be the one best suited against the 
organization and cultural dynamics inherent in the Department. This model positions the 
Management Directorate to operate within its authorities by establishing data and systems 
policies and standards, while allowing the Components to maintain control over their 
systems and processes in alignment and adherence to the policies and standards. Further, 
the combination of these tools with the focus on shifting the data governance from a 
“need-to-know” to “share first with controls” is instituting transparency and visibility 
across the historical Component silos, which has the potential to mature and integrate the 
management functions in line with the “Unity of Effort” and “One DHS” goals.  
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VII. FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter will be used to apply the data and analysis from the previous 
chapters and determine what it means. It will then present recommendations that the 
Department should consider based on this research. These findings and conclusions will 
be organized around the areas of “Organization and Structure,” “Policy and Process,” and 
“Technologies.” These areas correlate to three of the four corners of Leavitt’s Diamond, 
depicted in Figure 9, which was the analytical framework selected for this thesis at the 
onset of this research. The research from the literature review and the interviews was 
conducted with the understanding that change cannot happen in a vacuum. Therefore, to 
influence meaningful change, the Management Directorate’s initiatives need to obtain 
balance across these dimensions. Background information on Leavitt’s Diamond can be 
found in Chapter II under the section titled “Analytical Change Framework: Leavitt’s 
Diamond.” 
Figure 9. Leavitt’s Diamond Adaptation 
 
 
There are numerous adaptations of Leavitt’s Diamond found in 
literature. This adaptation stems from the model found in Strategic 
Knowledge Management in Multinational Organizations by Kevin 
O’Sullivan (Hershey, PA: IGI Global, 2007), 64. 
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The “People” dimension was the only corner of Leavitt’s Diamond that was not 
represented in the data because this dimension pertains to incentives/rewards systems 
designed to drive change, which was not within the scope of this research.  
This chapter will also address the original research questions identified at the 
onset of this research project, which included: 
 Primary Question: 
What are the likely impediments associated with the goal of collecting and 
managing enterprise-wide management data and from where do these 
impediments originate?  
 Secondary Question:  
How do these impediments relate to the primary technology strategies the USM 
is currently using in an attempt to meet this goal?  
A. APPLYING DATA TO LEAVITT’S DIAMOND DIMENSIONS 
This section applies research data and categorizes core themes into one of the 
three dimensions of Leavitt’s Diamond. In this context, the framework applies to the 
Management Directorate’s ability to drive change pertaining to data-driven decision-
making and the IT systems-related initiatives required to implement this objective. When 
applying the data to a dimension, the themes will be categorized as either an 
“Impediment” or “Facilitator.” Impediments are factors that obstruct the ability of the 
Management Directorate in achieving its goals of data-driven decision-making. 
Facilitators are factors or initiatives that the Management Directorate has employed to 






Acquisition and competition regulations resulting in repeated protests that 
undermine technology strategies. 
Changes to federal guidelines, predominantly made by OMB, that lack 
clarity and enforcement, and impact initiatives already in process. 
Size and complexity of technology projects, which increase costs, risks, 
number of stakeholders, and oversight. 
Pattern of failures when attempting to modernize systems in a centralized, 
enterprise-wide manner. 
Facilitators 
Investment in enterprise architecture that has established mission and 
business segment architectures—demonstrates a repeatable, proven 
methodology. 
Investment in a data consolidation strategy as means to conduct oversight 
and perform assessment, and requiring this investment be developed on a 
centralized DHS platform. 
Formalized governance to mature and integrate data warehousing and 
business intelligence solutions (albeit without dedicated funding source to 
reinforce governance). 
Adoption of FSSP model to allow Components to independently 
modernize systems within boundaries of existing federal providers. 
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Demands associated with NCR operations detract from primary core 
strategic missions. 
Legacy cultural and environmental dynamics associated with individual 
Components. 
Volume of Congressional and third-party oversight engaging at both 
Component-level and Department levels. 
Role of political cycles on leadership attrition and its impact on priorities 
and Component engagement. 
Reactive, event-driven nature of DHS results in too many priorities and 
focus on “urgent, but not importance activities.” Management Directorate 
is not organized effectively to counteract the event-driven nature of DHS.  
Facilitators 
Evolving focus on oversight and assessment missions as a core capability 
that aligns with existing authorities. 
Generational attrition within Components resulting in a workforce less 
tied to legacy cultures and less resistant to Management Directorate 
engagement. 
Consensus-driven governance model provides forum for dialogue and 
partnerships. 
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Lack of command-and-control environment as a means to institute change. 
Inability to enforce existing authorities and lack of institutional 
governance. 
Challenges with formalizing prescriptive policies and instructions.  
Inability to adopt standardized operating procedures. 
Historical lack of cross-LOB integration in organizational structure and 
structure resulting in silos, inconsistent priorities, and non-interoperable 
data.  
Facilitators 
Developing standardized training curriculum for all newly hired DHS 
personnel. 
Adopting industry and federal standards for policy and instruction.  
Utilizing OIG and GAO audits to influence change and enhance inter-
departmental relationships.  
Centralizing, standardizing, and repurposing regulatory, statutory, and 
legislative reporting requirements for oversight/assessment purposes.  
Demonstrable progress and maturation at LOB-level with Component 
stakeholders to mature oversight/assessment capabilities. 
Adopting “share first” governance for transparency, removal of 




B. APPLYING THE ANALYSIS TO THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
In the article “The Effects of Organizational Culture and Environmental Pressures 
on IT Project Performance: A Moderation Perspective,” Schein defines organizational 
culture as “a pattern of basic assumptions that are invented, discovered, or developed by a 
given group as it learns to cope with problems of external adaptation and internal 
integration.”127 Schein went on to provide interrelated findings that lead him to theorize 
that organizational culture has a direct impact on IT project performance.128   
The results of this research demonstrate that the Management Directorate’s 
technology strategy pertaining to the acquisition and implementation of a single 
centralized ERP system was not in alignment with its authorities and mission. An ERP 
system is predicated on the adoption of a singular set of management processes and a 
distinct set of business rules. Since the Management Directorate decided not to pursue 
standardized operating procedures and has not adopted a “command-and-control” model, 
it does not have the ability to influence these conditions, which are necessary for an ERP 
to be successful implemented. Therefore, the pursuit of a centralized ERP system as a 
systems modernization strategy resulted in the misalignment of the “Policy and Process” 
and “Technology” dimensions of Leavitt’s Diamond.   
Conversely, the parallel strategies associated with the decentralized systems 
modernization model with the data consolidation and integration model, via the data 
warehousing and business intelligence tools, appears to appropriately align the 
“Technology” and “Organization” dimensions. This is because the decentralized systems 
modernization model allows the individual DHS Components to evaluate and select 
solutions, though primarily based on the OMB FSSP governance, that best align with 
their distinct requirements. However, the Management Directorate is still able to 
influence aspects of these solution’s core configurations, such as the Core Accounting 
Structure and Accounting Classification Structure, as a means to drive data normalization 
                                                 
127 Vicky Ching Gu, James J. Hoffman, Qing Cao, and Marc J. Schniederjans. “The Effects of 
Organizational Culture and Environmental Pressures on IT Project Performance: A Moderation 
Perspective,” International Journal of Project Management 32, no. 7 (October 2014):1170-1181. 
128 Ibid. 
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and uniformity across the disparate solutions. Along those lines, this approach of using 
standards to drive towards data normalization and uniformity establishes effective 
alignment between the “Policy and Process” dimension with “Organization” dimension.  
Meanwhile, recognizing that a single centralized solution was not going to 
materialize, many of the Management Directorate’s LOBs implemented individual data 
marts as a means to consolidate and analyze data for the purposes of performing 
oversight and assessment of their respective business functions. These data marts were 
initially established on data dictionaries primarily founded against the Department’s 
legislative, statutory, and regulatory reporting requirements. The Management 
Directorate has experienced challenges instituting data standards that were not grounded 
against these forms of higher-level, third-party requirements. However, as policy and 
instruction have evolved and adopted the use of industry and government standards, 
progress has been recognized. The progress has materialized in the form of more 
prescriptive policies and instruction based on these standards, which are also being 
translated into data dictionaries and business rules with the LOB data marts.  
The Management Directorate is identifying and instituting data standards and 
business rules into policy and instruction, but is recognizing progress through allowing 
the Components to determine the best manner for adopting and tailoring the standards 
into their distinct processes and systems. This approach is consistent with the 
Management Directorate’s authorities to conduct oversight and perform assessments and 
this dual-pronged strategy—decentralized systems modernization in parallel to 
implementing LOB data marts for data consolidation purposes—has effectively aligned 
the “Organization and Structure,” “Technology,” and “Policy and Processes” dimensions.  
This dual-pronged technology strategy will be more time consuming, resource 
intensive, and ultimately more expensive. However, when combined with the acquisition 
and competition regulations, which have continued to plague the Department in the form 
of repeated protests and a trend of failed centralized system modernization attempts, this 
model appears to be the most viable for accomplishing the targeted objectives. It is viable 
because the other options pursued are misaligned across the change dimensions, while 
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this dual-pronged strategy demonstrates the most consistent alignment across the 
framework’s dimensions.  
Coupling this strategy with the adoption of a “share first with controls” 
governance model will help transform the Department to drive towards its “Unity of 
Effort” goals. The historical “need-to-know” posture of the Department has allowed the 
DHS Components to continue to operate in silos and places the burden on the 
Management Directorate to independently drive integration. Adopting a “share-first” 
governance will inherently break down these silos to centrally position information where 
authorized analysts from all facets of the Department will be able to conduct assessments 
in a streamlined and holistic manner using tools that are instituted with Management 
Directorate-driven data standards. As it relates to the framework, the “share-first” 
governance does not necessarily align the dimensions as much as it transcends the 
dimensions as an overall change enabler for each.  
C. RECOMMENDATIONS 
One of the recommendations made by the 9/11 Commission Report in 2003 was 
to reduce Congressional oversight of DHS and its Components. At the time of its 
publication there were 88 Congressional oversight bodies involved with DHS. Ten years 
later, it was found that oversight of DHS had increased to 102 Congressional bodies. This 
anecdote reinforces the position that DHS is a highly political, complex organization 
where change—even change spearheaded by those at the highest-levels of government—
faces immeasurable obstacles. Likewise, the Management Directorate is also a complex, 
political organization facing similar internal and external impediments to change.  
This thesis attempted to study one long-standing objective. But as this research 
revealed, there are numerous shifting demands and objectives that the Management 
Directorate is continually attempting to balance. Further, the ability to drive change in the 
homeland security environment involves numerous factors spanning political, legal, 
economic, and interpersonal complexities. The following recommendations attempt to 
recognize these complexities and submit proposals that reflect these constraints. These 
proposals are not dramatic changes. However, these proposals are grounded on the 
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aforementioned institutional impediments and facilitators and, as such, strive to present 
viable solutions.   
Additionally, the event-driven nature of the Department can impact its priorities at 
any given moment. Accordingly these recommendations build off the specific research 
conducted in this thesis. 
1. Maturation of Data Consolidation Strategy  
The Management Directorate’s data consolidation strategy executed via the data 
warehousing and business intelligence model was determined to be the most consistent 
alignment across the change dimensions. As the maturation of this strategy is influenced 
by activities spanning each of the three change dimensions, maintaining consistency in 
the alignment of policy and process, technology, and organizational authority is critical. 
Furthermore, for this strategy to continue to be viable, it must parallel the ongoing 
systems modernization initiatives.  
To successfully parallel these decentralized modernization initiatives, a two-
pronged approach should be incorporated. First, as the future-state systems are designed 
and deployed across the Components, the Management Directorate should institute 
governance and controls to ensure consistent configuration and adoption of their core 
data standards and business rules. This approach will ensure enterprise-wide data 
interoperability and consistency of the future-state systems and that the data can be 
seamlessly consolidated moving forward. Second, it should ensure adequate funds are 
provided to recalibrate the data marts to collect information from the future-state systems. 
These data marts were framed by the limitations of the legacy management systems and 
once the future-state systems are implemented, the data marts should be able to collect a 
broader, more consistent set of data elements. There will be costs associated with the 
recalibration of the data marts, which should be anticipated. The costs to recalibrate the 
data marts have a direct correlation to the number of future-state solutions that emerge.  
Along these same lines, if the data consolidation model is to be sustained, 
matured, and integrated, a few design principles should be adopted. The first such 
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principle is an overarching design methodology that provides for the consistent extension 
of the data marts by the LOBs. The second principle is a dedicated funding level. 
Because the data consolidation model was instituted, prioritized, and funded in a 
decentralized manner across each LOB, the various data marts are at different levels of 
maturity and functionality. This is an impediment for positioning these data marts to align 
to the overarching Management Directorate-level requirements.  
Another mechanism that should be considered in the maturation of this strategy is 
investing in cross-LOB policy integration and de-confliction. While the Management 
Directorate’s data integration approach to the individual LOB data marts via the 
Management Cube is demonstrating success towards consolidating data, it is not truly 
integrating the data. The inability to integrate the data is not a technology challenge, but 
is instead a policy one. The LOBs have matured their policy and data consolidation 
initiatives in isolation to their specific business functions, which have resulted in 
functional silos. Therefore, the information within these data marts reflects these silos. To 
overcome the insulated nature of the data marts, a top-down cross-LOB management 
approach is required to integrate policy, business rules, and data standards. Without this 
overarching policy integration approach, the Management Cube will struggle to 
successfully integrate cross-LOB data. This approach needs to be coupled with 
appropriate governance authorities and dedicated funding to ensure its recommendations 
can be implemented within the individual LOBs.  
The relationship of establishing cross-LOB data standards to the data 
consolidation strategy is depicted in Figure 10. 
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This model is a depiction of the relationship between policy oversight (on the left) over the 
transactional systems and their configurations and the associated impact on the flow of data into 
the LOB data marts from these systems.   
 
This model demonstrates that while there has been progress with instituting data 
standards from policy to the individual LOBs, there has not been a cross-Management 
Directorate approach towards identifying and standardizing data elements that are shared 
by more than one LOB. Because these shared elements must be ultimately embedded in 
the future-state transactional solutions’ configuration, if they are to ultimately flow back 
and be captured in the Management Cube, this gap has significant ramifications. The 
Management Directorate should invest in governance and cross-policy integration to 
establish these standards and ensure they are consistently adopted by each of the LOBs. 
Failure to do so will impede the Management Cube from capturing data in a uniform and 
consistent manner from each of the LOBs.  
Furthermore, the Management Directorate should ensure that it has consistent and 
effective influence and oversight over the core configurations of the future-state 
management systems. This influence, which could be instituted through the formalization 
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of segment architectures for each business function, is necessary to ensure that the data 
required for oversight and assessment purposes—and ultimately needed in the 
Management Cube—is adopted consistently within the Component’s transactional 
systems. Without this influence, the Management Directorate will face substantial 
challenges in getting the targeted data consolidated. The longer the delay in establishing 
this influence, the more costly and time-consuming it will be to influence the future-state 
transactional systems. This is due to the fact that IT systems are more difficult and 
expensive to reverse engineer after they have been deployed. Therefore, the Management 
Directorate needs to ensure the core configurations required under policy are embedded 
into these future-state systems while they are still in the process of being designed.   
2. Recommendations for Future Research  
This section will be used to identify concepts that presented themselves in the 
data, but were tangential to the research questions. Further research is suggested to 
follow-up on these concepts to determine if there are other efficiencies or controls the 
Management Directorate should pursue. 
a. Consolidation NCR Operational Support Activities 
The demands of managing the operations of the National Capital Region, referred 
to “as the tyranny of the present” by one research participant, are a significant distraction 
of and drain on the Management Directorate and its personnel. Interestingly, DHS 
attempted to emulate the DOD’s and HHS’s UFMS model, but did not appear to 
seriously pursue these organizations’ operations service support model. Both DOD and 
HHS have centralized service centers for all operational support activities in the NCR. 
The current operational support activities are fragmented across all the Management 
Directorate’s LOBs. More research should be conducted to determine if centralizing these 
activities, similarly to how DOD and HHS have done, is recommended.  
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b. Internal Shared Service Systems  
Certain Components have made significant investments in maturing transactional 
systems dedicated to meeting their specific management requirements (outside of 
financial management), such as grants management and facilities management. But these 
systems are being deployed in isolation by individual Components, despite the fact that 
multiple Components share the same requirements and are pursuing comparable, if not 
identical, systems. For example, CBP has acquired and enhanced a COTS-based facilities 
management system and FEMA has done the same for their grants management solution. 
CBP and USCG are both independently pursuing aviation management systems.  
Along those lines, the concept of establishing voluntary-based internal shared 
service systems—or potentially a center of excellence model—for these specific 
functional business domains should be considered. Further research is needed to 
determine how investments made by individual Components to acquire and modernize 
specific management systems can be extended and leveraged by other Components who 
share the same requirements. Such research should explore the concept of internal shared 
services from multiple angles, including oversight, governance, acquisition rules, 
configuration change management, and cost-sharing methodologies.   
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APPENDIX: INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 
Listed below are the questions that were provided in advance of and at the 
interviews with each of the research participants.  
 
Knowledge of Technology Strategies used to capture and integrate data: 
• Did DHS HQ have the ability to collect data to inform strategic 
department-wide business decisions?  
• If so, what was the primary mechanism or process used to collect data as a 
means to make decisions across the MGMT Directive?  
• What were the identified strengths and weaknesses of this mechanism / 
processes?  
• How did you influence or participate in developing the MGMT 
information integration strategy? 
• What types of strategic decisions were targeted? 
• Did DHS MGMT have the ability to influence and/or have the appropriate 
authorities to drive new strategies – and their associated changes - across 
the DHS enterprise during your tenure? 
• Did DHS HQ have known challenges with leading and driving technology 
strategies on the behalf of the Components? Conversely, did the 
Components communicate their concerns with DHS HQ playing this role?  
• What technology strategy was being pursued to drive management 
integration and data-driven decision-making? 
• How did this technology strategy align with the people, processes, 
policies, and organizational considerations within DHS?  
• Was this the right technology strategy to accomplish this goal for the 
Department? Why or why not? 
• What lessons learned and recommendations were documented for 
application to future strategies targeted at this goal? 
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Knowledge of Systems Modernization Strategies: 
• Did DHS HQ have known challenges with leading and driving technology 
strategies on the behalf of the Components as it pertains to transactional-
based business systems? Conversely, did the Components communicate 
their concerns with DHS HQ playing this role?  
• The modernization of enterprise business systems (i.e. ERPs like eMerge2, 
TASC, etc.) for financial management, procurement, and asset 
management has been a key focus of DHS for more than a decade.  
• What were known challenges that impeded the success of these efforts? 
• Does DHS MGMT have influence to drive and manage change as part of 
its systems modernization strategy?  
• Does HQ have the ability to standardize processes across multiple 
Components? 
• How do the legacy cultures, processes, and systems influence the ability to 
driven enterprise-wide change? How do these factors influence these 
technology initiatives?  
 
Knowledge of Data Consolidation Strategy 
• In lieu of standardized systems, DHS HQ has pursued the use of data 
warehousing and business analytics as a mechanism to collect and 
consolidate data. Are you aware of this strategy? 
• What are the challenges and impediments associated with this strategy? 
• Is this strategy able to capture data to information decision-make?  
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